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 i 
ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis has focused on debate surrounding the commitment of the Arab 
Spring’s neo-Islamists to democracy and pluralism.  It examines neo-Islamism as a 
tendency that emerged within the mainstream Muslim Brotherhood movement and its 
pro-democracy affiliates in the Muslim World that uses politically liberal sets of 
concepts, for tactical or strategic purposes.  
Neo-Islamism is distinguished by an ethical and theological emphasis on Islam 
that combines social conservatism with political moderation. Neo-Islamists are united in 
the view that Sharia law is not an immediate reform priority. However there are divisions 
over whether this is a tactical pause in the ultimate pursuit of shariatisation, whether it 
should be diluted if introduced at some future point, or whether it should never be 
introduced.  
This study has brought to light six preferences of neo-Islamism as a socio-political 
phenomenon: gradualist Islamisation, modernisation, moderation, nationalistic Islamism, 
and pragmatism in Western relationships.  It has been shown, through the case study of 
Tunisian Ennahda Party, that neo-Islamism employs tactical measures such as gradualism 
and pragmatic relations with the secularist elite and the West, and implements ideological 
reforms related closely to the concepts of democracy, civic participation and peaceful 
transitioning of power.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The Arab Spring (Arabic: يبرعلا عيبرلا ) describes the wave of violent and non-
violent revolutions in the Middle East, that started in Tunisia on 18 December 2010.1 To 
date, rulers have been forced from power in Tunisia, Egypt (four 
times), Libya and Yemen. Civil uprisings have erupted in Bahrain, and a civil war 
commenced and is ongoing in Syria. Major protests have broken out in Algeria, Iraq, 
Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco and Sudan; minor protests have occurred 
in Mauritania, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Djibouti and Western Sahara.   
The Arab world stretches geographically from the Atlantic Ocean on the western 
shores of Mauritania in North Africa to the Iranian borders of Iraq, and from the southern 
borders of Turkey to the Horn of Africa.  Arabic is the dominant language in twenty-one 
countries, with dialects across the region.  Despite the fact that the inhabitants of the Arab 
world are homogeneous neither religiously nor ethnically, there is a common Arab 
identity that has been forged by historical experience and reinforced for many generations 
by the school systems of each country.  There are also pop culture products like Egyptian 
soap operas and movies that Arabs throughout the region, and throughout the world, 
                                                          
1 The term 'Arab Spring' was derived from the European Revolutions of 1848, known as 'The Spring of 
Nations' and 'Springtime of the Peoples' (Dabashi 2012, XV).   
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share.  This is why the adage “Egyptians write books, Lebanese publish them, and the 
Iraqis read them” rings true (Gelvin 2012, 1-3). 
Prior to the Arab Spring, the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region has 
suffered from severe lack of freedom and democracy almost throughout the entire Arab 
world.  Most Arab countries, specifically those with close ties to the West, such as Egypt, 
Jordan, Tunisia, Morocco and the sheikdoms of the Persian Gulf (chiefly Saudi Arabia) 
“have continued to defy persistent calls for democratisation and accountability. Precisely 
such a historical trajectory has engendered opposition movements, which have been 
overwhelmingly articulated by religious (Islamist) political groups, and which have 
espoused equally undemocratic, exclusive, and often violent measures” (Bayat 2010, 27). 
The Arab Spring can be compared to the 1989 revolutions that struck Eastern 
Europe in that both caught regional experts completely off guard, as protest and crisis 
spread across regimes that almost all observers had seen as exceptionally stable (Way 
2011, 17-27).  Over two decades before, Mikhail Gorbachev’s Perestroika (literally, 
'restructuring') in the former Soviet Union and the fall of communism in Poland inspired 
the masses to take to the streets and demand change in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Eastern 
Germany, Bulgaria, and finally Romania.  These events showed how a “mere sight of 
change in one country can have an explosive impact on seemingly stable autocracies 
nearby” or on the borders, and vice versa (Way 2011, 17). However, the outcomes of the 
Arab Spring have surely not been the same thus far. In Eastern Europe, the whole 
communist bloc collapsed within a short time span (Vasiliev 2011). 
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After ten years of the war on terror, the Arab revolutions that began in Tunisia2 
have reshaped the region forever and led to the re-examination of traditional concepts 
about the political stagnation of the Middle East (Brumber and Diamond 2003). These 
revolutions have been a surprise for scholars and policy makers alike, and challenged a 
number of widely held assumptions about state-society relations in the Arab world 
(Cavatorta 2012a). More specifically, the English-speaking academic literature on Arab 
politics and society of the last three decades tended to neglect the case of Tunisia. Despite 
some notable exceptions, including Christopher Alexander, Francois Burgat and very few 
others, Tunisia never featured prominently either as a single case study or in comparative 
works. The fall of the Ben Ali regime seemed to change that and both the policy-making 
community and academia focused extensively on Tunisia (Merone & Cavatorta 2013, 2).  
The most obvious facet of the Arab revolutions is the rise of Islamic movements, 
not on the streets, but from organised political parties seeking to rule countries that have 
been freed from authoritarian regimes. Many of the Islamists involved in these political 
parties had been imprisoned as terror suspects or forced underground. Some scholars 
argue that while Islamists did not trigger the Arab Spring, they are coming to power on 
the back of it (Cavatorta 2012a; Bradley 2012; Hall 2012). Claims about the role and 
agendas of the Arab Islamists in the origins of these revolutions have reignited the long 
standing debate about Islamism and its commitment to democracy, pluralism and 
individual freedoms (Berman 2013; Jones 2013; Garcia 2012; Etzioni 2011; Ergun 2012; 
Hashemi 2009; Hefner 2011; Noueihed and Warren 2012; Bryant 2011). 
                                                          
2 Tunisia is a North African Arab country, sandwiched between resource rich neighbours Algeria and 
Libya. Under Ben Ali's autocratic rule from 1987 until 2011, Tunisia had been stubbornly isolationist and 
stayed out of the region’s turbulent politics (Bradley 2012). 
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Framing thesis topic 
This thesis examines neo-Islamism as a tendency that emerged within the 
mainstream Muslim Brotherhood movement and its pro-democracy affiliates in the 
Muslim World that uses liberal sets of concepts for tactical or strategic purposes.  
It scrutinises why such a trend has emerged in Tunisia and the factors that shape 
its prospects after the Arab Spring. It starts from the observation that the sudden 
successes of Islamists in politics in Tunisia, Morocco, Egypt, and Libya and elsewhere in 
2011 and 2012, have surprised many, both locally and internationally. Analysts have 
found it difficult to explain how apparently spontaneous revolutions, which arose in 
response to authoritarian rule, economic crisis and unemployment, could bring Islamic 
movements into powerful positions (Council on Foreign Relations 2012; Bülent and 
Akarçesme 2012; Schraeder 2012; Turner 2012; Khalil 2012; Hilal 2012). 
Furthermore, this thesis questions whether neo-Islamism will continue to be a 
major factor in the region after the Arab Revolutions, as many have projected.  The main 
case study will involve the Tunisian Ennahda Party.   
Whether Tunisian-style neo-Islamism can continue to be influential in Tunisia and 
the broader Arab and Muslim world depends upon the answers to the following 
questions: 
 What is neo-Islamism and how has it emerged in Tunisia and other Arab 
countries? 
 What are the sources of opposition to the rise of neo-Islamism? 
 What has been the role of neo-Islamism in the Arab Spring? 
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 What is the link between neo-Islamism and democracy and how is this 
reflected in the Tunisian case? 
 What does neo-Islamism political parties do when they rule? 
 
The main focus of the thesis is the nature, preconditions and implications of neo-
Islamism’s rise in the Arab world in general and in Tunisia in particular, as a case study.  
Neo-Islamism paradigm 
This study sheds light on the current players within the Muslim Brotherhood 
(MB) movement in Egypt, Tunisia and elsewhere, and draws conclusions as to whether 
the MB is in actuality evolving into an effective political force, willing to govern with a 
democracy and a moderate version of Islam, and promote a free civil society.   
The thesis discusses change and continuity in neo-Islamist political stances, in the 
context of regional and international geopolitics and socio-economic changes and 
challenges. (Khalifa 2012; Chamkhi 2014) 
By examining the party's political and philosophical motivations through data 
represented in the Ennahda Party leaders’ interviews, poll figures and survey methods, 
the phenomena of neo-Islamism can be studied. 
Although Islamists did not trigger the popular uprisings associated with the Arab 
Spring, “their decades-long resistance to autocratic rulers turned them into shadow 
governments in the peoples’ eyes. A vote for the Islamists implied a clean break with the 
failed past and a belief (to be tested) that they could deliver the goods-jobs, economic 
stability, transparency, and inclusiveness” (Gerges 2013, 390). 
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Post-Arab Spring elections produced mixed results for the Islamists across the 
Arab World. The 2012 victory of the Egyptian MB presidential candidate represented an 
instance, but not lasting, of revolutionary change; Islamists with Muslim Brotherhood 
roots were in power in at least three Arab countries. The MB dominated freely elected 
parliaments in Tunisia, Egypt and Morocco within a year after the start of the Arab 
Spring.  Moreover, there were Islamist dominated governments under prime ministers in 
Tunisia and Morocco, while Egypt elected a Muslim Brotherhood president.3  However, 
MB’s success in Egypt was short lived and by 4 July 2013 the Egyptian president 
Mohammed Morsi was ousted.  The instigators of the military coup justified their actions 
by citing dangers to ‘national unity', growing liberal and nationalist popular unrest, and 
dissatisfaction with Morsi's performance in office.  Following this, Egypt's hopes of 
democratisation and free society have been replaced by a reality that is considered by 
many observers to be worse than Mubarek's era4 (McDowel 2013).   
Tunisian liberals and anti-government allies have also rebelled, organising their 
own ‘tamaroud'5 movement to change the freely elected government and to dissolve the 
Constituent Assembly.  A few months later, the Tunisian Islamist-led government would 
survive both domestic and regional political unrest. (Fadel 2013; Elshinnawi 2013; 
Chamkhi 2014) 
                                                          
3 In contrast, Libya produced its first elected parliament in more than four decades, dominated by 
secularists rather than Islamists, due to complex reasons relating to tribal affiliations. 
4 Daragh McDowell wrote on 18th August 2013: “A cycle of brutality has been set in motion that all but 
assures any stable government in Egypt's future will be built on a foundation of corpses. No side is 
completely without fault, but the overwhelming share of the blame for Egypt's descent into a pre-civil war 
situation lies with the armed forces and the National Salvation Front (NSF). Yes, Mohammed Morsi's 
brief tenure as president showed him to be a dull and inflexible leader with an alarming authoritarian 
streak, a partisan for the Muslim Brotherhood unable and unwilling to provide the kind of unifying 
leadership Egypt needed after the 2011 revolution.” (McDowell 2013, par. 3-4) 
5 " درمت" Arabic word for rebellion, or civil disobedience. 
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Islamist victories have caused significant concern to conservative and 
authoritarian countries in the Arab peninsula (Saudi Arabia, Emirates, Kuwait, Oman, 
Jordan and so on).  They were, however, welcomed by Turkey, one of the strongest non-
Arab geopolitical players in the region. The Turkish government was established by 
elements of a new generation of Islamists over a decade ago and is considered a close ally 
of the traditional MB movement (Torelli 2012; Ergun 2012; Cavdar 2006; Menderes 
2006). 
Meanwhile, Iran remains ambiguous about supporting the Arab awakening.  
Iranian conservative religious leaders claimed that the Arab Spring was the fruit of the 
Iranian Islamic revolution (Eisenstadt 2011). Despite this, Tehran’s Shia leaders chose to 
support the Syrian regime against its own ‘spring’ and the Syrian people's armed 
revolution. Geopolitics and historical tension between the Arab rich oil states, mostly 
Wahhabis from either side of the Persian Gulf, have put the region in a state of turmoil.  
The Shia regime has added fuel to the existing fire; there is cause to fear that civil wars 
between Sunni and Shia factions might come to decimate the region (Noueihed and 
Warren 2012; Chaland 2013). 
This thesis addresses such issues by utilising the concept of “neo-Islamism” to 
examine Ennahda's declared goals, its commitment to moderation and inclusion, and the 
extent of its ability to provide an effective economic policy.  It argues that the rise of neo-
Islamism represents a phase of the MENA region’s political evolution, where moderate 
self-proclaimed Islamic democrats are leading the democratic transition process in an 
effort to steer their countries towards economic prosperity and harmony in democratic 
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consensus. The thesis will examine what has made this ideological move possible, and 
what might sustain or threaten this process. 
Major research aims 
This study is based on an interpretation of the rise of the political phenomenon of 
neo-Islamism over the past thirty years and its influence on Tunisian politics following 
the fall of Ben Ali's regime. The interpretation entails multiple tasks, including 
observation of the political progress of the neo-Islamists and the outcome of their 
political actions in Tunisia. The study focuses on the Ennahda Party, as one of the most 
obvious and successful cases of neo-Islamism after the Arab Spring of 2011, and its 
organisational and ideological developments to date.   
Also utilised are the following approaches to process the data derived from other 
academics and experts on Ennahda or Islamism in general: 
1) An approach that focuses on the historical development of the schools of 
political thought in Islam, from their beginnings to the present.  This approach sheds light 
on how competing theological views have interconnected with issues related to Islam and 
democracy over time.  This is discussed in Chapter One.  
2) A combination of interpretive and qualitative approaches that rely on 
interviews and examination of data obtained by analysis of historical and contemporary 
documents as well as the collection of statements made at press conferences and at major 
political events.  
The next five chapters explore the factors behind the rise of neo-Islamic parties 
after the Arab revolutions, with special focus on Tunisia’s Ennahda Party.  To start, a 
review of the literature that discusses Islamism and post-Islamism is explored, followed 
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by an examination of the debate regarding the compatibility of Islam and democracy.  
Following that, a discussion of Bourguibism and the Ben Ali era in Tunisia provides the 
emergence of Ennahda party within the postcolonial era.  Finally, Ennahda's political 
strategy, methods and performance are examined in the context of a post Arab Spring, 
which includes a discussion of Ennahda's political future. 
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THE ARAB SPRING AND THE 
EMERGENCE OF MODERN 
ISLAMISM 
 
While some are surprised by the sudden rise of Islamism, others have argued that 
its current prominence is not surprising, because Islamists are not alien to their own 
societies.  Rather, they have been the principal victims of decades of dictatorship, and 
they were the ones who have paid the highest price in the struggle for freedom (Council 
on Foreign Relations 2012, xii-xvi; Gerges 2013; Colvin 2011; David 2012).  It appears, 
therefore, that Islamists have not only been striving for an Islamic state under Shariaa,6 
but also fighting for freedom of expression, dignity and real liberation, concepts that 
clearly appeal to Arab citizenries that have had to cope with harsh authoritarianism over 
several generations (Roy 2011; Bayat 2011; Yilmaz 2012). 
                                                          
6 In this thesis, the terms 'Sharia', 'Shariaa' and 'shari’aa' and the like all refer to the same Islamic law.  
Differences in spellings are due to citations from different sources. 
1 CHAP
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Many questions have emerged specifically about Tunisia, where an Islamic party, 
Ennahda, won a democratic election on 23 October 2011, but was subsequently defeated 
three years later on 26th of October 2014. How did Tunisia’s Islamist government manage 
new roles after decades of underground opposition, without any training or experience in 
managing a democracy? What relationships developed between this government and the 
West, and the USA in particular?  Did Ennahda Party’s time in power lead to greater 
social conservatism and conflict with secular opposition groups, bringing social 
instability?  
This chapter deals with the preconditions of the Arab Spring and its spread.  It 
also looks at the role of social media in spreading support for revolutions as well as the 
very language of the Arab Spring across different countries. 
By focusing on the traditional Muslim Brotherhood movement’s development and 
evolution, this Chapter paves the way to understanding neo-Islamism and its links to MB 
as well as Islamism in its many varieties. As is well known, Islamists range from 
moderate to radical, violent to non-violent, with factions and individuals sometimes 
drastically contradicting each other, such as Osama Bin Laden and Recep Tayyip 
Erdoğan, as Ennahda's Rashid Ghanouchi (2012) pointed out recently.   
Bouazizi’s self-immolation 
The Arab world has an exceptionally young population.  The median age in Arab 
countries was twenty-two years in 2009, compared to the rest of the world at twenty-eight 
years. Sixty percent of the Arab population is less than twenty-five years old, which 
means that up until the Arab Spring of 2011, most Arabs spent their lives under the 
leadership of the same ruler (Filiu 2011).  
 12 
Human development in Arab countries has been limited.  Despite their rich 
resources, Arab countries are ranked amongst the lowest in education, human 
development and human rights, according to the United Nations’ (UN) Arab Human 
Development Reports (AHDR)7 (AHDR 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2009). The Arab 
oligarchic distribution of wealth dragged down per capita Arab income to amongst the 
lowest in the world,8 and therefore, productivity declined and scientific research remained 
at a standstill during the first decade of the new millennium.  School enrolment decreased 
and illiteracy remained considerably high despite high levels of spending on education 
(Bayat 2010, 27-28; Filiu 2011, 7).9 
The Arab Spring was ostensibly triggered when Mouhamed Bouazizi doused 
himself with gasoline and set himself on fire on 17 December 2010.  Bouazizi’s actions 
were prompted by the confiscation of his unlicensed vegetable cart and the subsequent 
slap to the face he received from the policewoman who had effectively confiscated his 
means of livelihood. This twenty-six year old man was both deeply humiliated by the 
                                                          
7 Arab Human Development Report of: 2002 ‘Opportunities’, 2003 ‘Knowledge’, 2004 ‘Freedom’, 2005 
‘Gender’ and 2009 ‘Human resources’.  Apparently, no comparable surveying and academic efforts in the 
Arab world have been as debated, commended and contested as much as the AHDR series has.  This 
report was prepared by a team of over a hundred Arab intellectuals and professionals, which just until 
2005, cost US$ 700,000.  The report provoked unprecedented discussion and controversy in the West as 
well as inside the Arab world about the predicament of the region, the topic airing on television talk 
shows, in parliaments, and in print media (Bayat 2010).  
8 According to AHDR, the percentage of the population living below the international poverty line of 
$1.25 (in purchasing power parity terms) a day is high in poor countries such as Mauritania, with 21.2% 
(2000), or Tunisia 5.87% (1990), which dropped to 2.6% in 2000. Also, figures shown that up to 2007 
Morocco recorded 2.5% and in 2005 Egypt recorded 2%.   Source: AHDR 2014 and World Bank (2011). 
9 Also, Bayat noted that media and information dissemination was no better off than education.  During 
the early 2000s, Arab countries had a lower information/media-to-population ratio than the world 
average; less than fifty-three newspapers per 1000 citizens, compared to 285 per 1000 people in the 
industrialised world.  Furthermore, the translation of books remained negligible; only 4.4 translated books 
per million were published every year, compared to 519 in Hungary and 920 in Spain (Bayat 2010, 27-
28). Also, Bayat noted that media and information dissemination was no better off than education. During 
the early 2000s, Arab countries had a lower information/media-to-population ratio than the world 
average; less than fifty-three newspapers per 1000 citizens, compared to 285 per 1000 people in the 
industrialised world. (Bayat 2010, 27-28). 
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abuse and exasperated by his inability to get redress10 (Council on Foreign Relations 
2012, 3). 
Furthermore, Bouazizi was not enacting the suicide commands of an Islamist 
jihadi group.  Rather, his self-immolation was a sacrifice that “echoed Jan Palach’s 
immolation on 19 January 1969, when the Czech offered his life in protest against the 
Soviet invasion” (Filui 2011, 19). 
In a matter of just a few days, Bouazizi’s anger ignited the Tunisian landscape, and in a 
matter of a few weeks, the uprising spread via internet forums such as Facebook and 
Twitter. Consequently, this uprising kick started similar but more protracted revolutions 
in Egypt against the Mubarek regime and in Libya against the Kaddafi regime. 
The Role of Social Networks in the Arab Spring 
Bayat (2011, 2013) and Roy (2011a, 2011b, 2012b, 2012d, 2012c) focus heavily 
on the Arab youth's use of foreign languages, social networks and media, street sit-ins 
and protest and consumption of Western merchandise such as signature jeans and 
American fast-food chains, as an exclusive phenomenon of post-Islamists, (though Roy 
credits the practices to so-called neo-fundamentalists as well). The plain fact is, almost all 
                                                          
10 Contrary to popular belief, Bouazizi was not a university graduate.  He dropped out of secondary 
school when his father, a farm labourer, died, leaving him in charge of his six sisters and brothers.  
Without decent permanent employment, he had only his produce cart and scale for income, earning the 
equivalent of about ten dollars per day.  Because Bouazizi had neither support nor connections with local 
authorities, and certainly not much money to bribe the appropriate officials, he could not get a licence for 
his work or an ‘overlook’.  On 17 December 2010, a municipal patrol, four men and two women, cornered 
Bouazizi and seized his possessions: seven kilos of bananas, along with five boxes of apples and pears.  
When the street peddler protested, a policewoman slapped his face.  Devastated by the loss and 
humiliated, Bouazizi tried in vain to retrieve his meager stock at the police station, then he pleaded 
unsuccessfully three times for mercy at the governor’s headquarters.  After the third attempt, he quietly 
parked his cart next to the Governor’s headquarters, bought a jug of turpentine at the nearby grocery shop, 
doused himself with it, pointed at the sky and lit a match.  By the fall of Ben Ali, and during the protest, 
eleven Tunisians set themselves on fire, and five of them subsequently died.  “There is nothing Islamic 
about this sacrifice, but such a denouncing of oppression is devastating” (Filui 2011, 19-20). 
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modern Islamists use modern tools to various degrees. Even the Jihadi Salafis11 or Hizb 
ut-Tahrir (HT)12 cadres, who still believe that democracy is religiously forbidden and an 
evil Western tool of domination, are computer and social media savvy and experts in the 
latest Western brands of various products. 
Social networks and social media were crucial to the Arab Spring, facilitating 
communication and coordination between the young, but these efforts came from a mass 
of individuals, rather than formal non-government organisations (NGOs) or political 
parties. (Bayat 2013; Ehrenberg 2012; Marzouki 2011a; Khalil 2012; Pontin 2011) 
When the Tunisian uprising started on 17 December 2010, none of the Western 
think tanks, politicians or policy makers predicted what would happen next across the 
Middle East.  Furthermore, almost all Western policy makers failed to predict the 
collapse of the Mubarek regime.  In fact, during the first weeks of the long Tahrir Square 
sit-ins with millions of Egyptians protesting against Mubarek, the Obama Administration 
refused to take a stand with the revolutionaries.  At the very least, the American position 
was that of disorientation. Some American policy makers saw the Mubarek regime as 
having regional political and security privilege, describing the regime as an example of 
‘durable authoritarianism’ (Mason 2012). 
                                                          
11 Salafis, Salafiyya and Salafism are derived from Arabic salaf. Salafiyyun literally, the ancestors, are 
used to describe the first three generations of Muslims, deemed to be the most pious believers. The 
Salaffiyya movement claims to return to the original Islam through the elimination of those elements that, 
throughout history, have been introduced to Islam from the outside, and inevitably changed the essence of 
the original. Groups that use violence to further their agendas are modernly described as Jihadi Salafists. 
Modern usage of the term Salafism that references radical Islamic groups is a relatively new practice. The 
original term which established from around the thirteen century, up until the early twentieth century had 
assumed reform and religious purity (Torelli, Merone, and Cavatorta 2012, 144). 
12 Hizb ut-Tahrir (Arabic: ريرحتلا بزح ; Party of Liberation) is an international pan-Islamic political 
organisation.  They are commonly associated with the goal of unifying the Muslim countries into one 
Islamic state ruled by Sharia and with a caliph head of state elected by Muslims.  The organisation was 
founded in 1953 in Jerusalem by a Sunni scholar and Sharia Judge Taqiuddin al-Nabhani. 
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A clear but infamous example of Western governments being complicit in the 
propagation of the modern Arab police state and misleading the outside world comes 
from the Ben Ali regime in 2005.  In November of that year, Ben Ali proudly hosted the 
World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) in Tunis.  It was the second round of 
the UN-sponsored conference, the first part of which had taken place in Geneva two years 
earlier. Hundreds of international delegations, both official and non-governmental, 
gathered in Tunis for three days to discuss the latest issues relating to Internet 
communication, the new era of digital and grass-roots information and to exchange ideas.  
They were, paradoxically, “confined to a well polished ghetto in the northern suburb of 
the capital city, and access to the internet was only unrestricted in the limited perimeter of 
the conference and the delegations’ hotels” (Filiu 2011, 43). 
Local civil society representatives, independent media and human rights activists 
were banned from attending the conference.  Those forces launched their campaigns to 
draw the world's attention to human rights abuses in Tunisia, some organising hunger 
strikes, though the outside world seemed oblivious to their existence.  As Filiu (2011, 45) 
observed, that the Orwellian nature of the Ben Ali regime never had 
reached such blatant authoritarianism and hypocrisy: while his guests at the WSIS were enjoying 
free internet service and celebrating the virtues of do-it-yourself new technologies and e-
management, the outside conference rooms' internet was heavily controlled and censored as usual, 
thanks to the monopoly of the state-monitored providers and their direct connections with (not so) 
secret police.  
By the time of the second Tehran Spring on the eve of the 2009 Iranian 
presidential election (the first Tehran Spring was in 199713), the reformist Iranian 
                                                          
13 In the spring of 1997, Mohammad Khatami was elected president of Iran.  He won 70 per cent of the 
votes on an 80 per cent turnout, and campaigned on a clear reformist ground, thrashing his theocrat 
opponent three-to-one. The commander of the elite Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps lobbied Ayatollah 
Ali Khamenei, advising him to reject the result.  According to a member of the Expediency Council, 
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presidential candidate, Mir Hossein Mousavi, lost to President Mahmud Ahmadinejad. 
Iranian youths immediately protested, using social media to organise, while they accused 
the government of fabricating election results.  For weeks, the Iranian Republican Guard 
Corps (IRGC) and Basij14 suppressed the protesters, while the world's media was flooded 
with short videos and news via Twitter and Facebook from the protesters' hotspots.  
Overcoming state censorship would also become, in less than two years, the most 
important feature of the Arab Spring.   
The boom years of globalisation have created a global culture of an educated and 
freedom-eager youth. Now “there is a mass transnational culture of disillusionment, and 
it transmits easily ... From Tahrir and Syntagma to the student ‘kissing protest’ in 
Santiago’s Central Plaza and Occupy Wall Street, these attempts to create instant 
‘liberated spaces’ have become the single most important theme in the global revolt” 
(Mason 2012, 69, 84). 
Few would dare to underestimate the role of social media in the Arab Spring, 
though as Gelvin points out, there is no evidence to demonstrate that it played any more 
of a role than the printing press and telegraph did in earlier uprisings (Gelvin 2012, 158).  
Social media might not have contributed to the content of the Arab uprisings, but due to 
the widespread governmental censorship and crackdown on protestors' conventional 
channels of communication (such as newspapers, lift-outs, radio and television), social 
media became the communication tool and propaganda forum for revolutionaries across 
                                                                                                                                                            
referee for the regime’s chronic infighting, Iran’s supreme leader showed the General how his Pasdaran, 
or guardians of the revolution, had voted: almost exactly as the nation had. That was what paralysed the 
hardliners during Mr Khatami’s Tehran Spring: the gnawing fears that the Revolutionary Guard might 
split if they confronted the reformists head-on (Maghen 2012). 
14 Literally means ‘Mobilisation of the Oppressed’, which is a paramilitary volunteer militia established in 
1979 by order of the Islamic Revolution's leader Ayatollah Khomeini 
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the Arab world.  An analysis of ten months of news, information and social media used in 
eighteen Arab spring countries found that the number of Facebook users swelled during 
that time, though the pattern of increased use of social media did not correlate directly 
with the pattern of protests. Social media sites told people where to find information, not 
to revolt (Ehrenberg 2012). 
John Pollock (2011, 82) writes, “people used not only all the technology they had, 
but all the technology they could borrow”. He added that the Arab Spring “sharpened an 
acrimonious debate in the United States and Europe about the uses and importance of 
technology in regime change” (Pollock 2011, 82). In North Africa, social media 
accomplished two major tasks. First, they made public the tyranny known and common to 
many Egyptians and Tunisians but hitherto unacknowledged. Second, they helped 
revolutionaries organise continuous protests in countries where the police had efficiently 
beaten, imprisoned, tortured, and murdered dissidents by creating networks the regimes 
found difficult to suppress (Pontin 2011). 
Without the amateur video captured on the mobile phone of al Bouazizi's cousin, 
and its immediate distribution to tens of thousands of Tunisians on Facebook, the 
Tunisian revolution might not have commenced.  The influence of Facebook prompted 
many to refer to the events in Tunisia as the ‘first Facebook revolution’15 (Schraeder 
2012, Feiler 2011). 
 
                                                          
15 Tunisian National Statistics show that 20 percent of Tunisian citizens, that’s more than 2.1 million; 
maintain Facebook pages.  According to a survey conducted in Tunis in March 2011, 91 percent of 
university students use Facebook daily or multiple times a day, and on average spend 1 hour and 45 
minutes each day on the website.  “Of great interest from a political science perspective is that this same 
survey demonstrated that 64 percent of students used Facebook as their primary source of information 
about protests and demonstrations during the 4 weeks period between December 17 and January 14.  
Indeed, 32 percent of all students indicated they first learned of Bouazizi’s self-immolation via 
Facebook.” (Schraeder 2012, 75-76) 
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Feiler (2011, 143) concluded:  
[Maybe] the Middle East uprisings were a Facebook Revolution after all. They were a massive, 
generation-wide Facebook friend request from a people as enamored of freedom as we are that 
arrives in our inbox looking for support at exactly the moment we had all but turned up our noses 
and turned our backs on anyone from their neighborhood. And in that way in which the Internet 
tries to make things easy, this request comes with two helpful options: CONFIRM OR NOT 
NOW. The choice is ours: which will it be?  
The Arab revolutionaries used a full suite of information sharing and 
communication tools, that  
were employed to spread the revolutions of 2009-11, it goes like this: Facebook is used to form 
groups, covert and overt in order to establish those strong but flexible connections.  Twitter is used 
for real-time organization and news dissemination, bypassing the cumbersome ‘newsgathering’ 
operations of the mainstream media.  YouTube and the Twitter-linked photographic sites - Yfrog, 
Flickr and Twitpic - are used to provide instant evidence of the claims being made.  Link-
shorteners like bit-ly are used to disseminate key articles via Twitter. (Mason 2012, 75) 
However, social media was above all a technical channel to report and spread 
social discontent and link the dissidents with each other, rather than cause of revolution 
itself.  In other words, what was more important was that Tunisia was already ripe for 
revolutionary change, if we take a number of factors into account. To quote Peter 
Schraeder (2012, 75), 
[The] first factor was an intensifying socio-economic crisis during the five years preceding the 
revolution, from 2006 to 2010, as measured by a number of economic indicators.  Overall 
unemployment had risen to 14% in 2010, with the figure for youth aged 15-24 years of age 
exceeding 30 percent.  Those with higher education were especially affected; over 45 percent of 
college graduates could not find work.  As of 2008, the average Tunisian spent nearly 36 percent 
of household spending on basic foodstuffs consumed at home.  To put this in comparative context, 
the average American in 2008 spent just under 7 percent of household spending on the same 
foodstuffs.  It is for this reason that the percentage of the Tunisian population that considered itself 
to be ‘thriving’ dropped from 24 percent (2.52 million people) in 2008, to only 14 percent (1.47 
million people) in 2010, meaning that at least 1 million citizens had witnessed a reversal in their 
economic fortunes.   
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Other factors that paved the way for the Jasmine revolution were the growing 
authoritarianism of the Ben Ali regime16 and public disenchantment with the growing 
corruption of Ben Ali’s extended family, which was estimated at 140 members.  This 
trend is captured by the annual ‘Perception of Corruption’ index maintained by 
Transparency International, in which Tunisia’s ranking declined from 43rd in 2005 to 
59th in 2010, out of 178 countries monitored17 (Schraeder 2012, 76-77). 
This evidence of corruption, which is similar to that nearby countries where the 
Arab Spring spread later, leads one to question the Arab Spring ideology and the success 
of the neo-Islamist parties afterwards: were the revolutions merely liberating, 
economically driven and spontaneous, or did they carry out hidden agendas despite their 
unpartisan appearance?  
Arab Spring ideology 
Although neo-Islamism did not lead the early stages of the revolution, it turned 
out to be more organised, more prepared ideologically, than other revolutionaries.  Non-
                                                          
16 Schraeder cited an example of Ali Khalifi, who was a student enrolled in a Master’s degree program in 
Common Law coordinated by the University of Carthage.  Ali was jailed because one of his friends, 
unbeknownst to him, was also friends with two young men who mentioned to the wrong person that the 
Ben Ali regime should be replaced by an Islamist regime.  Ben Ali’s secret police apparently learned of 
the public statements of the two young men via an informant.  All were arrested and jailed, and given 
prison sentences of one to three years. After several nights of jail, one of the jailers told Ali they knew he 
was innocent and that he had no contact with the students calling for the government’s overthrow, hence 
why he only received a one-year sentence.  When Ali asked, “Well, why am I in jail then, with one-year 
sentence?” the response was: “Because you should know who the friends of your friends are” (Schraeder 
2012, 73-77). 
17 The Tunisian people regularly mocked Ben Ali’s over the top totalitarianism behind closed doors.  
Special attention was reserved for his second wife Leila Trabelsi, who was twenty-one years younger than 
he.  Leila was derogatorily nicknamed the ‘regent of Carthage’ colloquially meaning ‘she who governs in 
the absence of the king’, a reference to her growing assertiveness in the governing of the nation.  Leila’s 
notorious brother, Belhassan Trabelsi (fled to Canada during the 14th January 2011 regime change) was 
often referred to as the ‘godfather’.  The Trabelsi family illegally controlled, or assumed control, over 180 
major companies including an airline, several hotels, one of the Tunisia’s two private radio stations, 
numerous car assembly plants, a Ford distribution centre, a real estate development company, and many 
more  (Schraeder 2012, 75-88). 
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partisan revolutionary language was quickly adopted by the neo-Islamists who enriched it 
with modern idioms and terminology as necessary. (David 2012; Bayat 2013; Roy 2011b 
and 2012c) Nevertheless, this ‘declared ideology’ (as opposed to their alleged actual 
ideology or hidden agendas) simply signifies a change in tactics; rather than a change in 
the goals of Islamic politics. Nevertheless, Ghanouchi has stated that democratisation and 
peaceful transitioning to power through fair elections were at the centre of his party’s 
agenda since June 1981, and that these were almost the same goals of the Arab Spring 
some thirty years later (interview with author, Tunis: 25 April 2013). 
What Filali-Ansary (2012, 10) observed as “[an] unsuspected wave … gathering 
strength and producing a new political language [which] can be seen in the coinage and 
dissemination of new concepts that capture the aspirations and hopes of the new 
generations”, has been diluted as well by the rise of jihadist groups. These are occupying 
cities, declaring their caliphate (Islamic state) and destabilising the entire region. 
Nevertheless, at least one neo-Islamist party, Ennahda, has proven itself committed to a 
new language of Islamic politics, which requires an investigation into the motivation 
behind the Arab Spring ideology in its early stages. 
However, the dream of some party elites of melding Western liberalism into an 
Islamic framework was to be shattered not more than three years later. The post-Arab 
Spring failure of establishing democracy is the result of a combination of many factors 
and an ongoing process of struggle between two major camps:  revolutionary Arabs who 
aspire to freedom and democracy and counter-revolutionary forces who aspire to restore 
the old systems. 
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This is seen very clearly in the Tunisian case. On 26 October 2014, the first 
Tunisian elections held under a new democratic constitution resulted in a comeback for 
those who had supported Ben Ali’s former ruling party.  Under the name Nidaa Tunis, the 
new party won around 18 more seats than Ennahda, (88 seats for Nidaa Tunis and 69 for 
Ennahda).  Such a result notwithstanding, Tunisia and Ennahda appear to be still on the 
track of an exciting yet painstaking transition to democracy, unlike other countries in the 
Middle East (Wolf 2014; Chamkhi 2014; Hilal 2012; Fadel 2013; Chaland 2013; 
Guazzone 2013; Ottaway 2012).  
The language of the Arab Spring  
The Arab Spring displayed a huge shift in the language of Arab revolution. 
(Filali-Ansary 2012) The young protesters were no longer shouting nationalistic slogans, 
calling for the shariatisation of the society, or getting frenzied about the Arab-Israeli 
conflict.  In fact, the protesters  
did not arise spontaneously for the abstract ideal of ‘democracy’, or because of the activities of 
outside democracy promotion organizations (as some authoritarian governments believed of the 
‘colored revolutions’ in Ukraine, Georgia and Kyrgyzstan). They occurred instead for a variety of 
homegrown reasons [such as: Economic deprivation, political absolutism and corruption] that 
should give all authoritarian governments pause (Craner 2011, par. 17).  
 
According to the Tunisian League for the Protection of the Revolution (LNPR)18 
spokesman Nasruddine Wezfa (interview with author: Tunis, 15th April 2013), most of 
                                                          
18 Tunisian National League for the Protection of the Revolution, (LNPR)  (French: La Ligue de 
protection de la révolution (LPR) or Ligue Nationale de Protection de la Révolution (LNPR) is a coalition 
of Islamists, jobless young people, thugs, and others who gathered and were legalised under the Hammadi 
Jebali government in May 2012.  Their goal was to defend what they perceive to be the objectives of the 
Tunisian revolution and to block attempts by the old regime to make a comeback.   The organisation soon 
evolved into loosely organised militias of thugs who allegedly attacked the UGTT headquarters, the 
secular anti-Ennahda opposition groups and former RCD supporters. The UGTT and Nidaa’ Tunis 
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the Tunisian revolutionary demands were shaped during the famous sit-ins of Qasbah 1 
and Qasbah 2. These sit-ins19 were a sort of open continuous congress, which witnessed 
days and days of discussions between all political cadres, youngsters and independents 
and intelligentsia.  
Wezfa stated that the early intent of the Qasbah sit-ins of early 2011 was simply 
to oust the old regime of Ben Ali, which was seen as a burden, and keep everything else 
untouched  (Interview with author, Tunis: 15th April 2013). After 14 January 2011 (the 
day Ben Ali fled the country), the government attempted to impose a curfew in order to 
restore security and to reorganize. However, spontaneous gatherings of communities 
originally intending to protect neighborhoods, spoiled government efforts.  The goal of 
the crowds quickly transformed into efforts to preserve the revolution. 
The reasons behind the uprising include: 
                                                                                                                                                            
advocate banning this group and accuse Ennahda of using these militias are its own to enforce its hidden 
agendas (Guazzone 2013, 37).  
19 Qasba1 took place in Qasbah Square next the Prime Minister’s office directly after the flight of 
Ben Ali on 16 January 2011; this was the first sit-in that led to changes in the government. On 27 
January, a compromise was reached: the government would continue to be presided by Ben Ali's 
last prime minister. With two uncorrupted technocrats of the former regime taking minor 
positions. The parliament featured new faces from Tunisian universities, the private sector 
outside Tunisia, and the judiciary. This compromise was supported by the the Tunisian General 
Labour Union (French: Union Générale Tunisienne du Travail) (UGTT) and notably, was 
accepted by the street, which for a short time had stopped demonstrating. This respite allowed 
the government to begin functioning 'normally' and it immediately started by taking the first 
transition measures: releasing political convicts, setting conditions for general amnesty, 
legalising previously forbidden political parties, liberalising the media, and the setting up 
commissions on political reform. 
Qasbah 2, started on 20 February 2011, demanded the departure of Prime Minister Mohamed 
Ghanouchi and his peers, as former militants of RCD.  This sit-in was more politicised than the 
first sit-in. Several opposition parties pushed the participants to demand an election of a 
constituent assembly to draft a new constitution and to create a council for safeguarding the 
revolution. This council would act as a counter-power to the government, which apart from the 
pressure of the street, was acting without oversight. 
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 A demographically youthful population with little reverence for the regimes 
that struggled historically for independence from European colonialism; 
 Widespread resentment over pervasive regime corruption and youths' inability 
to find jobs while they sank in poverty like the older population;   
 While some economic improvement had taken place at the time of the 
revolutions, this was insufficient to save the old regime. Furthermore, the 
interior population was resentful of the (relatively) more prosperous coastal 
residents;   
 Economic and political repression led to a yearning not necessarily for 
democracy, but for other more personal needs, such as ‘dignity’, ‘justice’ and 
‘respect’. People believed these desires could only be satisfied if the aged 
authoritarian regimes were removed. 
Technology such as the Internet and satellite television showed the people ways to 
defeat official censorship, and also opened people's eyes to the wellbeing of the outside 
world.  Technology showed Arabs, including in Tunisia, the abnormality of their 
country’s situation, and that they were falling behind in a more democratic and globalised 
world.  Social media gave them not new beliefs, but the channels to express their desires 
in a more rapid and organised way (Craner 2011, par. 22).   
Although ultra conservative and jihadi groups later explicitly called for 
shariatisation, taking advantage of the new era of freedom of speech and liberties, the 
revolutions themselves appear to have no ideological templates; they were not driven by 
established ideologies such as nationalism, socialism or Islamism, but “a retrieval of a 
cosmopolitan worldliness that was always already there but repressed under the duress of 
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a dialectic sustained between domestic tyranny and globalised imperialism” (Debashi 
2012, 11). At the same time, the Arab Spring shifted the traditional political language 
from blaming the West and Israel for all that is wrong to focusing on dignity, freedom 
and calls for democratisation (Roy 2011a and 2012c)  
In addition, the ousting of ageing pro-imperialist dictators such as Mubarek and 
Ben Ali caused confusion in American policy on Africa and the Middle East.  According 
to Petras (2012), the Obama Administration was hesitant to oust Mubarek for several 
reasons, even as the movement against him grew:  
The White House has many clients around the world - including Honduras, Mexico, Indonesia, 
Jordan and Algeria - who believe they have a strategic relationship with Washington and would 
lose confidence in their future if Mubarak were dumped.  
Secondly, the highly influential leading pro-Israel organisations in the US (AIPAC, the 
President of the Major American Jewish Organisations) and their army of scribes mobilized 
congressional leaders to pressure the White House to continue backing Mubarak, as Israel was 
the prime beneficiary of a dictator who was at the throat of the Egyptians (and Palestinians) 
and at the feet of the Jewish state. As a result, the Obama regime moved slowly, under fear and 
pressure of the growing Egyptian popular movement (Petras 2012, 17-18). 
Some scholars have been more optimistic than many of the Arab revolutionaries 
themselves. For example, Filui (2011, 135) concluded that the Arab revolutions, 
transmitted from Tunisia to nearby countries within days or weeks, are not the products 
of a domino effect, but rather of a renaissance:  
The Arab revolution is an Arab renaissance.  It is literally striving to revive a social body 
paralyzed by the various autocrats, their predatory clique and their unbridled security services.  
The vanguard role played by the youth is just the ultimate reaction of defense by the most 
exposed generation against the sterilisation of its aspirations, the privatisation of its nation-state 
and the obliteration of its future.  But this dynamic of defiance and empowerment will not stop 
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with the toppling of an ageing ruler … It is a regional tide that will leave no sector untouched, 
one way or another.   
Stepan and Linz (2013, 29) conclude something similar: 
Neither the Hungarian Revolution of 1956, the Prague Spring of 1968, nor Poland’s Solidarity 
in 1981 succeeded in immediately creating a democracy.  Yet each of these historic movements 
eroded forever the legitimacy of the dictatorial regime that it challenged.  We think that the 
events of the Arab Spring at the very least have made Arab ‘presidents for life’ increasingly 
unacceptable, and the dignity of citizens increasingly desired.   
The Arab Spring was not by any means an Islamic revolution, and it is unlikely 
that the Middle East will experience an Iranian style revolution any time soon.  Islamists 
as organised groups did not explicitly lead the revolutions, though individuals 
participated under more cosmopolitan banners, slogans and demands (Roy 2012c and 
2012d; Bayat 2013; Cavatorta 2012) 
Patrick Seale (2011, par. 9) adds to this discussion:  
For many Arabs, indeed for most Muslims, the West is highly suspect, and its current rampant 
Islamophobia a source of angry bewilderment.  America’s blind support for Israel – for its 
aggression against its neighbours and its long and cruel oppression of the Palestinian – is a 
source of great rage, latent and largely impotent so far, but for how long? The West’s colonial 
past in the region has also by no means been forgotten, whether in Algeria, Egypt, Syria, Iraq, 
to name only the most obvious countries.  
The so-called Arab Street is without doubt still occupied with chronic distrust of 
the West, but the Arab Spring revolutionaries were not targeting Western imperialism in 
the first place. They simply aimed to get rid of autocratic regimes and dictators. The 
revolutionaries were not necessarily enlightened by any particular philosophical concept 
or ideology, let alone democracy. They were also without proper leaders (David 2012; 
Roy 2011b; Etzioni 2011). 
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Yet the Arab nations have no major guiding ideology to fall back on, despite neo- 
Islamists trying to invent a new revised ‘Islamic ideology’ as well as secular and Islamic 
fundamentalist groups attempting to offer their own alternatives.  
Arabs irreversibly disposed of their most notorious dictators but have had no state 
or economic policies to revert to, since they can no longer sustain the old political system 
based on fear, or the old economic model, which failed to deliver prosperity. Indeed, the 
2011 uprisings had no focus but to overthrow the homegrown authoritarian regimes, and 
a vague eagerness for freedom and democracy.  
 Unsurprisingly, therefore, no serious economic reforms were proposed in the 
Middle East over the three-year period that followed the 2011 revolution (Eyal 2012a).   
It seems the neo-Islamists in parts of the Arab world were one of only two beneficiaries 
from the Arab Spring. The other beneficiaries were the jihadi Salafi groups, namely al 
Qaeda and its affiliated groups in Syria and Iraq, which under the banner of ISIL have 
achieved unprecedented victories. 
The historical origins of Islamism  
Islamism is a relatively modern phenomenon in Muslim societies around the 
world.  Political Islam, which is another term for Islamism, is a contemporary political 
ideology, rather than a religion, religious cult or theology.  Islamism is the social and 
political expression of Islam that seeks to integrate it into politics, state affairs, economics 
and civil and constitutional laws. Given the heterogeneity of political Islam across the 
globe, no academic consensus exists on what constitutes an Islamist party, but in the 
“broadest possible sense such parties can be defined as parties that strive for the 
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implementation of Islamic law (sharia) in all aspects of political, economic, social, and 
cultural life” (Tomsa 2012, 487). 
 The most precise definition of Islamism is provided by Yilmaz (2012, 42), who 
describes it as:  
a form of instrumentalization of Islam by individuals, groups and organizations that pursue 
political objectives. It provides political responses to today’s societal challenges by imagining 
a future, the foundations for which rest on reappropriated, reinvented concepts borrowed from 
the Islamic tradition. 
 While Asef Bayat (2013, 592) defined Islamism as  
those ideologies and movements that seek to establish some kind of an Islamic order; a 
religious state, sharia law and moral codes in Muslim societies and communities.  
Bayat observes that the association with the state is a key feature of modern 
Islamic movements, whose procedures include controlling state power. On the other 
hand, Aktay (2013, 125) observed that “Islamism is an indistinguishable element of Islam 
and its survival depends on it. In other words, Islamism represents the political grammar 
of Islam, and this explains why many Islamists do not need to employ the term”. 
 The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood slogan, ‘Islam is the Solution’, indicates that 
Islamism is a socio-political movement in the first place. However, Islamism, as Greg 
Barton points out, covers a “broad spectrum of convictions, at one extreme are those who 
would merely like to see Islam accorded proper recognition in national life in terms of 
national symbols. At the other extreme are those who want to see the radical 
transformation of society and politics, by whatever means, into an absolute theocracy”.  
(Ayoob 2008, 2). 
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The modern concept of reviving Islam in public life and considering politics an 
authentic part of religion, was developed by nineteenth and twentieth century thinkers as 
a response to direct contact with the West through colonialism, including figures such as 
Jamal Eddin al-Afghani, Mohammed Abdah and Mohammed Rashid Rida, the founder of 
a famous intellectual magazine, el-Manar.  Hassan al-Banna, the founder of the Muslim 
Brotherhood, reportedly worked with Rida and was strongly influenced by his reformist 
opinions.  According to Khatab and Bouma (2007, 58), al-Banna “was one of Rashid 
Rida’s regular disciples, he regularly attended Rida’s circle, read his journal and carried it 
on after Rida’s death in 1934”.   
Emergence of the Muslim Brotherhood 
The genesis of modern Islamism can be traced to March 1928, when “a twenty-
two-year-old schoolteacher mobilised six disgruntled workers from Egypt’s Suez Canal 
Company.  It was originally a social and religious movement but Hassan al-Banna's little 
group grew into the Muslim Brotherhood, ‘al-Ikhwan al-Muslimeen’” (Wright 2012, 4). 
Since then, the movement has “undergone significant internal transformation” (Hadiz 
2014, 127) and neo-Islamism is the latest, but not the last facet of such an evolution of 
ideas, tactics and even conceptual approaches. 
The Muslim Brotherhood was the first popular Islamist movement in the Arab 
world, and managed to organise and spread throughout eighty countries since its 
inception (Wright 2012).  The MB founder, Hassan al-Banna (1906-1949), dedicated his 
teachings to addressing the cessation of the last Caliphate following the Ottoman defeat 
in World War I and the establishment of the Turkish Republic, aiming for a transnational 
Islamic state.  While working toward this objective al-Banna became “increasingly aware 
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of the eroding social and religious values he so treasured”, and “rejected the passive 
posture of the Egyptian ulamas20 of his day” (Davidson 2003, 20).  Observers such as 
Hadiz (2014), on the other hand, see the establishment of the MB related to the “growing 
discontent within the [Egyptian] petty bourgeoisie with its fate under British political and 
economic domination” (Hadiz 2014, 127). Generally speaking, the MB filled the political 
vacuum 
to lead the despairing and oppressed masses to draw on their past for a better future of liberty 
and social justice. . . . This movement thought that the Muslim world had lost its identity to 
European colonialism.  The Brotherhood agreed that Muslims needed to draw on what they 
considered a pure Islam of Muhammad and his immediate successors to ensure their future.  
(Khatab and Bouma 2007, 58-59) 
Islamism at this early stage (during al-Banna's life) was direct, simple and 
appeared to vaguely contrast with secularism, without an established agenda or complete 
blueprint. It called for Islam to take a bigger role in public and private lives, in opposition 
to Ataturk’s call for secularism in Turkey. 
Hassan al-Banna viewed Islamisation as an absolutist ideology; Islam was seen as 
the only solution for political weakness, maldevelopment, imperialism, and later, the 
Arab-Israeli conflict.  The MB became active in Palestine in the 1930s, just a few years 
after its founding, providing arms and training fighters to resist both the British 
occupation and the invasion of Jewish Zionist settlers (Hessler 2012).  
While the Muslim Brotherhood grew and transformed into a major political party 
and social political movement by the 1940s, threatening the stability of the Egyptian 
monarchy and the British occupation of Egypt, other Islamic movements were launched 
                                                          
20 Arabic word for the Muslim theologists and religious scholars. 
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across the Muslim world, like the Indian-turned-Pakistani Jamaat-e-Islami in 1941, and 
HT in 1953.   
As the postcolonial era revealed its major political and economic challenges for 
the Arab and Muslim nation-state, more Islamic movements emerged.  Some movements 
had stricter political agendas than the MB; still others were jihadists, focusing on 
establishing an Islamic state and finding military solutions for societal underdevelopment 
and secularism.  
 The MB constructed Islam as a modern political ideology, choosing not to focus 
on religiosity as a top priority, although al-Banna had originally established preaching, or 
dawaa, as one of the pillars of his new organisation.  In fact, the vast majority of Islamic 
movements of the twentieth century focused on political affairs.  This contrasts with the 
purely legal approach of the ulamas, who saw the implementation of Shariaa as the sole 
criterion for an Islamic state.  Ulamas believe that the Islamic state should have the power 
to implement sharia from top to bottom, placing society back onto the path of Islam.  This 
re-Islamisation of society is a duty of those in power (Roy 2013).  
However, the emergence of MB took away the monopoly of religious 
interpretation from the ulamas and gave legitimacy to the involvement of knowledgeable 
lay people in religious matters and the subject of Islamisation. These lay people do not 
necessarily share the interests of the ulamas, who have historically been indebted to the 
state for their power. No wonder then that contemporary Islamists call them “ulamas el 
sultan” (scholars of sell out to their secular rulers) as a way of denigrating them and 
charging them with ethical incompetence.   
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Today, within the MB and similar Islamic movements, there is a widespread 
feeling that the cause of “society’s malaise stems primarily from a betrayal from within, 
rather than a domineering force from without” (Abdo 2000, 8). Al-Banna himself, though 
descended from a scholarly Sufi family, did not get along well with al-Azhar's traditional 
scholars, nor did he try to reform them directly and have them lead his new movement.  
Instead, he simply picked some al-Azhar scholars, mixed them with petty bourgeoisie 
businessmen, informal street preachers, doctors, lawyers, judges and women, and fused 
them all into the new MB (Parteger 2010). Such a mélange, which has lasted for eighty 
years, was not likely planned; more likely the composition of the Muslim Brotherhood 
has been influenced by a series of continuous, spontaneous gatherings around a common 
cause.   
Muslim Brotherhood: revolutionary or conservative? 
The MB ideology, as Roy (2013) points out, is not a revolutionary ideology, like 
Marxism or Nazism.  He notes, “seventy years of cautious politics hardly qualify a 
movement as revolutionary” (Roy 2013, 15).  The MB coexisted with Egyptian regimes 
for over eighty years without any serious coup plots or major revolutionary violence. 
Parteger (2010) observed the MB as being primarily a social movement that sometimes 
functions as a political party. Indeed, the MB is well rooted in diverse social services 
within their societies, providing charity and religious courses, initiating grassroots 
activism, instituting human rights work, journalism, and winning control of different 
union syndicates. These achievements and dominance in professional sectors like 
engineering, medicine and law during the last twenty or thirty years qualified them to be 
the most organized and effective opposition party in Egypt.   
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However, it should not be forgotten that between the 1930s and early 1970s the 
MB was without doubt a revolutionary political party which was even equipped for a 
time with an armed militia21. In fact, MB created the notorious Tanzeen Khass, in late 
1942 or early 1943, which was  
a clandestine group within the organization designed to defend the society from both British 
and the government.  But the secret apparatus also developed an aggressive, offensive 
capability of an extralegal nature, often expressed through hit-and-run attacks on British 
personnel and Egyptian police.  The identity of those brothers belonging to the secret apparatus 
was unknown to the society’s general membership, and its leaders reported directly to al-
Banna.  In theory, he controlled the group and its activities. However, control was never 
complete, and herein laid a fatal flaw for the future (Davidson 2003, 25). 
The MB movement officially renounced political violence after a period of 
considerable political tension that ended in the assassination of Egyptian Prime 
Minister Mahmoud an-Nukrashi Pasha by a young veterinary student in 1948, who was 
allegedly a member of the MB. The political violence escalated to the assassination of 
Imam al-Banna himself in 1949 (Mura 2012; Zahid and Madley 2006; Pargeter 2010). As 
Abdo (2000, 6-7) notes, however, the MB “became increasingly radical during the 1940s 
and 1950s”. Although, it had officially renounced violence, the organisation was not 
above encouraging violence in some circumstances.  
                                                          
21 The MB called for jihad against Jews in the 1936–9 Arab Revolt in Palestine, sent many fighters to 
Palestine during 1930s and 1940s, was behind the dramatic riots in Palestine in 1936, and participating 
heavily in the 1948 war which ended up with the establishment of the state of Israel.  The Syrian 
commander of the Palestinian mujahideen mission, Ezzedine al-Qssem, is considered one of the great MB 
military leaders of the time.  The organisation regarded the British as imperialist oppressors in Egypt, and 
agitated against the British military occupation of the country, especially after the Palestine 
rebellion. During Nasser's 1956 war against so the called ‘triple aggression’ on the Suez Canal, and 
during the 1973 war against Israel, the MB sent many volunteers and fighters (Mura 2012, 59-60). 
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 In 1952, the MB supported the Egyptian Revolution,22 led by the Free Officers 
Movement, which apparently started as a cell led by MB army officers as early as 1942 23  
(Zahid and Madley 2006).  After the MB was implicated in an attempted assassination of 
Egypt's president Nasser in the mid-1960s, it was deemed anti-government once again, 
banned and repressed.   
Generally speaking, however, the MB has always strived to participate in formal 
politics and has run in open elections since the 1940s, (Zahid and Madley 2006) though 
some of the early al-Banna literature showed mistrust of democratic elections, stemming 
from its association with the British colonial authorities that carried over to local 
elections (Mura 2012, 61-85).  It is worth saying here that Egypt had a sort of democratic 
experience from 1922 until the Free Officers’ coup in 1952, mostly under British 
colonisation24 (Traub 2007, par. 3).  The establishment of MB during colonial Egypt, then 
its continuity during post-colonial era, has resulted in the movement being affected 
politically by the western liberal concepts of democracy and transition of power. 
Although, the adoption of some or all of those liberal concepts would arrive much later 
                                                          
22 The Egyptian Revolution of 1952, known in Egypt as the 23 July Revolution, began with a 
military coup d'état by the Free Officers Movement, a group of army officers led by Muhammad 
Naguib and Gamal Abdel Nasser.  The revolution was initially aimed at overthrowing King Farouk.  
However, the movement had more political ambitions, and soon moved to abolish the constitutional and 
aristocracy of Egypt and Sudan, establish a republic, end the British occupation of the country, and secure 
the independence of Sudan (Euben and Zaman 2009, 53).  
23 According to al-Mahdi, The most important incident in the history of the Muslim Brotherhood is when 
Major Mahmoud Labib (the right arm of General Aziz Al-Masri while fighting with the Ottomans against 
Italy in Libya) together with seven low-rank soldiers that included Gamal Abdel Nasser and Khaled 
Mohey El-Din in 1943 went to pay allegiance to al-Banna, swearing on the Holy Quran and a gun to give 
birth to the Muslim Brotherhood Officers.  The illness of Mahmoud Labib and later his death in 
1950 gave Gamal Abdel Nasser leadership; many members in the secret organisation were trained by 
Nasser (al-Mahdi 2005; Zahid and Madley 2006; Pargeter 2010).  
24 Egyptian King Farouk saw the Brothers as a useful counter to the power of the major secularist political 
party, nationalist Wafd Party (Delegation Party"; Arabic: Hizb al-Wafd ) and the communists.  During 
1920s and 1930s, al-Wafd was instrumental in the development of the 1923 constitution and supported 
moving Egypt from dynastic rule to a constitutional, where power would be wielded by a nationally 
elected parliament. The party was dissolved after the 1952 Egyptian Revolution led by Nasser. 
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on, in the case of neo-Islamists, or not at all, in the case of the Egyptian MB, such as in 
their refusal to accept a women as head of state, even up until now.  
Despite widespread imprisonment and torture of MB members and Nasser's 
accusations of a coup plot during the mid- 1960s (which were never proven and always 
denied) and unlike MB splinter groups such as Islamic Group ‘Gamaa Islamiyya’ ('IG') 
or Islamic Jihad ‘Jihad Islamic’ (‘IJ’), the MB was never involved in armed uprisings, the 
1952 military coup being a major exception.   
From the late 1970s to the mid-1990s, the militants of IG and IJ were at the 
forefront of violent political activity. They 
killed dozens of foreign tourists, bombed banks, tour buses, and a café of a five-star Cairo 
hotel, assassinated cabinet ministers, attempted to kill president Mubarek himself, [most 
terrorism happened during Mubarek rule from 1981-2011] and carried out the bloodiest 
massacre in modern Egyptian history in the Pharaonic town of Luxor, in November 1997.  
Fifty-eight foreign tourists and four Egyptians were killed; some hacked to death with knives  
(Abdo 2000, 5).   
The MB developed gradually, leaving behind much of its revolutionary baggage 
as a result of the harsh security measures imposed on them by the Nasser regime (1952-
1970) followed by the relief provided by the Anwar el-Sadat presidency (1970-1981).  
Sadat gained popularity as the ‘believer president’ and made  
peace with religious forces by initiating a thoroughgoing Islamization of Egyptian society.  
Sadat rewrote the educational curriculum along religious lines and amended Article 2 of 
Egypt’s extremely progressive constitution to stipulate that Sharia – Islamic Law – was the 
‘main source’ of the nation’s laws (Traub 2007, par. 10).   
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These institutional changes favored Islam and religiosity and contrasted starkly 
with Nasser's harsh nationalist secularism, contributing to the shrinkage of the 
revolutionary aspects of the 1970s MB.   
Meanwhile, the newly emerged takfiris groups such as GI and IJ believed society 
and the government to be on the same path of jahiliyyah (religious ignorance) and 
recommended jihad to re-Islamise Egypt.  The MB over the years viewed these extreme 
interpretations as wrong and un-Islamic. However, their efforts to Islamise Egyptian 
society and the bureaucracy without violence have been described as 'revivals' by some 
observers (Abdo 2000).  These efforts did not work as well in nearby Arab countries.   
Transnational ‘copy and paste’ experiences 
On the international level, the MB spread to almost every Arab country in the 
early days of post-colonialism (1950-1960s), using the same literature, development and 
methodology of Egypt's movement. By the 1970s, the organisation spread into most of 
the Muslim world and into Muslim minority countries as well as within Muslim 
communities in the West. Fledgling branches might later reach complete independence, 
to the point of even changing their name. Yet the organisation that has spread its branches 
out over eighty countries has no great geostrategic design, as Roy (2013) observes. 
Parteger (2010, 9) thus concluded that MB is a; 
transnational organization that emphasizes the independence of its national branches; it 
declares that its ultimate aim is to establish an Islamic state, but asserts its willingness to 
participate in the democratic process; it projects itself as pacific, yet some of its branches have 
been directly involved in violent action; it broadly rejects the West and Western values, yet is 
increasingly anxious to be seen in Western eyes as a moderate organization that can represent 
the voice of Muslims.  (Pargeter 2010, 9)   
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The organisation never stopped its general rhetoric about belonging to the 
worldwide Muslim community, or the ummah. Although this solidarity becomes more 
symbolic over the last few decades, the Palestinian cause has prompted MB action over 
the years. 
The most sensitive topic for the MB is its alleged international organisation, 
Tanzeem al-Dawli.  This closed elite is wrapped in secrecy and is the subject of much 
speculation.  While some Muslim Brothers acknowledge the organisation as representing 
the MB's international presence, transnational identity, and as a vehicle for transnational 
coordination and communications, others dismiss it as little more than a coordinating 
body, with no significant function (Pargeter 2010).  Doctor Hassan al-Huwaidi, former 
deputy to the supreme guide (al-Murshid) of the organisation, described it as an advisory 
body that has no executive power (Pargeter 2010).  This explanation is likely to be true, if 
MB reaction to Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait in 1991, where the MB was split 
between supporters and opponents of the invasion, is taken as a guide. A similar division 
occurred over the participation of the Algerian MB branch in formal politics and 
government during the 1990s, while the Algerian army was massacring insurgents 
affiliated with the Algerian Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) and other Salafis jihadis groups. 
The reason behind this diversity is that each MB branch developed according to its 
domestic circumstances and struggles.  Branches were autonomous and not directed by 
any central MB organisation. 
Furthermore, MB branches disagree about domestic politics in Sudan, Yemen, 
Syria, and Palestine for various reasons. It appears more true than not that the MB is 
poorly prepared for international affairs and lacks a united political strategy; let alone 
 37 
proper coordination and communication. The fact that Mohammed Morsi was ousted 
while Ennahda continued to share power with secularists is demonstrative of the lack of 
coordination amongst branches and incongruity in adopting policies regarding power 
sharing, acceptance of secularist ideologies and parties, and the level of concession they 
are willing to endure.   
The greatest modern Islamist ideologist, Indian-turned-Pakistani Abul Ala 
Mawdudi (Maududi) (1903-1979) was the real manufacturer of MB's political 
philosophy.  His approach to Islam was quintessentially political, as Ayoob (2008, 67) 
explained: 
Mawdudi accepted only politics as a legitimate vehicle for the manifestation of the Islamic 
revelation and as the sole means for the expression of Islamic spirituality, a position that 
correlated piety with political activity, the cleansing of the soul with political liberation, and 
salvation with utopia.  
Mawdudi was the first contemporary Islamic thinker to write ideologically about 
the Islamic state. He believed the Islamic state to be a fruit of modernity, removed from 
classical Islamic thinking.  The conflict in the Indian subcontinent between Indian 
Muslims and others, and their wish for separation in a new state (Pakistan in 1948) 
influenced Mawdudi to offer a concept of the modern sovereign nation-state, which might 
at first glance seem contradictory to the concept of the universal ummah. However, 
Mawdudi's ‘state’ was based on the concept of God’s sovereignty (hakimiyyah), which 
would ultimately result in Muslims being governed according to Sharia along God's path 
(Ayoob 2008). While Mawdudi’s ideology was adopted and reproduced by later 
ideologues, Sayyid Qutb’s ideology was not, and is preserved as a unique case.  
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Sayyed Qutb is one of the most charismatic thinkers of the Muslim Brotherhood 
movement and he is said to be responsible for the Egyptian jihadi Salafi groups, which 
prospered in the 1970s. Qutb was an important MB leader during the 1960s and an 
influential ideologue with his famous theory of jahiliyyah.25 He added the latter to 
Mawdudi's principle of hakimiyyah (God’s sovereignty), to form a full-fledged theory 
with religious-political and philosophical implications. Furthermore, analysts such as 
Khatab observe that the exponents of more extreme versions of political Islam have used 
Mawdudi's theory, citing the fact that the current al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Dawahiri 
was deeply influenced by Qutb’s work (Khatab 2006, 1). Egyptian President Nasser 
hanged Qutb on 29 August 1966 for an alleged coup plot, which then triggered reactions 
and condemnations from around the world. 
Contemporary Islamism is flexible enough in that its many varieties are tied to, 
sometimes, contradictory elements. The influence of Qutb, therefore, has not been 
overwhelming. Indeed, most Tunisian Islamists, including Ghanouchi himself, were 
influenced by Qutb's writings during the 1970s and early 1980s. But this was before the 
MB across the world denounced Qutb's extreme views, without denying that Qutb had 
been one of its prominent leaders (Khatab 2006).   
It is worth adding that MB is anyway less revolutionary than the group of HT, 
which was established in the early 1950s calling for the global khilafah (caliphate).  This 
group rejects what they call the ‘materialistic tools of change’, which literally means they 
reject the use of violence, revolution, and coup d’état in changing unwanted governments 
(Allani 2013). They continue to be present in relatively small groups around the world 
                                                          
25 Jahiliyyah refers to a new period of ignorance within the contemporary Muslim societies, a time akin to 
the pre-Islamic period of Arabian paganism when the community was ignorant of God and his 
commandments (Davidson 2003, 12). 
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and are considered terrorists in some countries and extremists in others, but operate 
almost freely in Western countries like Britain and Australia.  Only two Arab countries in 
the world recognise HT as a legal political party: Lebanon and post-2011 revolution 
Tunisia.   
During the 1970s and 1980s, the MB was oppressed by most Arab and Muslim 
regimes, along with other more radical Islamist groups, and denied legal status and 
unrecognised as a legitimate political player (Calvatorta 2012; Alexander 2012).  The 
Afghan civil war (1989-1992) gave the more extremist Islamic groups the opportunity to 
compete with the MB through the military training they gained in Afghanistan during the 
Soviet-Afghan war in the 1980s. One of these Afghani trained groups, al-Qaeda, was 
later found responsible for the 9/11 terrorist attack. 
In fact, the Muslim Brotherhood sent many of their members from various Arab 
countries to contribute to the Afghani jihad.  One of them, Abdullah Azzem, was Osama 
Bin Laden's teacher. While the Muslim Brotherhood does not deny this fact or their 
previous support of the Afghani jihad during the 1980s, they've denied any allegiance to 
Osama Bin Laden and condemn al-Qaeda's ongoing terrorist activities (Abdo 2000). 
Islamism has experienced a significant evolution over the past twenty years, at 
times leading to contradictory messages and agendas.  Islamism gained ground during the 
1970s and 1980s, especially after the assassination of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat on 
6 October 1981 and during the Afghan mujahedeen warfare against the Soviets.  On the 
other hand, Islamists failed to rule in Algeria in 1992, when FIS was pushed aside in a 
military coup and over 200,000 civilians were killed in a decade-long civil war. The 
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bloody aftermath of that Arab world’s first democratic election had a ripple effect on the 
calculations of Islamist groups across the region (Roy 2012d).   
Roy’s observation regarding the failure of political Islam after the aborted 
Algerian election in 1992 recognises the historic milestone for mainstream Islamism in 
the Algerian civil war of the 1990s.  Also notable in the shift towards neo-Islamism are 
Sudan's failure to retain power, its misuse of power, and ongoing civil war.  
As mentioned in the definition of neo-Islamism, the new Islamists are undergoing 
serious attempts to learn from past failures and make alterations, which entail inclusion, 
moderation and a civil Western style democracy, which assumes compatibility with 
Islam.  
Since the early 1970s, Islamism’s division into maqasidis and dhawahiris has 
become more obvious and dramatic, as this school of Islamic thought divided into two 
camps: political violence, and grassroots Islamisation.  The schism came about mainly a 
result of Egyptian nationalist President Gamal Abdel Nasser’s 1967 war against Israel, 
his plan to eradicate the MB, then his brief unity with Syria and war of intervention in 
Yemen in 1970.  The MB, in a state of desperation, called for a review of old tactics, 
methods and even political thinking.  On the other hand, an elite group of extremely 
radical Islamists, who possibly interpreted the works of the MB ideologist Sayyed Qutb 
incorrectly26, established their jihadist groups, which would become even more radical 
                                                          
26 There was widespread debate during 1980s and 1990s between MB intellectuals on whether Qutb's 
ideas were responsible for the takfiri movements (jihadis) who emerged in the 1970s and 1980s.  Most 
leaders did not denounce Qutb or openly reject his ideas about Jahiliya and Hakimiya, although many 
called Qutb's literature adab nekba (literally: literature of catastrophe).  Qutb's later works are filled with 
“a pervasive sense of despair about a world enveloped by a new jahiliyya and a concomitant hardening of 
his thought around a stark polarity between good and evil, the solution to which is as radical as it is 
unspecific” (Euben and Zaman 2009, 53). 
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after the Egyptian President at the time Anwar Sadat signed the 1978 peace treaty with 
Israel.   
In this regard, Abdo (2000) stated that 1970s Egyptian Islamists, who advocated 
the creation of an Islamic society by Islamic means, and not by violence, led the revival 
and were “more organised and methodical than their predecessors had been” (Abdo 2000, 
7).  In fact, this grassroots effort towards Islamisation of the societal infrastructure was 
mixed with Islamists’  
pragmatic attempts to maintain the system [that] reinforced abandoning its underlying 
principles. Islamism becomes compelled, both by its own internal contradictions and by 
societal pressure; to reinvent itself, but it [has done] so at the cost of a qualitative shift (Bayat 
2007, 11). 
Conclusion: 
In general, Islamists had failed to offer clear and high quality social and economic 
programs nor to conceptualize civic modes of change until the success of AKP in Turkey 
in the early 2000s. 
However, taking a deeper look at the tasks undertaken to change civil society, 
such as Islamising financial institutions, universities and high schools, and regulating the 
major blue and white collar labor unions; demonstrates some successful narratives. From 
a political point of view, however the Islamists' provisional control of the unions and the 
illusion of Islamisation of different societal hubs resulted in no intellectual reform, 
Islamic revival, let alone any real progress towards the original MB political agenda. 
In fact, the sudden disappearance of the Cold War tensions in the late 1980s showed that 
this economic, political and societal progress was more delusional than real. The 
Islamists' ability to mobilise the street and to be the most prevalent symbol of populism 
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within the Arab world over the last three or four decades has not necessarily led to 
organisational achievement by the Islamic movement as a whole.  Furthermore, “the post-
Cold War environment has made it easier for Islamic movements to overtly embrace 
aspects of capitalism” (Hadiz 2014, 129). Turkey's AKP adopted at early stages the neo-
liberal economy, associated with conservative centre-right political values. The neo-
Islamists of the post Arab Spring did the same, retaining the same economic system of 
Tunisia's Ben Ali, and Morocco's King Mohamed II. Today’s Islamists have no specific 
Islamised economic blueprints, let alone workable social, constitutional or juristic 
blueprints whatsoever (Roy 2011).   
Neo-Islamists, in particular, appear to be invested in their parties' political failures 
(Roy 1994). This defeatist outlook and lack of effective blueprints have steered neo-
Islamists into Machiavellian style politics.  Acceptance of post-Cold War conditions, and 
then the hostile international environment following 9/11, has further pushed neo-
Islamists into gradualism and maqasidis-type thinking and action. For example, while 
Ennahda was officially absent from Tunisia for over twenty years, the Turkish AKP 
relied upon its remarkable army of businessmen and considerable holdings.  Islamist 
business leaders with their “self-identity, especially among the so-called Anatolian Tigers 
[are] members of this rising bourgeoisie [who] consider their newfound influence useful 
in advancing a ‘common good’” (Hadiz 2014, 129). 
Arab Spring slogans, which has made by post-Islamist non-partisan youth and 
neo-Islamist cadres were empty of anti-Western and anti-American sentiment and 
focused largely on one theme: erhal, which is the Arabic world for ‘go’, chanting ‘The 
people want the change of regime’. This 2011 slogan spread from Tunisian streets, where 
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it was actually uttered as the awkwardly-used French word dégage, to Cairo's Tahrir 
Square, to Yemen and the rest of the Arab countries.   
The development of the Egyptian MB, which spread to other countries including 
Turkey, Tunisia and Morocco, and the newer version of Islamism, neo-Islamism, both 
had roots in conservative religious reformist thinking and the violent revolutionary 
thinking of pre-1970s MB, according to many experts (Abdo 2000; Roy 1994; Filiu 
2011). Hence, many observers still argue about whether MB has ever been a 
revolutionary movement or even a fascist movement, (Pipe 2008) or whether it has been 
always a conservative religious group. 
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THE RISE AND CHARACTERISTICS 
OF NEO-ISLAMISM 
 
Neo-Islamism and other manifestations, such as the emergence of jihadi groups in 
the 1970s, have their origins in, or have intersected with, the pervasive Muslim 
Brotherhood movement.  
Many academics and policy makers have paid special attention to the diversity 
within Islamism prior to and since the Arab Spring (Wright 2012).  Others, like Daniel 
Pipes, (2006, 2008), have long depicted Islamism as a monolithic phenomenon, though 
he might see Islam in general as a diverse religion27.  Pipes defined Islamism as deriving 
from Islam, but as a militant, “misanthropic, misogynist, triumphalist, millenarian, anti-
modern, anti-Christian, anti-Semitic, terroristic, jihadistic, and suicidal version of it” 
                                                          
27 Daniel Pipes (1949/..  ) is an American historian, writer, and political commentator.  He is the president 
of the Middle East and publisher of its Middle East Quarterly journal.  His writing focuses on American 
foreign policy, the Middle East, Islam and Islamism. His controversial views towards Islam and Islamism 
generated enormous reactions from Arabs and Muslims in the USA and abroad. Pipes stated that Muslim 
practices can be categorized under one of three headings: ‘traditional Islam’, which he sees as pragmatic 
and non-violent, ‘Islamism’, which he views as dangerous and militant, and ‘moderate Islam’, which he 
describes as underground and not yet codified into a popular movement. 
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(Tassel 2005, 38).  This view has been influential among sections of the policy-making 
community, especially within the United States (Cavatorta 2012b). 
However, Islamism is not monolithic. On the contrary, Islamism is a diverse 
phenomenon, even within one country under the same socio-economic and political 
conditions, or operating under authoritarian or non-authoritarian regimes, within its 
constraints and cultural settings (Cavatorta 2012b).   
Definitions of Islamism28 differ widely amongst its adherents, who sometimes 
contradict each other on a wide range of matters, including ideology, policy and goals.  
Sometimes the tekfiris29 declare each other kafir and in some countries this has led to 
bloodshed. This recently happened in Iraq, Afghanistan and Algeria and is ongoing in 
Syria30.   
This chapter also defines neo-Islamism and distinguishes it from post-Islamism 
and neo-fundamentalism.  In the process, it explores the internal characteristics of neo-
Islamism, including a new form of religiosity, gradual Islamisation, and modernising, 
moderation and nationalist Islamism as well as pragmatic relations with the West. 
                                                          
28 Boubekeur and Roy (2012, 3) note:  
[Scholars] have long been preoccupied with describing the phenomenon of political Islam, and have 
employed a variety of terms and labels to create a theoretical framework for categorising Islamist 
movements.  This panoply of terminology includes: ‘fundamentalism’, ‘radical Islam’, ‘militant Islam’, 
‘political Islam’ and ‘Islamism’.  Academics have also tried to capture the changing nature of Islamism as 
a political ideology by using a host of additional qualifying labels, such as ‘neo’, ‘post’, ‘failure’, and 
‘decline’ . . . until recently, ‘Islamism’ mainly referred to the ideology that employs Islam as a tool for 
political action.  Islamism claims to recreate a true Islamic society, not simply by imposing the shari’a, 
but also by establishing an Islamic state through political means.    
29  Tekfir, tekfiri and kefir are Arabic terms for heretic, a person who declares others heretics, and 
apostate, respectively.    
30 The Syrian military resistance against the Assad regime, which started with Free Syrian Army (FSA) in 
late 2011 and early 2012, then dispersed into dozens of pro Islamist militias, many of whom are related to 
al-Qaeda in one way or another. By late 2013, the FSA was fighting al-Qaeda affiliated tekfiris groups as 
well as Assad's formal army. (Dahi 2013) 
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A New approach to Islamism 
Classifying Islamists into two camps, extremists and moderates, in terms of their 
commitment to peaceful or violent means of change, is the most common method used by 
researchers currently. I suggest, however, that today’s Islamists are divided into two 
major groups on the basis of their understanding of the Islamic religious sacred texts and 
the methodologies they use to approach them. These are, respectively, literalists 
(Dhawahir or Dhawahiris) and maqasidis, who adopt non-literal readings of religious 
texts.  
Unlike the first classification, which might include other political stances of non-
Islamic affiliation such as left, far right or nationalist, this second classification is unique 
to Islam. However, this classification is not based on a violent/non-violent stance, but on 
personal interpretation of sacred texts. In fact, all religions across the world can have both 
literalists and maqasidis, including personal or inter-personal interpretations of the same 
sacred text. Consequently, the same text can have a range of interpretations that, at times, 
totally contradict each other. 
Literalists or dhawahir, who read and follow literally the sacred texts, might be 
violent or non-violent, extremist or non-extremist.  They are “scriptists”31 (in reference to 
the sacred scripts) and range from al-Qaeda and its affiliated jihadists groups such as 
Ansar a-Sharia in Tunisia, to non-violent groups such as Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT), the 
                                                          
31 Scriptism refers here to literal interpretation of Islamic sacred sources, or the original scripts, using 
reason, in considering the use of metaphors, or examining the aims and surrounding circumstances of the 
original sacred text (namely the Quraan and Sunnah). This literal interpretation has been practiced since 
the early days of Islam, with some incidents even occurring during the prophet's life, lending them some 
legitimacy. Generally speaking, mainly the Salafis and Salafiyah practice scriptism, as opposed to the 
other four schools of Islamic jurisprudence, Maliki, Shafie, Hanbali and Hanafi, who tend to rely on 
reason in  considering the general aims of Sharia, the circumstances and conditions related to the original 
text and the conditions of the text's contemporary application. 
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scientific Salafis and the Saudi pro-Government Wahhabis.  The Egyptian al-Noor Salafi 
Party, which backed General el Sisi in his August 2013 coup against MB, also belongs to 
the literalist group. 
The maqasidis, on the other hand, follow the aims and objectives of Sharia rather 
than its literal meaning.  The debate between literalist and maqasidi ideologues goes back 
to early Islam and has lasted throughout fourteen centuries, involving theologists, jurists 
and interpreters or narrators of the Quran and hadith32. However, what has been at stake 
in the debates over fourteen centuries has varied between one generation and the next. 
Such debates may have been profoundly connected to a given generation; such as 
intellectual, sectarian or social-economic conflicts that took place within Muslim 
communities in specific historical contexts. However, the two ways of thinking, using the 
same logical techniques and the same verses of Quran or hadiths, have been almost 
always the same.  
Contemporary political Islam has added a special flavor to such old-fashioned 
debates, which is the focus of Imam Shatibi's33 notable work, Muwafaqaa’t fi Usool al-
Sharia (The Reconciliation of the Origins of Sharia). Neo-Islamists, in particular those of 
North Africa, notably Ennahda and Morocco's Justice and Development Party (PJD34), 
took special interest in Maqasid a-Sharia and Shatibi's other works, which impacted 
                                                          
32 Hadith refers to stories that record the Prophet Mohamed's life and are considered part of the sunnah, or 
the ideal life prescribed for Muslims. 
33 Imam Abu Ishaq al-Shatibi was an Andalusian Maliki scholar, who died in 1388 in Granada, Spain. He 
is well known amongst modern Islamists and within contemporary Islamic thought for his notable work 
on the philosophy of Sharia, or the theory of the higher objectives and intents of Islamic Law.  Imam 
Shatibi's theory, which he discussed in the four-volumes work, Al-Muwafaqaat fi Usool al-Sharia, and 
translated and published into English as The Reconciliation of the Fundamentals of Islamic Law, was first 
published in Tunis, Tunisia around 1884-85. 
34 The Moroccan Justice and Development Party (Arabic: ةيمنتلاو ةلادعلا بزح;  French abbreviation: PJD) is 
the ruling party in Morocco since 29 November 2011 and is considered the second most important neo-
Islamist party in North Africa, after the Tunisian Ennahda party. 
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greatly on the evolution of neo-Islamism and contributed to its contemporary ideological 
shape.   
Not all Islamic rival groups exist within the maqasidis, although the MB and its 
affiliates belong to this group and constitute the majority of Islamists across the globe.  
Despite that, we find some MB figures such as their icon Sayyid Qutb, cannot be 
qualified as maqasidi, and almost everywhere, you may find minorities of literalists 
within a maqasidi Islamic movement, and vice versa.   
Literalists, on the other hand, are varied and compete with each other for power 
and membership, but they remain the minority in the world of Islamists today. 
Neo-Islamists are the most obvious manifestation of the maqasidi branch.  This is 
seen in the thinking of such luminaries of the MB movement as Dr Ahmed Risouni, the 
PJD’s counterpart to Ennahda’s Ghanouchi, He is a scholar specialising in the maqasid a-
sharia, advocating a path widely considered crucial to the development of neo-Islamism 
(Chamkhi 2014; Aktay 2013, 120; Risouni 2012). 
Definition of neo- Islamism 
As the term neo-Islamism is rarely used within the academic context, in 
journalism the term remains vague and ambiguous.  Robin Wright (2012b, 9), however, 
insightfully described neo-Islamism as 
more flexible [than other traditional forms of Islamism], informed, and mature in their political 
outlook.  For them sharia is about values, civilization, and political context.  Neo-Islamists are 
seeking the ultimate objectives of sharia but without bonding each situation to a certain 
religious text.  They believe that Islam is dynamic and not a set of fixed rules and tenets, but 
rather an organic belief system that can adapt to or live with the times.  Neo-Islamists can be 
progressive and, on some issues, even liberal. [The] Neo-Islamists trust the reform scholars.   
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Wright’s characterisation provides a description of neo-Islamist values and some 
of their activities; rather than delivering a precise definition or a method of distinguishing 
it from other types of Islamism.   
In a recent paper, Roy (2012c) used the term ‘new Islamists’ to describe these old 
Islamist parties that are facing this new era of transition, from illegality under the old 
regimes, to power, noting the enormous changes in ideology and day to day politics: 
The new Islamist brand will increasingly mix technocratic modernism and conservative values. 
The movements that have entered the political mainstream cannot now afford to turn their 
backs on multiparty politics for fear of alienating a significant portion of the electorate that 
wants stability and peace, not revolution (Roy 2012c, 18).  
Within this context, Gerges (2013, 391) observed that the Islamist parties are 
slowly moving away from their traditional agenda of establishing an authoritarian Islamic 
state and imposing Islamic laws, “to a new focus that is centered on creating a ‘civil 
Islam’ that permeates society and accepts political pluralism”. The Islamist parties are 
increasingly becoming ‘service’ parties concerned mainly with the provision of social 
services and local public goods. Gerges added that “the Turkish model, [that of Justice 
and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi, AKP] with the religiously observant 
provincial bourgeoisie as its king-pin and a pattern of linkage with the business classes 
and market liberalism, also acts as a reminder that Islam and capitalism are mutually 
reinforcing and compatible” (Gerges 2013, 391). 
  While the Arab new Islamists were deeply affected, and to some extent stunned, 
by the first Gulf war (then afterwards the Iraqi and Afghani wars post 9/11), Turkish neo-
Islamists and others in Indonesia, Malaysia and elsewhere responded pragmatically to 
their local political challenges (Tomsa 2012; Bin Mohamed Osman 2011). Turkish neo-
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Islamists constantly improved their methods and political performance over the last thirty 
years, but the landmark event that produced the most dramatic changes was the 1997 
Turkish military coup that ousted Necmettin Erbakan's (1926-2011) pro-Islamist 
government.  Since then, neo-Islamists have embraced democratisation, with or without 
the 'Islamic' label. Emerging democratic tendencies and pragmatism have placed 
Turkey’s neo-Islamists in a better position today to participate and rule in a free 
democratic society than the traditional Islamism of the 1970s and 1980s (Ergun 2012; 
Chamkhi 2014; Menderes 2006; Cavdar 2006). 
More precisely, this neo-Islamism can be traced back to the 1990s, to the 
Sudanese Islamist leader Hassan al-Turabi, (1932- ) who influenced other MB leaders 
and activists in the region, including Rached Ghanouchi, (1942- ) the founder of the 
Tunisian Ennahda. Ghanouchi admitted the influence of the Sudanese Islamic movement 
on Ennahda ideology, especially its pragmatism and favoring of the participation of 
women within the movement and wider society (Ghanouchi 2011e).   
On this tendency towards pragmatism, Gerges (2013, 392) noted that  
… increasing evidence shows that the balance of social forces among Islamists has shifted toward 
pragmatists. It is a generational shift that favors technocrats and professionals, such as engineers, 
dentists, doctors, attorneys, and teachers, who are open-minded and reformist, less obsessed with 
dogmas, identity, and culture wars, and more willing to build governing coalitions with ideological 
opponents, whether they are non Muslim, liberal, or secular. For example Ennahda in Tunisia 
prefers to form alliances with liberals and leftists, not with the ultraconservative Salafis. 
The earliest experience of ‘Islamic governance’ (apart from the June 1989 
Sudanese coup d’état led secretly by Omar Bechir and Hassan al-Turabi), involved the 
establishment of the first modern Islamist-secularist power sharing arrangement in 
Turkey.  The Welfare Party (Refah Partisi, or RP), headed by the father of Turkish 
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modern Islamism, Erbakan,35 lasted one year (1996-1997) before the Turkish army and 
secular elite ousted the government and thereafter demolished the RP.  Shock and 
political failure led the way to a younger leader, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the successful 
mayor of Istanbul, to review the coalition's methods and pave the way for Turkey's 
official version of neo-Islamism, the AKP, which has proven to be the most successful 
version to date36.  
Professional pragmatic young Islamists such as Erdoğan played the Islamism 
versus secularism game in a new way.  Erdoğan refused to be called Islamist or neo-
Islamist, preferring instead to be called neo-secularist or simply conservative Muslim, 
and advocated a neo-secularism that does not contradict Islam37 (Kuru 2013; Yilmaz 
2012; Taşpınar 2012). 
                                                          
35 Erbakan entered a coalition in 1996 with Tansu Çiller's Correct Path Party (Doğru Yol Partisi), or DYP. 
36 Turkey has experienced substantial sustained growth since turning its economy around in 2001.  Today, 
Turkey is the world's 17th largest economy, and a member of the Group of Twenty (G20) Finance 
Ministers and Central Bank Governors (G-20).  Turkey's GDP (in million Euro) rose from 219,816 in 
2001 to 441,600 in 2009; its GDP growth rate was -5.7% in 2001, strong from 2002-2007, -4.7% in 2009, 
and an estimated 8.2% in 2010 (Çelik and Çelik 2012, 7). 
37 Ömer Taşpınar noted, “Autocratic regimes in the Muslim world often ban religious parties, which then 
go underground and turn violent.  Turkey’s Islamists have taken a different path.  Despite being 
repeatedly outlawed and ejected from power, pious politicians have shunned violence, embraced 
democracy, and moved into the mainstream”. The Economist noted in 2008.  “No Islamic party has been 
as moderate and pro-Western as the AKP, which catapulted into government in 2002 promising to lead 
Turkey into the European Union”. He added that Erdoğan, who founded the party, rejects defining the 
AKP in religious terms. “We are not an Islamic party, and we also refuse labels such as Muslim-
democrat,” he said in 2005. The AKP leader instead calls the party’s agenda 'conservative 
democracy.'  (Taşpınar 2012, 127-135) The AKP’s journey from political Islam to conservative 
democracy is not just the result of political expediency or respect for the red lines of Turkish secularism.  
The evolution of Turkey’s capitalism under the leadership of Turgut Özal in the 1980s created an 
entrepreneurial Muslim bourgeoisie in the conservative heartland of Anatolia.  The new Muslim 
bourgeoisie had a greater stake in politics—and became more engaged … they have been more concerned 
about maximizing profits, creating access to international currency markets, and ensuring political 
stability than about introducing Islamic law or creating a theocracy.  Turkey now has thousands of such 
small and medium-sized export-oriented businesses, often referred to as 'Anatolian tigers.' The vast 
majority of them support the AKP.  Beginning in the 1990s, the party’s assumption of political power 
gradually moderated the radical elements within Turkish political Islam” (Taşpınar 2012, 127-135). 
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Erdoğan has successfully avoided the ‘Islamism’ label and its disastrous legal 
consequences, whereby Turkish laws and the Turkish Constitutional Court may prohibit 
Turkish politicians from practicing politics or establishing any political party on religious 
grounds. Erdoğan's AKP denies being an Islamist or neo-Islamist party, despite 
Erdoğan’s close ties with MB movements in the Arab world, his support for their causes, 
and the provision of logistics for conferences, academic support, and economic and 
commercial agreements with newly elected governments post the Arab Spring, 
particularly in Tunisia and Egypt.38 
The concept of secularism, however, varies significantly recently as 2008, the 
AKP itself was defined by the majority in Turkey’s Constitutional Court as being ‘anti-
secular’ and only narrowly escaped a move to have it shut it down on those grounds 
(Kuru 2013). 
While it is difficult to compare the Tunisian Ennahda Party with AKP due to 
historical differences and experiences in the modern battle between Islamism and 
secularism (Torelli 2012), particularly after the Arab Spring, leaders like Rashid 
Ghanouchi believe that Ennahda will take the path of AKP and will achieve the same 
success.  A number of Arab MB intellectuals like Ghanouchi, Yussef Qaradawi and 
Salim al-Awaa, have gradually transformed the Islamists’ definitions of the state, 
citizenship, the Islamic nation and political participation in the last twenty years, and 
also, sometimes readjusted their goals accordingly.  Such a transformation in ideology is 
                                                          
38 Turkish foreign policy has played a very active role in the Arab world post the 2011 revolutions; 
Erdoğan himself travelled twice to Tunisia, at least once to Egypt, Libya and Morocco, welcomed the 
Syrian refugees and provided limitless logistic upport for the Syrian National Council and even the Syrian 
Free Army.  The Ennahda led government in Tunisia enjoyed special under carpet support during the first 
two years after the October 2011 election, including millions of dollars in government aid, delegates of 
dozens of Turkish businessmen to invest in the Tunisian economy, and so on. 
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necessary to align the party with the new religious youth who were the instruments of 
change in the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions, and to encourage them to join or vote 
for the party in their first free elections.   
Differentiating between post-Islamists and neo-Islamists 
This is where the non-partisan so-called 'post-Islamism' forces (consisting of 
university students activists, white collar religious employees and newly graduated 
professionals), identified by Bayat (2011) and Roy (2011a, 2012c), join these newly 
renovated parties after the Arab revolutions. However, neo-Islamism is different from 
what Bayat and Roy called post-Islamism for four main reasons.   
- First, neo-Islamists, unlike the post-Islamists, remain in traditional 
Islamic parties and prefer organisation and change through collective 
efforts undertaken by political/religious parties39 rather than through 
individual efforts.   
- Second, neo-Islamists, unlike the post-Islamists; have not given up on the 
idea of Shariaa or shariatisation40 of the state and society, unlike post-
Islamists; rather, neo-Islamists use gradualist tactics to further their 
agendas.  
                                                          
39 The neo-Islamists belong to the historic revivalist and dawaa movement that led to the Muslim 
Brotherhood, which was established by al-Banna in 1928. Indeed, the Tunisian neo-Islamists who are 
mostly still cadres of the 1981 Movement de la Tendence Islamique ‘MTI’ ('The Movement of Islamic 
Tendency' (Arabic: يملاسلإا هاجتلاا ةكرح Harakat al-Ittijāh al-Islāmī )  which changed its name to Ennahda 
in 1988, are debating today how to separate (or not) the dawaa activities from the political party. This 
challenge has not been solved yet, and is scheduled to be discussed in the 10th General Congress of 
Ennahda, to be held in 2015.  
40 Shariatisation means to replace a secular law system with Islamic oriented laws, well known as Sharia. 
 54 
- The neo-Islamists, unlike the post-Islamists, do not explicitly give up the 
ideal of the Islamic state, though; they might do so in the foreseeable 
future.  
- Neo-Islamists; unlike the post-Islamists; continue to be deeply concerned 
about dawaa (religious preaching and spreading the call of Islam) as 
much as they become concerned about taking over power, 
democratisation, human rights, and fair treatment by governments. 
However, the AKP in particular has maintained the narrative that it doesn’t 
promote shariatisation or an Islamic state and is happy to be called a secular party. Such 
stance is contradicted by the AKP’s unlimited support of MB in Egypt and the neo-
Islamist parties across the MENA region in the recent years, especially after the Arab 
Spring. Having said that, many AKP supporters are more post-Islamist than neo-Islamist. 
Indeed, many members of the Alavi community vote for the AKP. Furthermore, the 
Fethullah Gülen group41 (known as Hizmet Movement), which enjoyed years of alliance 
with AKP before they their relationship broke down in 2010, cannot be classified as neo-
Islamists, but post-Islamist par excellence (Torelli 2012; Schwartz 2011; Yilmaz 2012; 
Karen 2012; Aktay 2012; Kömeçoglu 2014; Mneimneh 2011; Kuru 2013). 
                                                          
41 Fethullah Gülen (1941- ) is a Turkish Islamic opinion leader and the founder of the Gülen movement, 
which is usually referred to as Hizmet movement or as Cemaat (the Community) by the broader public in 
Turkey. He currently lives in Pennsylvania, USA. Gülen teaches a modernised Anatolian (Hanafi) version 
of Islam, derived from Sunni Muslim scholar Said Nursi's teachings.  Gülen has stated his belief in 
science, interfaith dialogue among the People of the Book (Jews, Christians and Muslims), and multi-
party democracy.  He has initiated such dialogue with the Vatican and some Jewish organizations. Since 
late 2010, the AKP has been embroiled in a major conflict with the Gülen movement. Recently the 
Turkish government delayed the extradition case against Gülen that would have brought him back from 
voluntary exile in the United States (Wikipedia, 2013 see: Fethullah Gülen). 
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Consequently, the neo-Islamists across the MENA region, face accusations of 
exploiting democracy and the transition of power to establish an Islamic state, by arguing 
that Islamisation is compatible with it (Torelli 2012; Yilmaz 2012; Karen 2012; Aktay 
2012; Komecoglu 2014; Cavdar 2006; Ergun 2012; Kuru 2013). Ghanouchi and others 
have had to fend off accusations of hypocrisy in their embrace of democracy and 
postponing an Islamisation program (Ghanouchi 2011a, 2011b). 
Despite that, in using politically expedient tactics, neo-Islamists are contributing 
to an evolving ideology that may lead to them abandoning completely the aim of their 
forefathers, that is, the establishment of the Islamic state (Roy 2011a and 2012). 
On the other hand, El Taleedy (2013) observed that the Egyptian MB failed to 
understand the requirements of political geography in building a national political 
consensus that would exceed the Islamist ceiling.  El Taleedy distinguished it from 
Ennahda, which adopted universally acceptable politics and chose not to implement a mix 
of politics and dawaa, (or daw’wah; Islamic preaching), choosing pragmatism over 
ideological discourse.  The mix of dawaa and the politics prevented the MB from going 
too far with the democratic experiment, alienating pro-democracy political actors and an 
international community distrustful of a democratic experiment led by Islamists (El 
Taleedy 2013, 56-57). 
It may be said that neo-Islamism after the Arab Spring has turned out to be a 
mixture of ‘post-Islamist’ activism at the level of the individual and old-fashioned 
Islamic parties reinvented by the latest ideological developments and tactical choices. 
Theoretically, a post-Islamist could be a neo-Islamist, but the converse is not true.  Neo-
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Islamists could not be post-Islamists without giving up the idea of Sharia implementation 
and their political affiliations to the Islamic movement. 
In this sense, neo-Islamism is more tactical than strategic and less likely to 
constitute a new ideology. The ideological shifts it contains are not fundamental. Neo-
Islamists remain faithful to the dream of creating a state based on sharia, like the old 
Islamists. However, this may cause some confusion, as neo-Islamists like Erdoğan and 
Ghanouchi have tended to dispel the notion that they are ultimately seeking to establish 
an Islamic state. In fact, the neo-Islamists prefer to focus a gradualist approach, which 
requires patience, concession and sometimes secrecy, rather than slogans and emotive 
propaganda.  Turkish AKP leaders in particular maintain that they are not Islamists, that 
they advocate secularism, and have no intention of implementing sharia law (Torelli 
2012; Tugal 2009; Yilmaz 2012; Ergun 2012). 
Ghanouchi has stated that he would not go so far as to advocate secularism, or 
dropping Sharia law from Ennahda's agenda. However, he confessed that secularism 
could be part of Islam as a means of achieving a separation of powers (interview with the 
author, Tunis: 25 April 2013). He previously triggered the sympathy of the Tunisian 
secularist elite, and widely surprised them in a lecture delivered at a think tank on 2 
March 2012, in which he explained that secularism is not in contradiction of Islam.  But 
he also said that religion should not be removed entirely from state affairs, as this option  
[carries] some risks whereby things would get out of control and social harmony would be 
endangered. The way to do it, thereafter, is to find a balance that would guarantee people’s 
freedom and rights, because religion is here to do exactly that. To achieve this balance we need to 
go back to the issue of distinguishing between religion and politics and adjust the parameters of 
what is constant in religion and that which is variable. (Ghanouchi 2012, 15)  
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He stated further that the separation of powers in Islam is a widening of ijtihad 
(Islamic jurisprudence) opportunities. In the absence of a church in Islam, the 
interpretation of the sacred texts should remain free and open (interview with author 
Tunis, on 25th April 2013). While almost all Ennahda public statements fail to mention 
promotion of shariatisation, they also do not signal its outright rejection.  
As was the case in Turkey with APK since the early 2000s, Ennahda in Tunisia, 
and JDP in Egypt and Morocco, new developments and pragmatic strategies have 
allowed neo-Islamists to win most elections since the 2011 and 2012 revolutions (Gerges 
2013; Khalifa 2012; Tomsa 2012).  Despite the AKP repeatedly declaring that it is not an 
Islamic party, and Ennahda leader’s statement above, it is not clear that these 
organisations have given up their original missions of Islamising their states and 
societies.  Rather, their tactics and strategies have evolved to execute the same old goals. 
When asked about Ennahda’s Islamic economy program, Ennahda economist Ridha 
Chkoundali, didn’t deny such a goal in the long term. He added that the party has not had 
enough time to prepare a distinctively Islamic alternative for the economy (interview with 
author: Tunis, 18 April 2013). 
Finally, the Arab Spring bridged the gaps between post-Islamists, neo-Islamists 
and moderate liberals, nationalists, and human rights activists. These groups during the 
Arab Spring all came together against autocratic regimes, using modern tools of 
communication, ideas and techniques, in particular social media. The Arab 
revolutionaries of 2011 warmly embraced Twitter, Facebook and other outlets in 
pursuing their goals. 
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Characteristics of neo-Islamism 
Further differentiating the phenomena, neo-Islamism is distinguished by the 
following six characteristics: the evolution of new forms of religiosity; gradualism of 
Islamism; modernising Islam; moderation; nationalist Islamism; pragmatic relations with 
the West.   
1- New forms of religiosity:  These new forms of religiosity can be seen in 
Islamists’ day-to-day private and public religious practices, demonstrated by more 
secularisation in private life and social context that in the past as Bayat (1996) observed 
in the mid- 1990s.  Bayat’s major example was that of the Mayor of Tehran saying that 
his generation is not ashamed of destroying a bad urban mosque in order to give way to 
the construction of a new highway. Roy also mentions a new generation of Islamists who 
would queue in front of International fast-food outlets, wearing jeans and branded 
western clothes as well as routinely attending prayers at the local mosque and watching al 
Qaradawi’s weekly ‘Sharia and Life’ show on al Jazeera TV channel. (Roy 2011a, 2012) 
Such new forms of religiosity are commonly shared between neo-Islamists, post-Islamists 
and even some salafists.  
2- Gradualism of Islamisation: For neo-Islamists, the goals of shariatisation and 
an Islamic state require the adoption of AKP-style secularism (Gerges 2013). Their 
political parties focus on quantity rather than the quality of its members' religious 
devotion largely because they are in need of loyal voters. In fact, the neo-Islamist parties 
are loose in terms of allowing non-Muslims to be members, which contrasts with 
traditional MB methods of thoroughly screening potential members (Pargeter 2010). It is 
no surprise then, that Ennahda in Tunisia, the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) in Egypt, 
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the Development and Justice Party (DJP) in Morocco, and the AKP in Turkey have 
opened their doors for membership to any citizen regardless of his or her religion or 
religious practice.  Under these new rules, Tunisian and Egyptian Jews and Christians are 
free to join MB parties.  That was not the case under previous MB procedures.   
Also, some observers have noted that this neo-Islamist phenomenon has led to an 
environment where we have political Islamists without Islam. Al-Rahim adds that in this 
new Islamism, there is no explicit campaigning in the name of religion (Al-Rahim, 2011). 
AKP's example demonstrates an effective socially conservative campaign upholding 
public (Islamic) morality and virtue, whilst fighting systematic corruption largely 
associated with the oldest centre-left Kemalist political party in Turkey (the Republican 
People’s Party – Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, CHP) (Aktay 2012; Komecoglu 2014; Gerges 
2013; Garcia 2012).  This is the case even though Erdoğan himself, his family and some 
of his cabinet members, were accused of corruption in the years of 2012-2013. 
Another analyst, Ahmet Kuru (2013), distinguished two types of secularism of 
state: assertive and passive.  Assertive secularism requires the state to play an active role 
in excluding religion from the public sphere and making it a private affair.  Countries that 
embrace this form of secularism include France, Turkey (pre-AKP), Mexico, and until 
recently, Tunisia.  Passive secularism, on the other hand, requires the state to assume a 
passive role in accommodating the public visibility of religion. The passive secularist 
state will not interfere with individuals’ code of dress, religious gatherings and rituals in 
public places, though it might organise them, and in some cases, support religious 
institutions with regular financial subsidies and support.  This is the dominant paradigm 
in the United States, the Netherlands and Senegal, amongst others (Kuru 2013). 
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A major challenge to neo-Islamism has been assertive secularism, especially in 
Turkey and Tunisia, and to a lesser extent in Morocco and Egypt. The AKP softened up 
harsh Kamalist secularism in favour of a more comfortable version of passive secularism. 
With major help from the Gülen movement, AKP succeeded in moving Turkey towards 
becoming a religion-friendly country by defeating assertive secularists in elections over 
the last ten years, as well as pushing them back in civil society, sections of the media and 
sections of the bureaucracy.  What Erdoğan defended in his 2011 visits to Tunisia, Libya 
and Egypt was passive secularism, not assertive. 
As part of the ongoing and slow process of moving away from assertive 
secularism toward passive secularism, Ennahda has gone so far as to agree not to include 
Sharia as the main source of all laws in Tunisia's post revolution constitution.42 
These political choices are widely discussed in the works of the latest MB 
ideologues, such as al Qaradawi and Ghanouchi (2011), and fit well within the 
ideological framework of gradualism and the Islamic public interest, or “common 
goodness” known in Arabic as ‘maslahah moursaleh’.  Tariq Ramadan, a Western 
Islamist ideologist and academic and a role model for the neo-Islamists (and grandson of 
the MB founder Hassan al-Banna) declared that “what is good for the world must be good 
for Islam, and what is bad for the world and its people can no longer be considered good 
for Islam” (Boubekeur and Roy 2012, 206).  Theologically, this new thinking requires 
validation from traditional Islamic scholarship. Its proponents were to find them in the 
works of some of Islam's greatest jurisprudence philosophers, such Abū Hāmid al-
                                                          
42 One Tunisian journalist has already assumed the “death of Tunisian secularism” following Ennahda’s 
election victory in October 2011 (Bradley 2012, 17). 
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Ghazālī (1058–1111), Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyyah (1292–1350), Taqi ad-Din ibn 
Taymiyyah (1263–1328) and Imam al-Shatibi (?-1388).   
According to Aktay (2013, 120):  
Islamism, with its idea of fiqh, is a political position that attributes greater priority to presenting 
applicable and easy ways for people of all levels within their daily lives. The association of 
‘goodness’ in Islamic fiqh, with its strong emphasis on the concept of ‘utility’ (purpose) to 
fundamental principles, such as ‘the rules may change over time’, ’expelling badness is better than 
attracting goodness’, ‘the essence of existence is neutral’, and others, allows it to be ‘practical and 
solution oriented’ and to be more critical and free even towards its own taboos. Consequently, one 
of the dimensions of the political is to show that the fiqh can find middle-ground solutions among 
all possibilities and through negotiations with others. 
 
Gradualism is change that should occur in small steps.  In politics, a gradualist 
believes that slow changes are better than rapid ones.  The so-called neo-fundamentalists, 
according to Roy (2011, 2012), do not believe in gradualism and desire the Islamic state 
and a pious Islamic society instantly.  Most of these forces see the neo-Islamists' steps of 
gradualism as political weakness and forbidden ‘haram’ concession. They even go as far 
as calling ideologists like al-Qaradawi and Ghanouchi ‘kafirs’ as Salafis have over the 
past twenty years43. However, the aims of neo-Islamists and neo-fundamentalists are 
ultimately similar, especially in regard to the Islamic state and superiority of the Sharia 
over secular laws.  
3- Modernising Islam: Modernisation in this context means the maximum level 
of acceptance of the tools of modernity and most of its concepts, as outlined by most 
scholars in their discussions of the post-Islamism (Bayat 1996; Cavatorta 2012a; Esposito 
and Burgat 2003; Roy 2008; Roy 2011). While modernisation does not necessarily mean 
                                                          
43 It is worth mentioning that the latest Egyptian military coup on 3 July 2013 and the ouster of President 
Mohammed Morsi only serves to strengthen the position of revolutionary Islamists, proving that 
gradualism, vis-à-vis democracy and ‘moderate’, non-violent Islamism, does not get results.  (see: 
Ghanouch 2014b) 
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Westernisation as a philosophical worldview, neo-Islamists would argue that Islam is 
compatible with modern science, inventions and research, and with most democratic and 
pluralist values that spread from the West. Ghanouchi himself wrote over twenty years 
ago about democracy as a legitimate technique in the Islamic state ruled by sharia. He 
sees the Western techniques of managing the state as acceptable because Islam’s sacred 
texts do not mandate a particular form of state (Ghanouchi 2011a, 2011b, 2011c). 
Furthermore, he recently stated that in the absence of a better system, democracy (as a 
technique to manage transition of power, election and so forth) remains the best option to 
prevent totalitarianism as well as the violence that has been too common in the history of 
Islamic societies  (interview with author, Tunis: 25 April 2013).  
4- Moderation: Neo-Islamist movements such as Ennahda developed and 
promoted themselves as moderate, tolerant movements from the start. When Ennahda 
came to power after the October 2011 election, the voice of moderation became even 
louder. On the other hand, the Egyptian MB, and in particular, former President Morsi, 
have failed to promote a similar image, despite their victories in fair, democratic 
elections, and their status as victims of the military coup which resulted in hundreds of 
civilian deaths and thousands of others imprisoned since July 2013. 
Within the moderate Tunisian neo-Islamist context, observers like Cavatorta and 
Merone (2013) noted that harsh security measures and oppression had been imposed on 
Tunisians for decades, which pushed political players and Islamists to find alternatives 
and to make concessions on the go. Additionally, the rejection they faced: 
made it possible and necessary for Ennahda to entirely re-elaborate how political Islam could 
contribute to the developmental trajectory of the country. From this elaboration flows the 
acceptance of the dominant discourse of democracy, liberalism, and market economy without 
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which the party would not have been able to find much space in Tunisia (Cavatorta and Merone 
2013, 859).  
Moderation has involved a long journey for the Islamists, and they might have to 
prove further their sincerity and commitment to democracy, pluralism and peaceful 
political change, to the outside world. When asked whether Islam needs secularism, 
Ghanouchi has given vague answers such as  
Islam has not endured for so long because of states’ influence but rather due to the large 
acceptance it enjoys among its adherents, in fact the state has often been a burden on religion ... 
[Should] religion be entirely emancipated from the state and politics, this would also carry 
some risks whereby things would get out of control and social harmony would be endangered. 
The way to do it, therefore, is to find a balance that would guarantee people’s freedom and 
rights, because religion is here to do exactly that. To achieve this balance, we need to go back 
to the issue of distinguishing between religion and politics and adjust the parameters of what is 
constant in religion and that which is variable (Ghanouchi 2012, par. 13-14).  
Ghanouchi's statements demonstrate that Ennahda is being driven by the 
exigencies of politics, which allows for wide interpretation of religious and political 
doctrines. The constant changing of position, furthermore, depends on necessity and 
calculation of formulas that fall within maqasid a-sharia (aims or objectives of Sharia). 
Such elasticity is a core characteristic of neo-Islamists, especially after the Arab Spring, 
where they have had to govern in some countries, and face various harsh realities. 
The Ennahda–led government in Tunisia (between December 2011 and January 
2014) showed utmost respect for this historic agreement and towards the principle 
toleration. Ennahda's contribution to the National Constituent Assembly (NCA) was 
forty-two women, a larger percentage than all of the secular parties combined. Ennahda 
leaders “reassured Tunisian citizens that it [would] not interfere in their personal lives 
and … [would] respect their basic human rights” (Growder, Griffiths, and Hasan 2014, 
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123). With these assurances came tensions between the Jihadi Salafis and Ennahda, based 
on the belief that Ennahda's attempts to be seen as a 'moderate' Islamic party resulted in 
improper concessions in matters of religious doctrine.  
Comparing Ennahda to Egypt's MB reveals Ennahda's political savvy, particularly 
with regards to the dozed off neo-Islamists. President Morsi was in office for roughly one 
year before the army ousted him. While in office, he issued a controversial decree 
pertaining to the judiciary that was perceived by his opponents as an attempt at a 
constitutional coup.  For them, the act demonstrated Morsi and MB's tendency towards 
autocracy and a refusal to cooperate with the opposition, let alone to share power with s 
from outside the MB (Duran 2013). 
5- Nationalist Islamism: The international jihadist groups affiliated with al-Qaeda 
and the HT seek the collapse of the nation-state and reestablishment of the global unified 
Caliphate for all the ummah.  Hassan al-Banna focused clearly on the Islamic union and 
Islamic state and encouraged the development of branches of the Muslim Brotherhood in 
neighbouring countries, including Syria, Libya, Lebanon and Sudan during his lifetime.  
Ideologues who came after him, such as Sayyed Qutb and Abu Ala Mawdudi talked 
frankly about the global Islamic community and an Islamic state that crossed racial and 
ethnic boundaries. Mawdudi focused mostly on a nation-state version of Islamic state, 
mainly because of his direct experience with the establishment of Pakistan in 1948 
(Ayoob 2008; Euben 2006; Parteger 2010; Wright 2012b). 
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Neo-Islamism, on the other hand, has focused on what it has cultivated out of the 
1916 Sykes-Picot44 agreement between the major colonial powers after World War I (Al-
Rahim 2011). The neo-Islamists tend to focus on domestic politics, though they 
sometimes make controversial or contradictory statements about such matters as; the first 
Iraq war (1991), the Palestinian Israeli conflict and oppression and imprisonment of 
fellow Islamists in various Arab states.   
While neo-Islamists might have not completely forgotten the ideal of a single 
Islamic transnational state, they are currently more oriented toward nationally defined 
struggles rather than transnational affairs.  Neo-Islamists, like other nationalists, represent 
affairs of the ummah mostly through diplomatic channels and have ceased to cause any 
geo-strategic threat to enemy states like Israel (Roy 2012e).  Their parties do not accept 
members from other countries and their political and economic objectives are directed 
exclusively to the nation-state in which they live.   
6- Pragmatic relations with the West: Generally, neo-Islamists desire good 
relationships with the United States and Europe.  After the fall of Ben Ali and Mubarak, 
Ennahda and MB leaders met with American and European officials to discuss future 
relations.  Some Ennahda leaders went to Washington early in 2011 to ‘negotiate’ with 
their American counterparts regarding the future governance of Tunisia.  In general, MB 
                                                          
44 Sykes–Picot, or the Asia Minor Agreement, was a secret agreement between the governments of 
the United Kingdom and France with the assent of Russia, defining their proposed spheres of 
influence and control in the Middle East should the Triple states succeed in defeating the Ottoman 
Empire during World War I.  The negotiation of the treaty occurred between November 1915 and March 
1916; the agreement was signed on 16 May 1916.  The agreement effectively divided the Arab provinces 
of the Ottoman Empire outside the Arabian Peninsula into areas of future British and French control or 
influence.  The terms were negotiated by the French diplomat François Georges-Picot and British Sir 
Mark Sykes.  The Russian Tsarist government was a minor party to the Sykes–Picot agreement, and 
following the Russian Revolution of October 1917, the Bolsheviks exposed the agreement to the rest of 
the World.  (See the agreement terms on: http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/sykes.asp ) 
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politicians have maintained consistent condemnation of terrorism and targeting of 
civilians despite their criticism of the American wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, which they 
have considered invasions (Abdo 2000). Western governments have not seemed to 
consider the emerging neo-Islamist governments as threats to Israel in the MENA region 
or to international peace and stability.  Indeed, Germany, for example, was extremely 
annoyed by the overthrow of Egyptian President Morsi in July 2013.  Similarly, while the 
American President avoided calling the military coup by its name, he did not name any 
security threat that the MB had caused or might cause in the foreseeable future.   
Neo-Islamist Erdoğan and his party AKP enjoy a cooperative relationship with the 
USA and other NATO nations, as Turkey is an active and strategic NATO member.  
Erdoğan, furthermore, has been in constant preparation for Turkey to join the EU over 
many years, despite continuous rejection based officially on Turkey's non-conformance 
to the Copenhagen criteria45, and unofficially and more loudly based on its religious and 
ethnic nature (Elshinnawi 2013; Gerges 2013). 
Recent American foreign affairs interviews and leaked documents seem to 
suggest that the United States’ new strategy in the Arab world is to work closely with the 
neo-Islamists, supporting them in power both to replace the old autocratic allies and 
continue to fight jihadis who are considered threats to American security (Elmaazi 2012). 
As Elmaazi (2012) observes, the situation of the modern Islamist movement is 
similar to the developments of socialist parties, as seen in Europe during the peak of the 
                                                          
45 The Copenhagen criteria are the rules that define whether a country is eligible to join the European 
Union. The criteria require that a state has the institutions to preserve democratic governance and human 
rights, has a functioning market economy, and accepts the obligations and intent of the EU. These 
membership criteria were laid down at the June 1993 European Council in Copenhagen, Denmark, from 
which they take their name. 
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Cold War in the 1960s and 1970s, whereby they had to assimilate into the democratic 
liberal process over time.  He was not certain though if the neo-Islamists would commit 
to liberal democracy as those social democrats did in Europe during the Cold War. He 
explains:  
In Europe, when the fight against communism was at its peak, centre-left social democratic 
reformists acted as the best bulwark against revolutionary communism.  The Social Democratic 
parliamentary parties were able to steal the communists’ thunder by subscribing to some of the 
basic narrative of Marxism, introducing major economic and social reforms; however, these 
parties also maintained a fundamental commitment to the tenets of liberal parliamentary 
democracy (Elmaazi 2012, par. 2). 
Within the Tunisian context, the new religiosity and adoption of modernity before 
the uprising (while most Ennahda leaders and supporters were either in exile, in prison or 
underground) influenced the way in which Ennahda was re-established, behaved and, to 
an extent, changed during its revival in Tunisia after January 2011 (Cavatorta 2012a). 
From the discussion above, we conclude that neo-Islamism’s adherents have 
adjusted their strategy and developed concepts, priorities and agendas of Islamic politics 
in response to the urgent question, ‘What went wrong?’ during last thirty or forty years.  
The impetus has been to redress prior failure to execute state shariatisation and societal 
Islamisation. In the absence of a proper definition, the author proposes the following 
definition of neo-Islamism:  
Neo-Islamism is distinguished by an ethical and theological emphasis on Islam that combines 
social conservatism with political moderation. Neo-Islamists are united in the view that Sharia 
is not an immediate reform priority; however there are divisions over whether this is a tactical 
pause towards ultimate pursuit of Shariatisation, whether it should be diluted if introduced at 
some future point, or whether it should never be introduced. 
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Conclusion 
With the sudden rise of extremists jihadis such as (ISIL) and Jabhat al-Nusra (the 
Syrian affiliated group of al Qaeda), the world’s attention has once again focused on 
violent political Islam rather than Islam and democracy. Unsurprisingly, Rachid 
Ghanouchi has stressed (Ghanouchi 2014b) that the current ISIL threat is a consequence 
of the West’s hesitation to support democracy after the Arab Spring, such as through 
support for the Syrian people’s uprising against the Assad regime. 
Following the collapse of post revolutionary governments, some commentators 
immediately started talking about the ‘failure of political Islam’, or the ‘end of Islamism’ 
(Tadros 2014). In contrast, others such as Aktay (2013, 112) view the celebration of the 
‘end of Islamism’ as an acknowledgement of authoritarian, anti-democratic regimes in 
the Muslim world.  Such renewed talk is considerably uprooted from the reality on the 
ground; where armed Islamic groups, have taken over cities and lands in Syria and Iraq, 
prompting a new war on terror by a coalition of over 70 countries led by the USA. 
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ISLAM AND DEMOCRACY BEFORE 
AND AFTER THE ARAB SPRING 
 
To understand the state of affairs of Islamism and neo-Islamism before and after 
the recent Arab revolutions, a number of factors need to be examined. Most prominent 
among these are the motivations of the revolutionaries, the changing social and political 
context, and the role of social media in facilitating the protests and riots almost 
everywhere across the Arab world, as discussed in the introduction.  In addition, a deeper 
understanding of the ideological aspects of Arab democratisation helps determine 
whether neo-Islamists, particularly in the Tunisian case, have simply used 
‘ballotboxcracy’46 as a tool to achieve agendas other than those espoused by the original 
Arab Spring protesters. This has become a common theme given new political conflicts 
that have ensued in the aftermath of the Arab Spring (BBC 2013).   
                                                          
46 This is a journalistic term coined by the BBC that refers to a political system that has a democratic 
façade because of the presence of elections. 
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Having determined that region-wide democracy is not beyond imagination 
(Tessler 2012), other questions arise: what sort of democracy might emerge in the Arab 
world?  Would neo-Islamists, as a dominant political force post-Arab Spring, stick to a 
liberal form of democracy as envisaged by Fukuyama (1997) and Lewis (1993), or 
something else?  Will the Arab world be able to 'adapt' democracy to its own historical 
and cultural headquarters?  
Prior to the Tunisian revolution and the Arab Spring, there were numerous studies 
published regarding the relationship between Islam, terrorism and global security threats.  
Today, researchers of political Islam and experts on the Middle East have had to adopt a 
paradigm shift regarding countries like Tunisia and Egypt, whose storylines about 
democracy have gone from ‘It can’t happen here’ to ‘Can it happen here?’ to ‘It’s 
happening here!’ (Council on Foreign Relations 2012, xv). Following the Tunisian 
revolution, the Arab Spring and subsequent victories of Islamist parties, the outlawed 
Islamists of yesterday have been transformed into the mainstream politicians of today.  
Without doubt, this new circumstance requires a new focus and a fresh approach, which 
we will explore in the fourth chapter of this thesis, which deals with Ennahda as a party 
in power.  However, the latest military coup in Egypt, and the apparent comeback of old 
regime autocrats to power, suggest that sweeping generalisations about the region's 
political arena cannot be made. 
Properly investigating whether neo-Islamists used ballot boxes to further their 
own, mostly hidden, agendas requires a discussion of the relationship between Islam and 
democracy, and why democratic tendencies came quite late to the MENA region 
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compared to the rest of the world, and if it has to do with the doctrines of Islamist 
ideology, and Islam as a whole, or other social and economic factors.  
Many academics (Sadiki 2002; Bayat 2011, 2012; Bradley 2012; Chaney 2012; 
Esposito 1994; Gelvin 2012; Huntington 1993, 1996; Lewis 1993; Pipes 2006; Roy 2011, 
2012, 2013; Sidiki 2002; Stepan and Linz 2012; Wright 2012) discussed the fundamental 
reasons behind the so-called Arab democratic deficiency and drew various conclusions 
from them. A discussion of the following matters is necessary: 
1- Why does the Arab world have a democratic deficiency?  Is the deficiency 
related to the nature of Islam and the structure of Islamist thought and action, 
or is it a result of other objective factors, such as social, cultural, historical 
and economic issues? 
2-  Are neo-Islamists willing to become real democrats, using the power of 
elections and the ballot box to impose their ‘non democratic agendas’?  And, 
regardless of their success, are they willing to support free and fair elections? 
These questions are pertinent because over the last few decades, extremist parties 
around the world (of the far right and far left) have used democratic procedures merely as 
an instrument,  
either to polarize the population along communal cleavages (e.g., ethnic parties) or, in the case 
of Leninist, ultranationalist, and religious fundamentalist parties, to simply obtain power and 
then dismantle democracy altogether. Parties with such antidemocratic agendas should 
therefore [ ] be excluded from participation in democratic elections to prevent election-related 
violence and, in the worst-case scenario, a repeat of the events that unfolded in post-Weimar 
Germany (Tomsa 2012, 487). 
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Roy (2012b, pars 8) has shown skepticism about the neo-Islamists’ ability and 
readiness to become democrats, wondering “why would the Islamists, with no democratic 
culture to speak of, behave like good democrats who believe in pluralism? No doubt 
many activists are asking themselves the same question”. 
Such reservations annoy neo-Islamist leaders, including Ghanouchi himself, who 
insist that they are genuinely democratic and that Islamists can and should be democrats 
as their religious teachings dictate (Ghanouchi 2011b, 2011c).  At any rate, the Islamists 
are no longer enjoying a religious monopoly of the public sphere (Roy 2012).  The 
Egyptian military coup, which was supported by the Salafist al-Nour Party, and in 
Turkey, the Gülen movement's recent collusion with AKP shows that democracy might 
be the only practical choice in avoiding instability and civil war.  
Analysts and observers categorise Islamists in general and the neo-Islamists in 
particular as going two different directions.  First, the moderate Islamists, namely the 
neo-Islamists, who can be democrats and have a proven commitment to democracy. This 
view sees the neo-Islamists as needing a fair opportunity to develop and execute their 
self-styled democracy. These commentators might have observed the previous failures of 
moderate Islamists and MB movements in Sudan in the 1990s and later, or Algerian 
Islamists after the 1991 elections, but they give the emerging Islamists the benefit of the 
doubt (Bayat 2011, 2012; Chaney 2012; Esposito 1994; Gelvin 2012; Roy 2011, 2012, 
2013; Sidiki 2002; Stepan and Linz 2012; Wright 2012).   
On the other hand, Bradley (2012) sees the neo-Islamists as just the same as any 
other sort of Islamist, who have disguised their autocratic tendencies, and are using 
democracy as a tool to seize power.  This point of view is supported by the Palestinian 
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Hamas’ victory in the 2006 elections, or more recently, President Morsi's refusal to share 
power. Additionally, these commentators cite the AKP's imprisonment of journalists, 
their suppression of the Taksim Square activists, their ban of social networks such as 
Twitter (2014) and a refusal to significantly confront jihadi Salafists in Tunisia during 
Ennahda's rule in 2012 and 2013  (Bradley 2012). 
On the other hand, as Islamists work and develop within their socio-economic 
spheres, the more general question can be asked: why is there a democracy deficiency in 
post-colonial Arab states?  The most thought provoking explanation of this deficiency 
that the Arabs are immune to democracy movements, due to a desire to adhere to sharia 
law and proceed towards Islamisation.47 
Arab democracy deficiency 
Some scholars, have given a more diversified set of reasons for the Arab world’s 
democratic deficit before the recent uprisings, many of which do not rely on cultural 
explanations (Dalacoura 2007; Kramer 1993; Hashemi 2009; Tibi 2009 and 2012a and 
2013). First, it has been observed that Huntington's view is contradictory to the 
emergence of democratic regimes in Indonesia and Turkey, which demonstrates that 
Islamists or Muslims in general, can play a constructive role in democratic institutions, 
(Turkish AKP) or at least could play an active role within the opposition (Indonesia’s 
Prosperous Justice Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera; PKS) (Tomsa 2012; Chaney 2012; 
Gelvin 2012; Stepan and Linz 2013).  For the Arab world, scholars have given varying 
                                                          
47 Daniel Pipes, in 2006 straight after Hamas won the Palestinain free election, wrote: 'The fact that 
majority-Muslim countries are less democratic makes it tempting to conclude that the religion of Islam, 
their common factor, is itself incompatible with democracy ... I disagree with that conclusion. Today's 
Muslim predicament, rather, reflects historical circumstances more than innate features of Islam. Put 
differently, Islam, like all pre-modern religions is undemocratic in spirit. No less than the others, 
however, it has the potential to evolve in a democratic direction.' (Pipes 2006, par. 2-3) 
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explanations, such as the effects of the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the 
subservient status of women, fossil fuel-based wealth, and Arab specific cultural and/or 
institutional characteristics, many of these studies reach conflicting conclusions (Chaney 
2012). 
Scholars offer multiple explanations for this deficiency: 
- The resources of the rentier state and oil money are used by those in power, 
causing delays in the democratisation process (Bayat 2012); 
- Successful sultanism of various extremes across the Arab world have 
suppressed democracy (Stepan and Linz 2012); 
- Islamic or Arab exceptionalism posits that Arabs and Islam are not compatible 
with Western-style democracy due to cultural and religious baggage (Lewis 
2002; Chaney 2012; Huntington 1993) 
- The institutional persistence of the unrelieved autocracy throughout history 
has worked to prevent democracy from taking hold (Chaney 2012; Lewis 
2002) 
- Western support of Arab autocratic regimes and violent Islamic militants has 
prevented the spread of democracy throughout the MENA region.  
- Political Islam is viewed as antithetical to liberalism, and democracy is 
necessarily liberal (Chaney 2012). 
Amongst these explanations five are worthy of discussion.   
The first is the exceptionalist’s view. For decades, analysts believed that Arabia 
and the rest of the Muslim world were ‘immune’ from the “yearnings for freedom” 
(Feiler 2011, 12). Feiler’s observation resonated with those famously advanced in Samuel 
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Huntington's influential work, The Clash of Civilizations (1993, 1996)48, which argued 
that “humans are irreparably divided along religious and cultural lines, and that foremost 
among those is a fiery chasm that separates Jews and Christians from Muslims” (Feifer 
2011, 12). This assumption leads to the conclusion that Islam is not compatible with 
pluralism and democracy. It is argued that Muslims, despite being vastly diverse in 
ethnicity and culture around the world (and the Arab world is fraction of the Muslim 
world), do not share the core desires of the West.  Consequently, Muslims have learned 
from their religion to be hostile to pluralism, individualism and a free society (Feifer 
2011).  Other observers have gone to the extreme of relegating MENA to the margin of 
social science with the exceptionalist claim that these regions are a locus of ‘ugly 
movements’ (Beinin and Vairel 2011). 
The French scholar, Jean-Pierre Filiu, also examined this treatment of the Arabs 
as being  
‘unique’, which was not a badge of honour for them, ‘since the Arab ‘predicament’, ‘despair’, 
‘impasse’, ‘lost opportunities’, ‘malaise’, (and even ‘cocoon’) were the topic of numerous 
essays, conferences and multi-layered programmes,  ... the Arabs were the quintessential Other, 
lagging behind modernity and its countless rewards (Filui 2011, 5).   
The code word of these campaigns was ‘deficit’, and the list of the Arab deficits 
appeared endless, from education, to infrastructure, to governance and technology, with a 
special focus on the shortcoming of women’s empowerment. Filui states that “Arabs are 
no exception, but the resilience of their ruling cliques has been exceptional” (Filui 2011, 
                                                          
48 Samuel Phillips Huntington (1927–2008) was an influential conservative political scientist from 
the United States of America whose works covered multiple sub-fields of political science.  He gained 
wide prominence through his "Clash of Civilizations" (1993, 1996) thesis of a post-Cold War new world 
order, in which he provokes great debate among scholars of international relations. His description of 
post-Cold War geopolitics contrasts with the influential ‘End of History’ thesis advocated by Francis 
Fukuyama (1989, 1993, 2007 and 2013). 
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16).  The latest Arab uprisings showed that the Arabs can fight bravely for freedom and 
justice at any cost: some two hundred in Tunisia and nearly nine hundred in Egypt lost 
their lives in the first few weeks of the Arab Spring.  The fact that they were spontaneous 
grass-roots movements made the uprisings even more striking. The promoters of Arab 
exceptionalism lost their ground with the fall of Ben Ali, their theories completely 
destroyed after the fall of Mubarek (Filui 2011). 
Roy (2013) stresses, however, that the claim that democracy is a unique product 
of centuries of Western Christianity is rather biased.  “It is steadily becoming clear that 
‘Islamic exceptionalism’ is an illusion: both the political and religious changes in Muslim 
societies are in tune with global trends” (Roy 2013, 18).49 
Asef Bayat (2013) agrees with Roy’s view above, criticising some observers as 
being distracted by minor events and failing to observe the underlying Arab society.  
They were 
concerned less with the theme of change than continuity, less with exploring internal forces of 
transformation than explaining how authoritarian rules endured.  Many observers, wearing the 
‘exceptionalist’ lens, focused on a narrow and static notion of culture (one that was virtually 
equated with the religion of Islam) to explain the status quo.  Others who found little 
explanatory power in the ‘culturalist’ paradigm (because after all the major opposition to the 
pre-revolution regimes came from the rank of Muslims, especially the Islamists) pointed 
instead to oil and the rentier state as factors that presumably ensured stability and continuity  
(Bayat 2013, 589).  
                                                          
49 He added that:  
while is true that the a complex chain of events in European history first gave birth to modern democracy, 
capitalism, and human rights, the notion that they were the offspring of Christian theology is highly 
questionable.  For two centuries, Arab countries have been struggling to cope with challenges from the 
West. Different countries have tried different models- from enlightened despotism to revolutionary 
movements driven by charismatic leaders (and even including some short-lived democratic experiences).  
Over time, Arab societies have changed as a result of mass education and globalisation, both of which 
have altered their social fabric and their political culture  (Roy 2013, 18-19). 
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On the other hand Larbi Sadiki, while rejecting the exceptionalism theory, 
stressed that the “route to democracy in this part of the word is not going to be a carbon 
copy of transitions elsewhere.  This is not engaging in ‘exceptionalist’ scholarship about 
the ‘other’, for culture may not be inhospitable to good government” (Sadiki 2002a, 124). 
The second explanation concerns the Arab rentier state's control over resources, 
as illustrated above briefly by Bayat (2012).   
Stepan and Linz (2013) argue that it would be more difficult to transition from a 
strongly sultanist regime if a powerful military institution were present.  Being fortified 
by petrodollars further strengthens despots. Thus, countries that do not depend on a 
functional taxation system, industry or services, but rather oil revenues derived from 
renting drilling rights to business, will find such transitions especially difficult to make.50  
Iran's regime and the ruling families in Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait, Oman, and the 
Emirates buy loyalty, or at least the silence of their discontented subjects with cash, the 
compensation increasing dramatically after the nearby Arab Spring revolutions.  Bayat 
(2013) agrees that oil money, especially lots of it, does matter in buying off dissent, by 
helping to establish the ‘regime class’, which is 
a class of loyalists who lend strong support to the incumbent regimes in exchange for state 
handouts, as in the Islamic Republic or Gaddafi’s Libya.  But the rentier state is also 
developmental; it ‘modernises’, helping to establish the infrastructure of economic and social 
change, and classes of political actors who may come to question the very authoritarian states, 
which assisted to create them.  The development processes under the Shah and the Islamic 
Republic in Iran, or those in Saudi Arabia, Oman, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates 
exemplify the generative facet of oil income.  (Bayat 2013, 590)  
                                                          
50 These rentier states distribute the rent they receive to favoured clients and projects.  The most lucrative 
source for rent in the Arab world is, of course, oil.  Some Arab states derive well over 90 percent of their 
revenues from oil (Gelvin 2012, 7). 
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In the case of the Bahraini uprising, the neighboring rentier states were able to fix 
the problem by using their cash to fund military intervention by the Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC) and secure the sultanistic regime there.  On the other hand, the presence 
of petrodollars in Libya had the opposite effect, speeding up NATO intervention, which 
helped rid Libya of a tyrant who had been in power for over forty years.   
The third explanation concerns American foreign policy. Rather than 
emphasising cultural incompatibility with democracy, some observers blame hypocritical 
Western governments for the deficit of democracy in the MENA region, and thereafter 
their obsession with prioritizing self-interest and security rather than global democracy as 
an international diplomatic tool.  Lahoud and Johns (2005, 23) wrote: 
Graham Fuller51 observes how US policies have contributed to the radicalisation of Islamist 
movements.  He writes, “despite its rhetorical stance in favor of democracy worldwide, 
Washington possesses an unspoken sense that representative governments in most Muslim 
states will be less acquiescent to American interests than the current generation of authoritarian 
leaders”.  George W.  Bush himself, the first time an American President referred to the lack of 
success of such policies, once observed, “sixty years of Western nations executing and 
accommodating the lack of freedom in the Middle East did nothing to make us safe”.  Indeed, 
Western nations were not only ‘excusing’, but also contributing to this lack of freedom in the 
Middle East.  
Gelvin (2012) too blamed US foreign policy in the Middle East in particular, 
rather than Westerners in general. He elaborates:  
Throughout the cold war, the United States sought to attain six goals in the region: prevent the 
expansion of Soviet influence; ensure Western access to oil; secure the peaceful resolution of 
conflicts and the maintenance of a regional balance of power; promote stable, pro-Western 
                                                          
51 Graham Fuller is an American author and political analyst, specialising in Islamic extremism. Formerly 
vice-chair of the National Intelligence Council, he also served as Station Chief in Kabul for the CIA. 
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states in the region; preserve the independence and territorial integrity of the state of Israel; and 
protect the sea lanes, lines of communications, and the like connecting the United States and 
Europe with Asia. Authoritarian regimes were useful in achieving all these goals.  (Gelvin 
2012, 8) 
The fourth explanation is the ‘sultanistic’ theory of the Arab states during the 
post-colonial era, (Stepan and Linz 2012) which necessarily includes the above two 
explanations and excludes the others. 
The scorecard of the Arab Spring neatly divides by regime type; monarchies fared 
far better than republics (Yom and Gause III 2012).  The eight Arab monarchies stand 
firm, with the exception of Bahrain, which had a large scale secular uprising (the majority 
Shia against the minority Sunni ruling family).  The al-Khalifa clan has weathered the 
uprising for geopolitical and sectarian reasons, aided by the armed intervention of the 
Saudi-led Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). Saudi forces considered the uprising a 
standoff that pitted Shia Iran and the various regional Shia minorities against the Sunni 
Wahhabi Saudi Arabia and its ally America (Bradley 2012). 
 The Syrian case is reversed; the minority Alavit al-Assad regime is heavily 
supported by the region’s Shia population and, of course, the strong regional player, Iran.  
By June 2013, Hezbollah's pro-Iran Lebanese militia declared its strategic armed support 
of the al-Assad regime.  Thousands of soldiers, and also frequent 'martyrs', were shown 
on satellite TV, al-Manar, fighting in various Syrian civil war zones. 
To date, both Oman and Saudi Arabia have sustained minor revolts, while Qatar 
and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have remained virtually untouched.  In both Jordan 
and Morocco, youth tried to mobilise the streets, but after some royal concessions, they 
failed to join in the Arab Spring (Way 2011). 
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Stepan and Linz (2013, 15-30) delivered an interesting interpretation of how the 
Arab authoritarian monarchies coped with social forces differently than those secular, 
economically liberal, autocratic Arab republics such as Tunisia, Egypt and Syria.  
Patrimonialism and its extreme, sultanism, tend to arise when “domination develops an 
administration and a military force which are purely personal instruments of the master” 
(Stepan and Linz 2013, 26).  Max Weber's original definition of sultanism supposes that 
the ruler's domination operates primarily on the basis of discretion, and in extreme cases, 
there is no autonomy for those with state careers.  All officials, including generals and 
admirals, are best seen as being the ‘household staff’ of the sultan (Stepan and Linz 2013, 
26).52 Stepan and Linz develop Weber's term further, distinguishing between degrees of 
sultanism, as regimes can be entirely despotic or have many or few characteristics 
associated with sultanism. An extreme sultanistic regime is far less likely than other 
authoritarian regimes to concede and allow a peaceful transition of power that might lead 
to democracy.  The presence of the sultan (as seen in the cases of Syria's al-Assad and 
Libya's Ghaddafi) makes negotiation or concession too difficult.  In specific regard to the 
Arab monarchies, despite some of their leaders actually carrying the title 'Sultan', the 
monarchies range from pure to partial sultanism. 
However, the military institution has also been used as a tool to defend the Libyan 
and Syrian regimes, for example, Gadhafi invented his own militias called revolutionary 
                                                          
52 Stepan and Linz (2013, 26) give a clear example of sultanism in Rafael Trujillo, the dictator of the 
Dominican Republic from 1930 to 1961, who made his son a brigadier general when the boy was nine.  In 
return, General Augusto Pinochet, the military strongman who ruled Chile from 1973 to 1990, could 
never have done such a thing, mainly because the Chilean military had a degree of established autonomy 
as an institution and would not have allowed it. 
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committees,53 on which he relied heavily to secure his regime, and marginalise the 
Libyan army.  The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) in Egypt defended the 
Mubarek regime before giving him up and trying to establish their direct military rule by 
issuing constitutional declarations and establishing a de facto junta54 prior to the first free 
presidential election and that resulted in Morsi's win. Morsi's overthrow by the military 
reversed most of the constitutional gains intended to protect the Egyptian people. A 
section of Egyptian society felt that they weren’t being protected by the constitution, 
particularly the Copts and a wide portion of secularists, who gathered in tens of thousands 
in Tahrir Square in June and July 2013 demanding the resignation of President Morsi. 
On the other hand, recent history has shown the power of the military to bring a 
quick and nonviolent end to the Tunisian dictatorship. The popular revolt that took place 
between 17 December 2010 and 14 January 2011 was supported by the Tunisian military, 
resulting in a finalisation of their “regime change business” in much less time than many 
expected (Stepan and Linz 2013, 29). 
The fifth explanation for the Arab world's democratic deficit is ‘institutional 
persistence’ of ‘unrelieved autocracy’, which has accumulated over centuries (Chaney 
2012).  This explanation is built on a scholar's historical approach that dates back to the 
French philosopher Montesquieu, and suggests historical developments in the Islamic 
Middle East, which was built on despotism, have made the region particularly prone to 
                                                          
53 Libyan former Revolutionary committees started in late 1977 in response to Qadhafi's promptings to 
secure his regime from any danger, As such, their role was to raise popular awareness, to prevent 
deviation from officially sanctioned ideology, and to combat tribalism, regionalism, self-doubt, apathy, 
reactionaries, foreign ideologies, and counterrevolutionaries. The revolutionary committees sprang up in 
offices, schools, businesses, and in the armed forces. Carefully selected, they were estimated at 3,000 to 
4,000 members in 1985. 
54 The SCAF went as far as bringing 14,000 revolutionaries before a military tribunal, subjecting many to 
prosecution and torture (Bayat 2013, 596).  
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autocratic rule (Chaney 2012; Lewis 1993). Accordingly, these historic control structures 
have left a legacy of weak civil societies where political power is concentrated in the 
hands of the military, autocrats or religious leaders.  Chaney's (2012, 21) results  
cast doubt on claims that Muslim theology, Arab culture, the Arab-Israeli conflict or oil wealth 
are systematic obstacles to democratic change.  Instead, the available evidence suggests that 
the region’s democratic deficit is a product of the long-run influence of control structures 
developed under Islamic empires in the pre-modern era.  
However, the theory of 'unrelieved autocracy' and 'intuitional persistence' is not 
consistent with the core facts.  As mentioned above, during or after the Arab colonisation 
era, some parts of the Arab world had short forays or, in Lebanon's case, a long term 
constitutional democracy. Some countries have had what Stepan (2012) calls ‘hyper-
democratic’ regimes, which basically mean systems without full democracy or with 
constitutional monarchies, such as Kuwait, Jordan, and Yemen. The MB and other 
Islamist parties participated in those regimes' political systems during elections, and 
sometimes formed coalition governments.   
Yemenis had a 'hybrid' democracy in place prior to 2011.  After experiencing their 
Arab Spring, Yemenis worked to get their full version of democracy, focusing on their 
‘president for life’ dilemma, featuring President Ali Abdullah Saleh, a member of the 
General People's Congress. Al-Islaah (the Reform Party), Yemen's version of the MB, 
had been a static part of the government for quite some time and its leader, Abdullah al-
Ahmar, was the parliament speaker. The affiliation with this hybrid semi-autocratic 
regime, however, did not stop al-Islaah from heavily participating in the 2011 Yemeni 
uprising, resulting in the ousting of President Ali Saleh.  
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The various autocratic Arab states were reinforced by secret police and instituted 
security measures that suppressed free speech, criticism of the rulers and their families, 
free press and free association. The Arab public, furthermore, grew tired of rigged 
elections and lack of election transparency, flaws that were rampant during the post-
colonial period (Ghanouchi 2011a, 2011c). 
The sultanistic Arab regimes, in fact, used all their resources to prevent legitimate 
democracies from forming, to include ‘war on terror’ fear-mongering against non-violent 
Islamist groups, and Western governments' turning a blind eye to their autocratic 
behaviour.   
The sudden, yet painstakingly achieved political independence of the Arab states 
did not allow enough time for the major Arab renaissance forces, thinkers and 
intellectuals to pave the way to a transitional democratic populist modern state.  Instead, 
military rulers seized power in most Arab countries, but not all, and began the so-called 
Arab sultanistic age over the last sixty years or so. These sultanistic regimes still exist in 
some Arab countries, resisting their people's eagerness for democracy and broader 
freedom (Bayat 2013; Stepan and Linz 2012). Also, it is worth noting that 
counterrevolutionary forces, which defended the regime militaries in Syria and Libya and 
tried to oust fairly elected governments in Tunisia and Egypt, have shown that without 
doubt, that some people in the Arab world support the sultanic regimes, either 
consciously or unconsciously, as a result of fear of the unknown.    
There are several reasons for this. First, the campaign for democracy, freedom and 
peaceful power transitions in Arab societies across the MENA region never stopped.  For 
example, the colonisation era of 1940's Egypt, the post-colonial era of Lebanon until its 
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civil war in 1975, and Tunisia from the 1970's onward have experienced civil unrest, 
general strikes, protests and revolts. Most of these popular uprisings and protests 
involved demands for freedom, democracy and the transition of power, though other 
causes such as that of Palestine, the Iraq war in 1991, economic and workers’ rights may 
have also been present.   
On the other hand, some sociologists argue that the Arab Spring, revealed cases 
where mobilisations emerged in the absence of ‘opening opportunities’ or when they 
were highly restricted or uncertain (Beinin and Vairel 2011). This view is represented by 
scholars who believe that the Arab world has not been immune to democratic change, 
though these changes came later than originally predicted, due to the almost 
insurmountable constraints and obstacles constructed by autocrats after World War II.  
The desire for change within Arab nations did not help to resist these obstacles 
until at least the 2011 revolutions, though many separate attempts at small uprisings 
happened across the Arab world during last three or four decades.  Notably, the Algerian 
democratisation of Chadli Bendjedid55 around 1988 ended violently by military coup in 
1992 and resulted in a decade long civil war that dragged the country into autocratic rule 
and military dictatorship.  
                                                          
55 Chadli Bendjedid, (1929 –2012) was the third President of Algeria; his presidential term of office ran 
from 9 February 1979 to 11 January 1992. In office, Bendjedid reduced the state's role in 
the economy and eased government surveillance of citizens. In the late 1980s, with the economy failing 
due to rapidly falling oil prices, tension rose between elements of the regime who supported Bendjedid's 
economic liberalisation policies, and those who wanted a return to the statist model. In October 1988, 
youth riots against the regime’s austerity policies developed into a massive uprising, known as the 1988 
October Riots which were confronted by the military’s brutal suppression and left, as consequence, 
several hundred dead. Bendjedid called straight after for implementing a transition towards multi-
party democracy. However in 1991 the military intervened to stop elections from bringing the Islamist 
Front (Front Islamique du Salut - FIS) to power, ousting Bendjedid and sparking a long and bloody  Civil 
War (Addi 1998; Volpi 2013). 
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Islamism and democracy 
From a theological point of view, democracy poses a formidable challenge for 
contemporary political Islam.  Muslim jurists throughout history have argued that human 
laws made by a sovereign monarch are illegitimate because human authority is 
substituted for God’s sovereignty. Modern laws that are made democratically by 
sovereign citizens face the same problem of legitimacy. In Islam, God is the only 
sovereign and the ultimate source of legitimate law.  So, the question to be asked here is: 
how does one reconcile the concept of popular authority with an Islamic understanding of 
God’s authority? (Abou El Fadl 2003, 4) 
As per our earlier discussion chapter one, contemporary Islamism is part of the 
evolution of modern Islamic thought. For instance, the maqasidis current raw ideas and 
reformist thoughts, which they developed through a practical underground activism, and 
their attempts to gain legitimacy in the official political scene (as in Tunisia, Morocco 
and Egypt), or simply within its casual political discourse (as in Turkey) ends in the neo-
Islamism seen today. Mura (2012, 78) elaborated: 
 a great reformist like Muhammad Abduh (1849-1905) had used the legal notion of maslahah, 
the ‘common good in Islamic jurisprudence, to re-consider the traditional prerogatives of the 
government, influencing he cultural climate preceding the foundation of the Brotherhood in the 
1920s. Since the 13th century, the concept of maslaha had undertaken important conceptual 
shifts, allowing for doctrinal innovations … Al-Banna’s focus on ‘the interest of the people’ 
came to sanction these ongoing cultural transformations, bringing the Islamic notion of 
‘common good’ –which had to maintain some moral and theological characterization as 
expression of the will of God- close to the liberal concept of ‘public interest’ or ‘general 
welfare’, to use Robert Mitchell’s translation of this term.  
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Al-Banna himself, as mentioned above, was against party politics, and against 
democracy as a tool of colonialism or Western domination and division. However by the 
early 1940s, he developed more positive views of democracy, which might have been due 
to British interference in the Egyptian political system at the time. Al-Banna formally 
engaged, for instance, in the mainstream political process, “even advancing his 
candidature to the parliamentary election of 1942. Although his candidature was 
withdrawn under pressure from the king and the Wafd in exchange for the promise to 
introduce some ‘Islamic laws’ prohibiting gambling and prostitution, this event reveals 
that al-Banna had begun considering the modern state as offering all the tools needed for 
the implementation of an Islamic system” (Mura 2012, 79) 
Several contemporary ideologues of modern pluralist Islamism, who inherited al-
Banna’s ideology, such as Hassan al-Trabi, Rachid Ghanouchi, Mohammed Salim al 
Awwa, Tareq el Bishri and Yussef al-Qaradawi, would look even deeper into Western-
style democracy, parliamentary representation, separation of powers and freedom of 
organisation, and link them all to similar traditions within Islamic laws and traditional 
jurists’ works, to reconcile Islam somehow with modernity. They will not disagree that 
the Islamic political system is based on shura (public or expert consultation), which is 
inspired by the Quran and taken from Prophet Mohamed's practices during over thirteen 
years of his statesman affaires and war battles.  In addition, some MB leaders have 
propagated the concept of ‘shuracracy’ to refer to the Islamic political system56. 
According to Fattah’s (2006, 59) survey of Arabs and Muslims across thirty-two Muslim 
                                                          
56 The first well-known of using this terminology is Mahfoud el- Nehneh, the founder and former leader 
of the Algerian branch of MB. 
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societies, Muslims would be more supportive of a democratic system and its institutions 
if they see it as a modern application of Islamic shura. 
Some modern scholars have found a recipe to marry Islamic political rules 
(sometimes with spiritual guidance elements) and modern Western democracy.  
Contemporary neo-Islamist thinkers such as Rashid Ghanouchi reconcile theological 
concerns by distinguishing between legislation, which is mainly from God and the 
people's sovereignty as citizens in the Islamic state (Ghanouchi 2011a).  In fact, 
according to Mura, (2012) al-Banna himself from his early passages on the immanent 
character of sovereignty, defined ‘truly Islamic government’ as: 
a servant to the nation in the interest of the people. It is not God or shari’ah that defines the 
ultimate ‘interest’ of which the Islamic government is an expression, but ‘the people’, here 
incarnating the locus of sovereignty and the space of public interest. This signals the 
integration and re-elaboration of modern national signifiers and the substantial resonance with 
modern theories of sovereignty of the state, in itself a further expression of al-Banna re-
elaboration of the language of modernity (Mura 2012, 78-79). 
In an interview with the author, (Tunis, 25 April 2013) Rached Ghanouchi 
revealed that during his four imprisonments between 1981 and 1985, he detailed the 
democratic principles in Islamic thought, which was first penned in the draft of his 
famous book: ‘Public Liberties in the Islamic State’ [Ghanouchi 2011a]. He then wrote a 
small booklet about the rights of non-Muslims in the Islamic state, and referencing the 
Constitution of Madina, where the prophet Mohamed granted full citizenship to the Jews 
and other non-Muslims within the newly established state of Madinah. Ghanouchi 
affirmed confidently that: “during 30 years of Ennahda life from 1981 to 2011 our 
discourse about democracy didn’t change and remained concrete”. 
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Furthermore, those referred to by Moataz Fattah (2006, 27) as modernists, “accept 
new ideas, mechanisms, and values insofar as they do not contradict authentic and well-
established sharia. They would accept that Allah deliberately left Muslims with some 
legislative vacuums [gaps] for the human mind to fill through ijtihad within the 
boundaries offset by sharia”. Such observation applies directly to the neo-Islamists57.  
However, while Ghanouchi and other neo-Islamists mentioned their theories of 
Islamic oriented democracy within the last two or three decades, the post-Arab Spring 
neo-Islamists have, to date, failed to discuss the potential of instituting Sharia law or state 
Islamisation, likely due originally to the volatile new political environment.  Hence, 
Ennahda rushed to disregard Salafi calls to make ‘Sharia as the main source of laws’ 
within the first few clauses of the new Tunisian constitution, proving they are progressing 
step-by-step along the path taken by Turkey's AKP. Egypt's MB and the neo-Islamist 
Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) seemingly hesitated to follow the AKP and showed a 
tendency towards Islamisation. They breached one of the main conditions necessary for 
the propagation of neo-Islamism: gradualism.    
After observing the Arab uprisings in 2011, Chaney (2012) was not optimistic 
about the repercussions of Islamists winning the Arab heart.  He claimed that the region’s 
institutional history showed that overwhelming popular support for Islamists might 
                                                          
57 Fattah also observed that, the neo-Islamists would practice ijtihad throughout the sacred sources of 
Islam, but the well-established and clear-cut verses of the Quran and hadiths are the only material that is 
not subject to skeptical scrutiny; yet the interpretations of these verses and hadiths are subject to ijtihad. 
The scholars of the past and al-salaf al-salih [the pious predecessors] carried out ijtihad to respond to the 
new challenges that they faced.  Now it is time for contemporary Muslims to take their turn at ijtihad.  
Modernists think that their ijtihad rarely violates consensually agreed-upon fatwas (religious verdicts) of 
the past.  If there is such a violation, a direct and clear reference to authentic sources of Islam must be 
made to justify the violation of the previous ijma’ (consensus).  Modernists find nothing in the Islamic 
authentic sources that hinders them from communicating with and learning from non-Muslims as long as 
the thinking of these outsiders does not violate authentic Islamic principles.  To modernists, most aspects 
of democracy are compatible with Islam  (Fattah 2006, 27). 
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undermine democratic efforts, by concentrating power in the hands of these emerging 
groups. In reference to the religious autocracy that followed Iran’s 1979 revolution, 
Chaney (2012, 22) concludes: 
[The] recent past shows that Islamists are just as likely to establish autocratic rule as other 
groups in the absence of checks on their power.  Thus, unless other interest groups (such as 
labor unions or commercial interests) check their power, Islamists may replace secular rulers 
and usher in a new wave of autocracy in some Arab countries. 
Certainly, the experiences of Islamist governance over the last two or three 
decades in countries such as Afghanistan (with the Mujahedeen then the Taliban till 
2002), Sudan, and Egypt from June 2012 to July 2013, have not been encouraging.  On 
the other hand, there are many examples, like Turkey, Senegal, Malaysia and Indonesia, 
of Islamist parties committed to democracy and accommodating their established political 
and economic systems with varying degrees of success. 
While near-term expectations for the Egyptian branch of neo-Islamists are 
diminished, Tunisia and Morocco's MB58 affiliates were holding on to their power59, due 
either to counter-revolutionary obstructions or to other circumstances related to the 
previous regimes.   
Whatever Morsi's treatment of the Egyptian people for his or his party's political 
purposes, the period between August and October 2013 shows that military-backed 
unelected rulers have shown a remarkable lack of concern for the fundamental rights of 
                                                          
58 In Morroco, the neo Islamists progress towards democratisation so far, and lack or real revolution 
during or post 2011 Arab Spring, shows that such progress is due to a certain cooptation and concession 
made by the king, rather than Morrocan democrats acting as agents of democratisation. However, the 
main characteristics of the Moroccan neo-Islamism, such as gradualism, pragmatism, tendency towards 
liberal political systems and neo-economy as well as abandoning sharia law as other similar states, remain 
in general the same.  
59 up to January 2014 in Tunisia, while the Morrocan Islamists are still in power up-to-date as per May 
2015. 
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the Egyptian people. Violations of human rights, civil liberties and freedom of the press 
have been well documented. Members of Egypt's Islamist FJP have become subject to a 
military campaign of arrest, imprisonment and ‘kangaroo court’ procedures (Dyer 2013; 
Tudoroiu 2013).  Morsi's alleged human rights violations pale in comparison.   
It is worth considering that Egyptian neo-Islamists would not have necessarily 
established an autocracy like that in Iran.  The Iranian revolution itself enjoyed a degree 
of democracy and transparent elections in the early days, though the established structure 
was not by any means a Western-style democracy. There is no doubt that the Iranian 
Islamic Republic’s democracy is marked by clerics' supervision and religious institutional 
constraints with conservative tendencies. The Iranian regime has been successful in 
insulating itself from anti-Islamic; rather, anti-wilayet faqih (the rule of Sharia’s top 
jurists) threats, and excludes secularist and liberals, not to mention non-religious, pro-
revolution Shia and non-Muslims.   
Instead, the neo-Islamists no longer talk about an Islamic state; they call for al-
dawla al-madaniya, or a civil state. As Gerges (2013, 379) pointed out, even the old 
guard among the Egyptian MB, no longer advocates building an Islamic state explicitly, 
as they substitute ‘civil’ for ‘Islamic’ in an effort to avoid using the term ‘secular’.  
The neo-Islamists thus continue to be committed to democracy, where possible, 
such as in Turkey, Tunisia and Morocco. In fact, in 2012 and under a coalition 
government led by Ennahda, Tunisia became the first Arab-majority country in thirty-
seven years to receive a political-rights score as high as three on a seven point scale from 
Freedom House (Stepan and Linz 2013, 18-24). The new Tunisian constitution reflects a 
spirit of pluralism and tolerance. The neo-Islamists “have a vested interest in the 
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institutionalization of the political process that will protect them against the whims of 
autocratic military rulers” (Gerges 2013, 399). 
The American commentator Noah Feldman praised what he called Islamic 
democrats for their authentic democratic tendencies, long before the Arab Spring of 2010.  
He observes the writings of  
such Islamic democrats as Rashid al-Ghanouchi, a Tunisian Islamist intellectual living in exile 
in Paris;60 Abdolkarim Soroush, an Iranian who shuttles between Tehran, Cambridge 
(Massachusetts) and Princeton; the Egyptian journalist Fahmi Hwaidi; and the Qatar-based 
internet and al-Jazeera phenomenon Yusuf al-Qaradawi.  Though these thinkers disagree on a 
wide range of issues, they share a view of Islam that emphasises justice, human dignity and 
equality, the rule of law, the role of the people in selecting leaders, the obligation of having 
consultive government, and the value of pluralism.  All share a commitment to Islam as the 
starting place and ultimate ground for evaluating democracy, and all insist that Islam is not 
self-interpreting: ascertaining the will of God and coordinating quotidian social organisation 
require human effort.   
Although Islamic democrats differ in their precise understandings of democracy, they agree 
that democracy requires much more than elections; it must also incorporate the basic rights 
necessary to make it both liberal and egalitarian: free speech, free association, freedom of 
conscience, and equality across race, religion, and gender.  Moreover, Islamic democrats find 
the roots of values such as liberty and equality in Islam-in Qur’anic verses, prophetic Hadith 
that recount the actions of the Prophet, and Islamic legal tradition. (Feldman 2004, 60).  
Ghanouchi confirmed this recently by stating (interview with author, Tunis, 25 
April, 2013) that democracy is not perfect but is the least objectionable of options. It is of 
course open to be developed and to be criticised. Ghanouchi added that democracy has no 
                                                          
60 Observers like Feldman mistakenly thought that Ghanouchi lived in exile in Paris, which is not the 
case. He lived in London since early 1990s until he returned to Tunisia within the first two weeks of the 
14th January 2011 ousting of Ben Ali. 
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alternative yet, and that’s why he believes that Islam can add to democratic values, and 
take from them the techniques of managing disagreement and opposite opinions. Muslims 
have missed these tools for centuries and disagreements have been managed most of the 
time by the sword rather than shura. Shura was disabled throughout centuries of 
government. Ghanouchi criticises even other leaders of MB who still believe that shura 
in Islam is for guidance only; not an obligation to be undertaken by Muslim rulers 
(interview with author, Tunis, 18 April, 2013). 
The post 9/11 ‘war on terror’ during the long decade of the 2000s may have been 
seen as a disadvantage for the democratisation process in the Arab world, and thereafter, 
the democratic development of Islamic movements across the region.  On the other hand, 
the war on terror might have helped to trigger the revolts against decades long oppression 
that kick-started the Arab Spring.  Despite the rhetoric, it turns out that the United States 
did not abandon local Arab dictators, and reportedly worked closely with notorious Arab 
autocracies in Syria, Tunisia, Yemen and Libya (Roy 2011a, Aktay 2013; Bishara 2012; 
Cavatorta 2012b; Gavin 2012a; Ghanouchi 2014a; Petras 2012; Feldman 2013) The war 
on terror empowered the already mostly aged and weak dictators “even more 
considerably and allowed them to stamp down not only on the genuinely violent groups, 
but also on all other opposition movements that had an Islamist agenda no matter how 
peaceful or moderate” (Cavatorta 2012a, 189).  One of the key players, Tunisia's Ennahda 
Party, campaigned for a decade against Ben Ali through different channels of 
communications with the European Union, the American Administration and various 
human rights groups.  Ennahda's warnings that Ben Ali was manipulating the ‘war on 
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terror’ to conduct acts of despotism, torture and other human rights abuses went 
unacknowledged until the time of the 2011 uprising (Sadiki 2002; Ghanouchi 2011b). 
Regardless of academic stereotypes and the potential for democracy in the future, 
it should be noted that 300 million Muslims have been living under democracies for each 
of the past ten years in the Muslim-majority countries of Albania, Indonesia, Senegal and 
Turkey. Adding to that the roughly 178 million Muslims who are natives of Hindu-
majority India, the total number of Muslims who are living in democracies outside the 
Western liberal democracies, easily exceeds half a billion, which is over one third of the 
Muslim population worldwide (Stepan and Linz 2013, 17). 
Notably, the neo-Islamists who developed their ideas about Islam, democracy and 
role of Shariaa twenty years or so ago have not shown themselves to be as adept, savvy, 
flexible and pragmatic as the younger neo-Islamist groups. Unlike Ennahda, the Egyptian 
MB never conducted a single joint meeting with secularists to discuss the problems of 
democratic transition, power sharing or governance alternatives.  It is arguable that such 
overtures may have helped to prevent the erhal protesters' reoccupation of Tahrir Square 
in June 2013, demanding President Morsi to leave power.  The Tunisian branch of the 
MB, on the other hand, seems to have achieved, by regularly meeting with secular parties 
in a sort of opposition coalition since 2003, successful post-revolution power sharing 
experiences.  Regarding the Egyptian MB's isolation, Stepan and Linz (2013, 23) wrote: 
The Muslim brotherhood’s website was still displaying its 2007 draft party platform, complete 
with nondemocratic features such as a rejection of the idea that a woman or a non-Muslim (two 
groups comprising more than half the populace) could ever be president of Egypt, and the 
recommendation that a high court composed of and appointed by imams should be empowered 
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to review all new legislation to ensure its compliance with shariaa.  Small wonder, then, that a 
sense of growing distrust has continued to dominate the political atmosphere in Egypt.   
Also, within the context of Muslim society, successful modernisation and 
democratisation cannot be achieved without taking into account local culture and 
religion, as Bassem Tibbi (2009) observed (9-40).  Such an observation might explain 
why some neo-Islamist leaders were aware that Turkey's AKP might provide good 
guidance, but not a copy and paste model61 (Gerges 2013, 407). Tibi (2009) points out to 
thus criticise Western understandings of Islam’s predicaments with modernity, saying: 
Real Islam is the product of Muslims themselves.  The reality is neither a reflection of divine 
scripture nor a deviation from what they think is right.  It follows that Islam is always that 
which Muslims make of it and that historical, man-made Islam is not divine, despite all the 
efforts of the ulema to invoke God in it.  In short, Islam changes with the course of 
development, in spite of whatever Muslim believers may think to the contrary.  This reality of 
change stands in conflict with the ahistorical Muslim Salafist worldview.  After years in 
research in Morocco and Egypt, John Waterbury coined the term ‘behavioral lag’ in order to 
describe the tensions arising from the inconsistency between what Muslims really do and what 
they think they are doing  (Tibi 2009, 40). 
What sort of democracy do Arabs want? 
In his discussion of the common autocracy of contemporary Arab countries, 
Gelvin (2012) argues that compatibility is not an issue that requires serious discussion.  
“There is no reason to assume that Islam is any more or less compatible with democracy 
and human rights than Christianity or Judaism, for example” (Gelvin 2012, 7).   Notably, 
                                                          
61 Gerges (2013, 407) noted that the Arab moderate Islamists:  
admire and wish to imitate the example of Turkey, even though they know little about the complexity of 
the country’s economy and lack [of] Turkey’s strategic economic model.What impresses them is 
Turkey’s economic dynamism, especially the dynamism of the religiously observant provincial 
bourgeoisie, who have turned Anatolian towns such as Kaysari, Konya, and Gaziantep into industrial 
powerhouses driving the growth of the Turkish economy.  
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as in many other societies, there are democratic and anti-democratic interests in the Arab 
world, and who wins is a matter of struggle.  
Roy (2012d) goes further to criticise the assumption that democracy presupposes 
secularism. He notes that historically, this has not been the case. America's Founding 
Fathers  
were not secularists; for them, the separation of church and state was a way of protecting 
religion from government, not the reverse.  The French Third Republic was established in 1871 
by a predominantly conservative, Catholic, monarchist parliament that had just crashed the 
Paris Commune.  Christian democracy developed in Europe not because the church wanted to 
promote secular values, but because it was the only way it could maintain political influence 
(Roy 2012d, 8).  
Also, while criticising Huntington's view that religion, especially Islam, would 
limit the spread of democratisation, Stepan argues that neither assertive secularist 
societies (adopting a stance that is openly anti-religion) nor passive secularist societies 
require a complete separation between religion and the state for democracy to emerge.  
So what was needed for both democracy and religion to flourish? Stepan (2012) asserts 
his theory of ‘twin tolerations’, which he observes as a successful approach in post-
revolution Tunisia.  In this context, the “religious authorities do not control democratic 
officials who are acting constitutionally, while democratic officials do not control 
religion so long as religious actors respect other citizens’ rights” (Stepan and Linz 2013, 
17).   
The results of opinion polls on Arab attitudes to democracy are worth noting. 
Prominent scholars Mark Tessler, Amaney Jamal and Michael Robbins (2012) directly 
asked the Arab public their opinions on a variety of topics including the nature of their 
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ideal democracy and whether they are in favour of Islamic laws. Their 'Arab Barometer 
Survey' was conducted in two waves, occurring in 2006/2007 and 2010/2011.62 The study 
showed a remarkable lift and overwhelming and consistent support for democracy after 
the Arab Spring occurred.  A majority of respondents surveyed in both waves of the Arab 
Barometer believe that their countries fall short of their ideal democracy. At the same 
time, they recorded a slight decline in their support for the role of religion in politics 
(Tessler and Jamal and Robbins 2012, 93), which explains the terminology shift in the 
early Arab Spring, trading religious and nationalist slogans for the secular and universal. 
While that the vast majority of Arabs support democracy, the same surveys 
discovered that the respondents in every country, except Lebanon, agreed that the 
government should implement Sharia law. Meanwhile, in response to a number of 
questions about the preferred role of religion in the political system, in nearly all cases a 
majority preferred a system without a strong role for Islam or religious actors. The trio of 
researchers summarise: 
[that] it is clear that the concept of law under the shari’a is popular, which highlights the 
positive connotation that shari’a has in many communities.  Although other response patterns 
demonstrate that most individuals do not desire a harsh Taliban-style legal system and that the 
law should also be guided by the will of the people, there remains broad agreement that laws 
should be consistent with people’s understanding of the shari’a (Tessler, Jamal and Robbins 
2012, 96-97). 
                                                          
62 They carried out their first survey though face-to-face interviews of representative samples of men and 
women aged 18 and older in seven Arab countries: Algeria, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco, Palestine 
and Yemen.  The second wave of the Arab Barometer employed similar methods and was carried out in 
the previous countries except Kuwait, as well as in Egypt and Tunisia (where political conditions 
prevented the conduct of the surveys during the first wave), Iraq, Saudi Arabic and Sudan (Tessler, Jamal, 
Robbins 2012, 89-103). 
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In fact, a system based on Sharia could mean different things to different people 
and in different contexts, and that may depend on personal or localised interpretation of 
the sacred texts of the Quraan and Sunnah. To some, Sharia might signal 
‘Talibanisation’, while to others; it may just provide the moral source of laws. However, 
the variety of responses is surely affected by socio-economic differences as well as by the 
ethnic, cultural and linguistic environment.  
United States President Bush’s purported attempts to promote democracy in Iraq 
in 2003 (and later in other selected Arab countries) were unsuccessful because they 
lacked political legitimacy, and more importantly, caused democracy to be associated 
with military intervention, which offended Arab dignity in the first place (Roy 2011b).  
The Arab Spring was 
[a] succession of indigenous upheavals centered on particular nation-states and delinked from 
Western encroachments, that democracy is seen as both acceptable and desirable.  This is why 
the ritual denunciations decrying Zionism as the source of all the Arab world’s troubles, were 
so remarkably absent from the demonstrations …  this also explains why al-Qaeda is out of the 
picture: the uprooted global jihadist is no longer a model for young activists and fails to find 
many takers when he seeks to enlist local militants for the global cause … al-Qaeda in short is 
a yesterday’s news, part and parcel of the old anti-imperialist political culture that the Arab 
Middle East is now leaving behind.  (Roy 2012d, 9) 
Roy's conclusions about the natural demise of the jihadist in the process, however, 
are premature.  In fact, the emergence of military uprisings in Libya and Syria 
demonstrates that insurgent Islamism is alive and doing well, though some are doing 
better than others due to their respective geopolitical conditions. Libyan rebels 
cooperated with NATO in order to get rid of Ghadaffi, then later on became a burden for 
the West, with strong militias located throughout Libya that threaten Western interests.  
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In Syria, on the other hand, they have lacked direct Western support, though, reportedly 
some regional countries such as Turkey, the Emirates and Saudi Arabia, have supported 
them with weaponry and logistic background. 
The Islamist fighters in Libya, despite their inability to coalesce as a political 
force during the 2012 election, factor heavily in the daily political scene as armed militias 
cause severe security unrest.  In Syria, which continues to struggle in a civil war between 
revolutionaries and the regime, the strongest liberation army groups are composed of 
Islamist and al-Qaeda style fighters who call themselves ‘Jebhaat u-Nusraa’ (Support 
Front) and other emerging jihadist brands.  These fighters believe that a caliphate may be 
achieved in Syria. It is unlikely they would accept or promote liberal democracy and 
human rights if they were to be successful. 
Conclusion 
To conclude, the post revolution government in Tunisia has demonstrated that 
democratisation is a painstaking process; while in Egypt it has been an absolute and 
ongoing failure.  Economic troubles and the new political diversity have further slowed 
the democratisation process and transition period. In addition, the sometimes 
unreasonable expectations of ordinary people who have suffered through decades of 
maldevelopment during authoritarian rule create pressure on these governments, as was 
seen in Tunisia before a new constitution could be approved and in Egypt, after the 
ousting of Mubarek.  With that said, the ousting of Egypt's Morsi was undertaken through 
an organised army coup, ostensibly justified by the incompetence, including in the area of 
economic management, and Mubarek-type corruption, of the Morsi Administration.  
Events in Egypt and other Arab states beg the most important questions of the post-Arab 
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Spring: Can MB Islamists deliver a true democratic transition as promised? Is it possible 
for neo-Islamists, whether in Tunisia or elsewhere, to preside over smooth democratic 
transitions in the foreseeable future?  
Neo-Islamists are the offspring of their societies, and they have evolved during 
last two or three decades. Most neo-Islamists desire democracy and the multi-party 
political system. Without a doubt, there have been some failures in trying to enact 
democratic transitions for various reasons, and some attempts might fail in the 
foreseeable future.    
When it comes to a case study of a neo-Islamist party to explore further its 
moderation behaviour, democratic credibility and political openness, as well as reviewing 
whether it has the skills required to run a country post 2011 revolution, we chose the 
Tunisian Ennahda Party. In the next chapter we will examine the Tunisian postcolonial 
context where Ennahda emerged as major political force in the early 1980s, then a brief 
history and the general circumstances surrounding Ennahda’s conceptualisation of its 
political and ideological choices, as well as other external factors that contributed to 
Ennahda’s particular tendencies and historical direction. 
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TUNISIAN CONTEMPORARY 
POLITICS AND THE EMERGENCE OF 
ENNAHDA PARTY 
 
The modern Tunisia nation-state’s borders are now almost exactly the same as 
when the state was founded under the Hafside Dynasty (1229-1574), though French 
occupation cut off part of western Tunisia and added it to Algerian soil.  The 1534 
Ottoman conquest of Tunisia under the command of Barbarossa Hayreddin Pasha led to 
direct Ottoman governance for decades, until the dynasty of Muradi Beys, starting around 
1613.  The last Tunisian royal family, the Husaynid Beys, ruled effectively from 1705 
until the French invasion in 1881, but remained as a symbolic institution under French 
occupation until independence in 1957 when Bourguiba transformed the country into a 
republic.  Both the Muradi Dynasty and the Husaynid Dynasty were self-governing states 
under the Ottoman crown, with close ties with the Empire. 
As Stepan (2012) noted, the high degree of de facto autonomy that Tunisia 
enjoyed as a nominal province of the fading Ottoman Empire, allowed it to develop 
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(along with Egypt) the most liberal and rights-friendly policies in the Arab world.  
However the 1881 French invasion and subsequent colonisation until 1956, contributed to 
Tunisia's modernisation and bend towards European politics and liberal values, though 
sectors of Tunisian society rejected French colonisation and its liberal values altogether. 
In 1846, two years before France banned slavery in its dominions, Tunisia 
abolished slavery after an effective campaign of arguments driven by both religious and 
secular groups.  This was a first for the Muslim world, and occurred 19 years before the 
abolition of slavery in the United States (1865), 42 years before Brazil (1888), and 116 
years before Saudi Arabia (1962) (Stepan 2012). 
In order to better understand the social and historical circumstances of Ennahda’s 
birth, a study of Tunisia's contemporary postcolonial history is in order.  Thus, the birth 
of the Tunisian republic is examined here, with its modern, French-style constitution and 
secular laws, the effects of the first two Tunisian presidents, Habib Bourguiba 63 and Zine 
El Abidine Ben Ali 64 on the republic, the relationship between the state and Islam, and 
thereafter a discussion of the state's challenging relationship with the emerging political 
                                                          
63 Habīb Bourguiba (Arabic: ةبيقروب بيبح, 3 August 1903 – 6 April 2000) was a Tunisian statesman, the 
founder and the first president of the Republic of Tunisia from 25 July 1957 to 7 November 1987.  
Bourguiba was a member of the Executive Committee of the Destour Party before he clashed with 
mainstream pro-Arabism and pro-Islam party vision, and he created the Neo-Destour Party in Ksar Hellal 
on 2 March 1934.  From that moment, Bourguiba set out across country to try to enrol the majority of 
Tunisians from the countryside, thus creating a larger base for his newly formed party. 
After independence on 20 March 1956, Habib Bourguiba was appointed the President of the National 
Constituent Assembly, and head of the interim government.  At the same time, he acted as the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs of Tunisia.  On 25 July 1957, a republic was proclaimed, abolishing the monarchy and 
vesting Bourguiba with powers of president of the Republic.  Bourguiba's long and powerful presidency 
was formative for the creation of today’s Tunisian state and nation. 
64 Zine al-Abidin Ben Ali (Arabic: يلع نب نيدباعلا نيز, born 3 September 1936) was the second president of 
Tunisia, ruling from 1987 to 2011.  Ben Ali was appointed Prime Minister in October 1987, and he 
assumed the Presidency on 7 November 1987 in a bloodless coup d'état that ousted President Habib 
Bourguiba, who was declared physically and mentally incompetent to resume his duties.  Ben Ali was 
subsequently re-elected with enormous majorities, each time exceeding 90% of the vote; the last re-
election was on 25 October 2009. He fled the country on 14 January 2011, nearly four weeks after the 
Jasmine Revolution kicked him out of the country. 
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Islam. Tunisia’s own Islamism emerged in the late 1960s and early 1970s, due to 
Bourguiba's call for a ‘Tunisian version of Islam’ and secularisation of the state-religious 
affairs relations, as small cells of intelligentsia. Its current form as a popular movement 
only showed up in the 1980s. 
The main focus of this chapter is whether Ennahda’s very own evolving 
conditions from its birth in early 1970s, and its local Tunisian environment contributed to 
its uniqueness, and the tendency towards more liberal politics and adoption of democracy 
at early stages. Consideration is also given to whether the harsh active secularism of 
Bourguiba and Ben Ali’s post-colonial Tunisia has affected the transformation of 
Ennahda ideology over the years or not. These issues directly relate to the aim of 
examining the ways in which neo-Islamism has been shaped in general, wherever it is 
found across the region.  
Still, each Islamic movement in each Arab or Muslim state is unique and differs at 
least in its localised conditions and socio-economic environment; Ennahda is no 
exception. The contemporary characteristics of Tunisian politics are analysed in this 
chapter, including their development through the unfolding of historical events related to 
the rise of the Ennahda Party.  The discussion encompasses Tunisia's history from the 
early 1970s and aims to define the contemporary constraints that Tunisian neo-Islamism 
has had to endure since then. 
Tunisia’s postcolonial authoritarianism dilemma  
Between its independence in 1956 and 15 January 2011, Tunisia had only two 
presidents: Habib Bourguiba (1956-1987) and Zine El Abidine Ben Ali (1987-2011).  
During both rules, regime policies remained similar, following Bourguiba's assertive 
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secular state doctrine.  That is, the state played an active role in excluding religion from 
the public sphere and keeping it a private affair (Kuru 2013; Sadiki 2002a and 2002b; 
Prince 2012a; Alexander 2012).  Bourguibism distanced itself from Arabism and the 
Islamic ummah ideal, and called for Tunisian nationalism with a Tunisian traditional 
version of Islam.  (Salem 1984; Zemzemi 2011, Kallali and Ben Yussef 2012; Cherni 
2011; Ayachi 2012). 
Bourguibism’s radical secularism  
During this period, the process of rebuilding Tunisia as a postcolonial republic 
from scratch (Bourguiba demolished the Tunisian Husaynid Dynasty65 in 1957) was 
positive and progressive on some levels, but harsh and interrupted on others. 
Bourguibism is a postcolonial vision of the nation-state developed with French-style 
laicism and an overzealous focus on Tunisification. The latter entailed emphasis on 
Tunisia as a unique nation; Tunisian traditions and even Tunisian Islam (Mabrouk 2012; 
Salem 1984; Tamimi 2001; Zemzemi 2011, Kallali and Ben Yussef 2012; Cherni 2011; 
Ayachi 2012). 
Arguably, the Bourguiba era improved the status of women, education and 
tourism. Bourguibism promoted secularism and Westernisation along the lines of 
Turkey's Ataturk, but without the later affiliation with a strong military institution.  As 
the first postcolonial president, Habib Bourguiba followed a bare-knuckled policy of 
French and Turkish-style state-led ‘modernisation’ peppered with harsh denunciation of 
                                                          
65  Bourguiba demolished the Tunisian Husaynid Dynasty; which resumed its function throughout the 
French occupation from 1881 until 1956. He also put the last king Mohamed Lamine Bey under house-
arrest until his death in 1961. 
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religious belief (Stepan 2012; Sadiki 2002a; Alexander 2012; Allani 2009; Mabrouk 
2012). 
Bourguiba promoted a clear separation between religion and state institutions.  
For instance, in 1956, the year of independence, he promulgated the Tunisian Code of 
Personal Status (CPS), creating a set of Westernised legal provisions regulating family 
law which were “unprecedented in the Arab and Islamic world” (Torelli 2012, 67-68).  
For Bourguiba and Bourguibism, the CPS became a symbol of secularism and 
modernisation at the forefront of the Islamic world.  Bourguiba also nationalised the waqf 
or "pious trusts", which were, in effect, landholding foundations whose revenues paid for 
mosque building and maintenance, orphanages and other Muslim social programs.  He 
cut the study of religion in public schools to a single hour a week, and required all 
teachers to be fluent in French as well as Arabic, in a clear attempt to exclude Zaytouna 
Grand Mosque University graduates from teaching, as they knew only the latter language 
(Stepan 2012). 
From the early months of 1956, “the young Tunisia state mobilised all its 
resources to ensure its monopolisation of Islam” (Mabrouk 2012, 50).  The government’s 
new elite headed by Habib Bourguiba cleverly mounted a systematic campaign to achieve 
two aims: the ‘Tunisification’ of Islam and the dismantling of religious institutions, as the 
Tunisian sociologist Mahdi Mabrouk notes (Mabrouk 2012).   
The steps taken by the new state to monopolise Islam were: the termination of 
education through Zaytouna;66 the termination of religious endowments; the prohibition 
                                                          
66 Zaytouna Mosque, also, Zaytuna, Ez-Zitouna or Ezzitouna Mosque (Arabic: عماج ةنوتيزلا, literally, the 
Mosque of Olive) is a major mosque in Tunis, Tunisia.  The mosque is the oldest in the capital of Tunisia, 
and the second built in North Africa.  It covers an area of 5,000 square meters (1.2 acres) with nine 
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of all education provided by zawiyas (shrines where Quranic classes are taught), which 
were to become institutions exclusively dedicated to worship; the abolition of Quranic 
schools; and the legal prohibition of any activity in mosques other than prayer. Even 
religious instruction, such as sermons, was subject to prior administrative sanction 
(Mabrouk 2012, 52). The Zaytouna mosque, which was founded in Tunis in 737, is the 
oldest religious scientific institution in Africa, if not the world, and is more than two 
centuries older than Cairo’s al-Azhar University (Stepan 2012).   
Rashid Ghanouchi, Ennahda’s founder and current president, grew up during this 
stage of independence and witnessed the secularisation imposed by Bourguibism. He 
writes: 
In reality, Bourguiba’s victory was more a victory over Arabic and Islamic civilisation as a 
conqueror, and like the foreign invaders he took power.  Then he began targeting religious 
institutions, the institutions that were the very life of Tunisia.  At this time, everything revolved 
around the University of Zaytouna: traditional craftsmanship, Tunisian literature, and all 
thought.  In a sense, all of Tunisia was produced at the Zaytouna. …  [For] those who had been 
raised in an Arab and Muslim culture – the majority of Tunisian intellectuals who came out of 
the educational institutions affiliated to the Zaytouna – recognised the link between Arabism 
and Islam.  They added weight to the importance of Arabic language and literature, the roots of 
Arab-Islamic belonging in Tunisia, which breathed into the spirit of resistance to foreign 
invasion … and served as a kind of shield for it against Europe.  (Ghanouchi in Burgat 2003, 
29) 
                                                                                                                                                            
entrances.  It has 160 authentic columns brought originally from the ruins of the old city of Carthage.  The 
mosque is known to host one of the first and greatest universities in the history of Islam. 
Along with theology, the university taught jurisprudence, history, grammar, science and medicine.  
Zaytouna's libraries were the richest among North African counterparts, with several collections totalling 
in the tens of thousands of books.  One of its libraries, al-Abdaliyah included a large collection of rare and 
unique manuscripts.  Zaytouna mosque remained open for students during the French occupation (1981-
1956) till Bourguiba downsized it to a faculty of theology at the University of Tunis (Ismail 2006, 141). 
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The Zaytouna Grand Mosque University and its associated religious foundations, 
along with other smaller religious establishments, were dismantled in 1958. Thus, a 
millennium-long tradition of education and teaching was terminated (Mabrouk 2012).  
This stage of the destruction of traditional Islam in Tunisia would provide a key reason 
for the resurgence of political Islam just a decade later. Zaytouna's dismantling resulted in 
early clashes between the state and the sheiks and ulamas; that were suddenly 
marginalised, defeated and, basically, made redundant after centuries of prestigious social 
leadership. Frequently, Bourguiba publically mocked them and ordinary Tunisians 
denigrated zawatnas (Zaytouna’s scholars) as following an outdated Islam.  In the words 
of Ghanouchi, “The generation that attended these institutions was like a defeated 
army”(Ghanouchi in Burgat, 2003, 30)67. 
In this climate, President Bourguiba often expressed criticism of early Islamic 
figures such as the Prophet Mohammed and his companions (sahabah), degrading them 
through caricature. The greatest jihad in Bourguiba’s eyes was the struggle against 
ignorance, which in his opinion included religious heritage. The political elite mostly 
referred to him by as the mujahid al-akbar (the greatest jihadist).  His hero status carried 
over into national television where his name was mentioned on a daily basis, until Ben 
Ali ousted him in November 1987. 
On 18 February 1960, President Bourguiba shocked many Tunisians in an 
infamous speech, when he called on them to place the moral worth of work above all 
other values, including religious values. He decided, as a consequence, to challenge the 
religious fasting tradition of the month of Ramadan because it reduced the efficiency of 
                                                          
67 According to Rashid Ghanouchi, at independence in 1956 there were between 25,000 and 27,000 
people attending institutions affiliated with Zaytouna.  On the other hand, there were only 4500 to 5000 
studying at secondary schools created under the French occupation in European style. 
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the labour force with subsequent economic consequences (Salem 1984; Mabrouk 2012; 
Cavatorta 2012; Allani 2009). 
Bourguiba also urged Tunisian women to achieve his vision of a secular modern 
Tunisia, in particular by disregarding women’s Islamic dress. He once removed the 
headscarf (hijab) of a Tunisian woman in public with the footage subsequently shown on 
national television.  In one of his speeches, Bourguiba called the Islamic veil an ‘odious 
rag’ (Cavatorta 2012a). Furthermore, in 1981, after many Tunisian women returned to 
wearing the hijab, Bourguiba issued an infamous decree called ‘Manchour 108’ (Decree 
108) which prohibited women from wearing the veil in government buildings, such as 
public administration buildings, schools and universities (Mabrouk 2012). This legal 
prohibition lasted thirty years, until the revolution in 2011, when the interim government 
of Mohamed Ghanouchi and his interior ministry allowed women to be photographed 
wearing their headscarves on their national ID cards and passports.   
Conservatives of traditional and religious backgrounds criticised Bourguibism for 
its radical secularism and pro-Western culture. Islamists emerged in the early 1980s to 
establish the first real political opposition party, the Islamic Tendency Movement (MTI).  
This party, despite being continuously banned until the 2011 revolution, constituted a 
threat to both Bourguiba and Ben Ali, attacking their regimes’ propaganda, challenging 
the legitimisation of their autocratic rule, and criticising their lack of democracy and 
political liberty.  In return, its members were faced with torture, imprisonment and heavy 
anti-Islamist propaganda from the government. 
During the colonial period, the traditional scholars of Zaytouna worked hand in 
hand with the Union Generale des Travailleurs Tunisiens (UGTT) whose first president, 
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Sheik Mohammed Fadel Ibn-Achour, was one of the top Zaytouna scholars and son of 
Grand Mufti Imam Mohammed Tahir Ibn Achour. During the resistance era, many 
Zaytouna scholars contributed to fighting French colonialism. Soon after independence 
however, Bourguiba pushed the UGTT to adopt his views of Tunisian nationalism and 
move away from Arabism, Islamism and universal Islamic identity. He alienated or 
eliminated all pan-Arab or Islamist UGTT leaders, and independence figures including 
Saleh Ben Youssef, 68 who was murdered in Germany by a government intelligence agent 
(Salem 1984, 178-179).  
Saleh Ben Youssef, who had close ties with the king of the Husaynid Dynasty; 
Mohamed Lamine Bey (1881-1961), was supported by the traditional authorities of 
Zaytouna Mosque, traditional artisans and merchants, and the people of Djerba, his 
birthplace, and the surrounding southern areas. Bourguiba was supported in the Sahel 
area, his home.  Ben Youssef was seen as a promoter of pan-Arabism and Islamism, 
while Bourguiba was accused by the Youssefists of being too westernised and too slow to 
push for full independence from France (King 2009; Salem 1984).  
The 1955 internal autonomy accords with France aimed at a self-governance 
agreement, to which Ben Youssef was opposed, was the tipping point for both men.  In 
the following years, Ben Youssef organised a guerrilla war in the southern parts of 
Tunisia, which was quickly destroyed by the French air force with the full cooperation of 
Habib Bourguiba (King 2009; Salem 1984, 132). 
                                                          
68 Ben Youssef was assassinated in Frankfurt on 12 August 1961.  During the 1950s, he entered a battle 
for power against Habib Bourguiba.  The struggle between the two men regarded the leadership of the 
Neo-Destour (the new Constitutional Party) and accession to control over the state in the past independent 
era. After Bourguiba won, and thereafter the merciless crackdown on his supporters in the late 1950s, Ben 
Youssef fled the country to Egypt where President Jamal Abd al-Nasser granted him a safe haven until he 
was murdered in 1961 (King 2009). 
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The next challenge for Bourguiba would be from the left, and radical Marxists in 
particular. Bourguiba saw the ‘Perspective Group’ (Affak) as a direct threat to the regime, 
and started a series of trials against its members during 1960s, eventually banning the 
Communist Party in 1963 (Allani 2009, 259). 
The continuity of the Bourguiba regime in the 1970s, especially after Bourguiba 
was named President for Life in 1974, the failure of Ahmed Ben Saleh's69 socialist 
economic reform plan, and thereafter, the economic crisis and unemployment in the mid 
1970s, led the UGTT to engage in an open conflict with the regime. A bloody 
confrontation ensued between UGTT and the regime in the Black Thursday of 26 January 
1978, where the Tunisian army was deployed with brutality, resulting in many casualties 
and leading to the arrest and the prosecution of a large number of unionists (Allani 2009; 
Sadiki 200, 60). 
The third major episode of unrest came with the terrorist attack on Gafsa (South-
west) in 1980, which was carried out by a group of Tunisian pan-Arabism dissenters, who 
managed to sneak in from Algeria and were supported by the Libyan government.  This 
attack drove Bourguiba to mobilise the Tunisian army to the Libyan borders.  
Four years later, Bourguiba would face his fourth major challenge, from the so-
called bread uprising in January 1984, which was triggered when the government 
                                                          
69  Ahmed Ben Saleh is a Tunisian politician and unionist, born in 1926, who was elected as Secretary 
General of UGTT from 1954-1956, and held high ranked roles within Destour ruling party. During 1960s 
he held various ministries under Bourguiba cabinet, and sometimes he held more than two ministerial 
portfolios at the same time. In 1961 Ahmad Ben Salah took charge of planning and finance. Rural and 
conservative opposition within the Bourguiba entourage foiled his ambitious efforts at forced-pace 
modernisation; especially in agriculture; adding to the bad reputation he gained by his famous socialist 
program. He was sacked in the late 1960s from all of his positions and in 1970 charged by the Bourguiba 
regime with treason. He fled the country in that year secretly, and didn’t come back from exile 
permanently until 2000. 
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eliminated the subsidy for this vital product.  The uprising resulted in the sacking of a few 
ministers and the trial of UGTT Secretary General Habib Achour, who was sentenced to 
prison (Allani 2009, 262). 
Bourguiba’s standing as the father of independence did not last long.  By the late 
1960s and the early 1970s, a new generation of Tunisians had been born who had not 
witnessed the fight for independence, nor did they support Bourguiba’s vision of Islam in 
secular state.   
Yet “the children of independence, now the country’s youth, began not only to 
rebel against a tyrannical father but even began to reject the idea of such a paternity” 
(Mabrouk 2012, 53). Bourguiba viewed the Islamists of MTI 
as backward fanatics, who would destroy the progressive and pro-Western country he was 
building.  He rejected the movement’s bid for legal recognition and launched the first of 
several crackdowns that jailed thousands of Islamists in the mid 1980s.  By the summer of 
1987, Tunisia teetered on the brink of civil war.  The looming prospect of violent chaos 
prompted Prime Minister Zine al Abidine Ben Ali to depose Bourguiba in November 1987.  
(Alexander 2012b, 41) 
Rachid Ghanouchi was sentenced to death during Bourguiba’s rule and later 
sentenced several times to life imprisonment during Ben Ali’s subsequent time in power.  
As Mehdi Mabrouk (2012) pointed out, the official religious policies undertaken during 
Bourguiba's long rule contributed to the emergence of Tunisian political Islam, and 
thereafter the “radicalisation of many aspects of Tunisian religiosity itself” (48-70). 
Bourguiba's secularism was active, intellectual and somehow camouflaged by 
French-style civil governance, his understanding of which was acquired during his 
studies in Sorbonne, Paris in the early 1900s. Ben Ali's secularism, on the other hand, 
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tended to be more pragmatic, opportunistic, and actually harsher in its execution and 
security measures than Bourguiba's. Bourguiba and Ben Ali tried their best to wipe out 
political Islam with different methods, though most of the religious policies were 
profoundly the same.  Although late in his rule Ben Ali opened up some religious outlets, 
such as Zaytouna Radio and Zaytouna Bank (Mabrouk 2012) and softened his security 
measures on headscarf prohibition, he stopped short of making any remarkable change in 
state policy towards political Islam. 
Though he was not an intellectual like Bourguiba and his anti-Islamism 
sentiments were not as deep and ideologically aggressive as Bourguiba's, Ben Ali 
introduced one notable and infamous policy, which was uncovered instantly by state 
media during the 1990s.  This policy called for the ‘cleansing of the sources’, and by 
‘source’, Ben Ali meant the origins of Islamism.  Some of Ben Ali’s opportunistic leftist 
entourage developed this policy, convincing Ben Ali to execute it in order to wipe out the 
Ennahda movement once and for all (Ghanouchi 2011; Mabrouk 2012; Zemzemi 2011). 
While Bourguiba targeted Islamists during the last three or four years of his rule 
(1984-1987), his successor Ben Ali tried to wipe them out throughout his twenty-three 
years in power, particularly from 1990 until 14 January 2011 when he fled the country to 
Saudi Arabia. 
Ben Ali and Islam cleansing policies 
On 7 November 1987, Ben Ali came to power, ousting Habib Bourguiba, the 
President of the Tunisian Republic of over thirty-one years, in a bloodless ‘doctor's 
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coup’70. It was a remarkable political feat from a man whose name at the time was no 
more than “an inconspicuous footnote in Tunisia’s public affairs, mostly in the obscure 
and unimportant domain of national security and the military” (Sadiki 2002a, 58).   
It was alleged that Bourguiba, who was eighty-five years old, had dementia 
(Stepan 2012).  The most reliable direct explanation for the coup d’état, however, was 
that Ben Ali’s advent to power was a much needed breather during 1986 and 1987 when 
the issue of succession was made manifest by the questionable wisdom of Bourguiba's 
insisting on politically motivated trials of Islamist dissidents of the MTI (Sadiki 2002).   
Before Bourguiba's overthrow in 1987, civil and political unrest and almost daily 
protests filled newspapers and television screens across the country. Organised by MTI, 
demonstrations protested the unfair trial of its leaders.  Bourguiba demanded the death 
penalty for MTI leader Rashid Ghanouchi, despite popular unrest and growing support 
for the Islamists across the country.  There were rumours that MTI had a secret Tunisian 
army based cell (khaliyah amneyah) and had planned to save the country from bloodshed 
by staging a coup d’état on 8 November 1987, just one day after Ben Ali’s coup.71  Not 
surprisingly, one of Ben Ali’s very first actions as the new head of the state was to arrest 
the alleged members of the secret cell and remand them for trial.  Ennahda has yet to 
officially acknowledge that it approved any plot to oust Bourguiba.   
                                                          
70 The Medical (or Doctor’s) Coup is a Tunisian popular reference for the 7th of September 1987 coup 
d’état, where Bourguiba’s head of doctors was urged or forced to write a medical certificate stating that 
Bourguiba was mentally unfit or incompetent to discharge his duties as President of the Republic. This 
step was made according to a clause of the Tunisian constitution. 
71 According to some sources, the MTI established a secret wing in 1981 that was dominated by Saleh 
Karkar, as well as Hamadi al-Jibali and Habib al-Mokni, and that became the vanguard of the movement, 
being responsible for ensuring both its secrecy and cohesiveness.  The MTI leadership at the time “has 
vigorously denied these accusations, insisting that such claims are simply attempts by the regime to 
weaken their credibility and to find an excuse to repress them even further” (Pargeter 2012, 79). 
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In his first months in power, Ben Ali tried to heal the wounds of the Bourguiba 
era by releasing political prisoners, including MTI members and promising free elections, 
pluralism and an end to Tunisia's ‘president for life’ condition. The tense last few months 
of Bourguiba’s rule prompted Ben Ali to treat the critical situation with a much-needed 
facelift of the regime's image and credibility. Ben Ali even invited Rashid Ghanouchi to 
his palace in Carthage. At the end of that meeting, Ghanouchi made his famous 
statement: “We trust Allah, then Ben Ali” (Sadiki 2002b; Zemzemi 2011). After his 
release from prison and grant of presidential amnesty in May 1988, Ghanouchi declared: 
“Ben Ali refused to obey Bourguiba’s orders to kill Ghanouchi and his colleagues in 
prison and dared carry out the famous change; in doing this, he not only saved one person 
but the whole nation” (Allani 2009, 263).  
In another bid for legal recognition, Rashid Ghanouchi changed the name of his 
party from MTI to ‘Ennahda (Renaissance) Movement’ in order to comply with a new 
law that forbade party names to contain religious references (Alexander 2012, Allani 
2009).  The Ben Ali regime, however, refused to recognise Ennahda as a legal party.  The 
regime did allow the group to express their opinions almost freely through a licensed 
newspaper called Al-Fajr72 for six months before a crackdown in late 1990.  Prior to the 
crackdown, Ben Ali, while refusing to formally recognise Ennahda, did not want to 
provoke this clandestine group that enjoyed strong popular support (Alexander 2012b).   
Ben Ali also invested in the ruling party, which he inherited from Bourguiba.  
Sheikh Abdelaziz Thâalbi founded the Constitutional Liberal Party in 1920, which was 
known as Destour Party, to lead the country towards constitutional life, self-government, 
                                                          
72 Al Fajr newspaper published its first issue on 21 April 1990, and was forced to cease printing by Ben 
Ali authorities in December 1990, due to accusation of publishing aggressive anti regime statements of 
Rashid Ghanouchi.   
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then at late stages, independence from the French.  Bourguiba managed to split that party 
and form the neo-Destour Party in 1934, which was the ruling party from 1964 until 
1988, where it picked up the name Socialist Destourian Party (Parti Socialiste 
Destourien, or PSD). Ben Ali changed its name again in 1988 to the Democratic 
Constitutional Rally (Rassemblement Constitutionnel Démocratique, RCD) which was 
dissolved after the 2011 revolution.  By the 1994 and 1999 Ben Ali re-elections, “the 
RCD developed into an octopus-like apparatus of two million members (in a country of 
ten million!) and it orchestrated a campaign for Ben Ali’s candidacy in 2004” (Filiu 2011, 
15). The party ran campaigns to amend the constitution to allow him to run for re-election 
in 2004, 2009 and 2014, extending the three terms, fifteen years time limit and the 
maximum age to be in office. 
Prior to the 1989 election, Ghanouchi signed Ben Ali’s National Pact, which was 
essentially a social contract between the government and civil and political groups 
intended to ‘manufacturing consensuses’ and build confidence between the regime and 
non-state actors. During this time (1987-1989) the pace and content of change was 
impressive, as Sadiki observed (Sadiki 2002a, 133). 
Without a doubt, Ennahda ceased fire, either to heal its wounds or driven by the 
set of expectations promised in Ben Ali's ‘new era’. Leaked news from the Ben Ali and 
Ghanouchi meeting revealed that the de facto president promised Ghanouchi that the 
legalization of MTI would be just a matter of time (Allani 2009; Ghanouchi 2011a). 
According to Alaya Allani (2009), the years from 1987 to 1989 represented a 
short break in Ennahda's very long journey of confrontation with the regime. During this 
period, Ben Ali offered opportunities for the Islamists through three avenues. First, the 
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movement was permitted to take part in the High Council of the National Pact by the end 
of 1988. Second, the movement was allowed representation in the Islamic High Council, 
through it’s the second-in-charge Abdelfattah Mourou, in early 1989.  Finally, Ennahda 
was permitted to take part in parliamentary elections of 1989. The movement was also 
allowed an Islamic student union (the Union Generale des Etudients Tunisiens - UGET), 
established on 17 December 1988 (Allani 2009, 263). 
The drafter of the National Pact was an academic named Mohamed Charfi, an extreme 
secularist, who would become the education minister in 1989. Charfi was allegedly the 
mastermind behind the cleansing program against Islam, which was executed later 
(Ghanouchi 2011; Allani 2009, 265). 
Various civic groups and parties carefully negotiated the Pact prior to its 
implementation. These groups included the Tunisian League of Human Rights, UGTT 
and formal and informal political organisations, like the Tunisian Communist Party and 
Ennahda.  The given reason for the discussions was that the authorities wanted to achieve 
national consensus in developing a roadmap for democratic transition. However, there 
was no mention of free elections or real democratic mechanisms that could accommodate 
multiple parties and a power transition.  Instead, the Pact focused on the Tunisian Code of 
Personal Status (CPS).  Ben Ali expected all parties to consent to the Pact, including the 
Islamists who saw that it contained un-Islamic clauses such as making adoption and 
consensual sex outside marriage legal, while criminalising polygamy and condemning 
Islamic physical punishment, such as stoning married adulterers to death, as against 
human and natural rights (Ghanouchi 2011). 
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According to Rashid Ghanouchi, who had just been released from prison in May 
1988, the National Pact was a challenging test for his movement.  It was a tough decision, 
but Ennahda chose to make concessions to avoid recurring confrontation:  
The pact was a real crisis for the Islamic movement, which was keen to maintain the national 
harmony as the condition for the democratic transition, and to gain legal status in order to cut 
off the means of its enemies, who wanted to drag us to confrontation again so we would not 
have enough time to heal wounds and invest our previous sacrifices (Ghanouchi 2011a, 115).73 
Despite signing this agreement, Ben Ali changed his position and began targeting 
the Islamists once again. The Islamists saw this aggression as evidence of the regime's 
penchant for totalitarianism and its desire to eliminate the Islamists from the political 
scene, selling it to the public as necessary to protect the country from extremism and 
terrorism (Ghanouchi 2011).  
Islamist candidates received more public support prior to the election, however, 
than the government expected. Subsequently, security forces, Ministry of Interior 
informants and members of the RCD were sent to identify and spy on supporters of the 
Islamist candidates, leaders and organisations. Islamists subsequently received 13 percent 
of the nationwide vote with up to 30 percent in urban areas, but failed to win any seat 
outright due the electoral system in place at the time, which was a proportional system 
(Zemzemi 2011; Allani 2009; Ghanouchi 2011a).74 
                                                          
73 This is an English translation of the original Arabic text. 
74 Under a proportional representation "PR" voting system, if 30% of voters support a particular party 
then roughly 30% of seats will be won by that party.  However, there are several different forms of 
proportional representation. Some, as in this case, are focused solely on achieving the proportional 
representation of different political parties while others permit the voter to choose between individual 
candidates.  Ennahda candidates in the 1989 election ran as independents, and Ennahda supporters missed 
out on the opportunity to be represented. 
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As a result of the election outcome, Ennahda accused the regime of fabricating the 
election result, and public protests again escalated with violence followed by reprisals 
from the Ben Ali regime.  Ghanouchi fled to Algeria in late 1989, then to Sudan before he 
finally travelled to London to seek political asylum.   
The reasons behind the overnight crackdown on Islamists are unknown, though 
the Islamists themselves would often refer to conspiracy theories that call for an 
elimination of the ‘Islamic threat’. Alternatively, the alarming results of the 1989 
elections could have showed Ennahda to be a viable threat to the regime, though it didn’t 
obtain more than 13% of the votes nationwide, which was nevertheless only second to the 
tally attained by RCD ruling party (Allani 2009; Ghanouchi 2011a, 2011b; Brown 1998a 
and 1998b). 
After the 1989 elections, a confident Ennahda decided to go back to confronting 
the regime.  It used the opportunity of the first Gulf War to influence public opinion by 
raising its own slogans against the government, among them being ‘eliminate the regime’ 
(Allani 2009). The government reacted immediately with the mass arrest of Ennahda 
cadres, banning the al-Fajr newspaper in December 1990 and dissolving the UGTE in 
March 1991. The official media and the security agencies portrayed Ennahda's opposition 
as an emergency crisis, propagating stories regarding the discovery of secret cells within 
the security establishment. By the end of 1991, the regime prosecuted around 300 top 
Ennahda leaders, 100 of whom were military personalities (Allani 2009, 265).  According 
to Ennahda's official statements, more than 30,000 supporters were either arrested for 
casual interrogation or imprisoned and severely tortured by the end of 1992 (Ghanouchi 
2011; Zemzami 2011). 
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By then, virtually all of the Ennahda leadership was imprisoned and its 
organisational capabilities within the country were destroyed. Although it was commonly 
understood that Ennahda was effectively dismantled in the early 1990s, many Tunisians, 
including Ben Ali and his security agents, believed it maintained a clandestine structure 
and presence in the country (Alexander 2012). Indeed, after its January 2011 comeback, 
and early April 2011 official recognition as a political party, Ennahda showed Tunisia its 
ability to move the masses, organise meetings, public gatherings, and rallies.  The party 
opened branches at a furious speed in almost every major Tunisian city or town, 
outpacing other liberal, nationalist and leftist parties. By October 2011, national and 
international observers concluded that Ennahda's was clearly the most effective and 
organised election campaign (Cavatorta 2012).  
Once Ben Ali crushed Ennahda in the 1990s, his regime went on to introduce a 
new strategy to prevent the Islamists from regrouping. The strategy, developed at a 
congress of the RCD, was called ‘Plan for the Cleansing of Sources’ (Mabrouk 2012, 57).  
Strangely, without fearing the provocation of ordinary Muslims, the full details of the 
plan were highlighted in the media in order to stimulate popular support.  In fact, the 
main characteristic of the plan was to purify traditional Islamic resources from any item 
that could lead to politicising Islam or encouraging development of political Islam.  
According to Ennahda, rather than targeting just the ‘sources’ leading to political Islam, 
the plan targeted Islam as a whole religion and the common conscience of the Tunisian 
people (Ghanouchi 2011b; Zemzemi 2011). 
Mehdi Mabrouk, an academic expert on this ‘cleansing program’, notes that the 
executors of the program were very precise about the sources to be targeted, namely: 
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Intellectual sources involved books, school programs, journals, newspapers and the mass 
media.  As a result, there was little surprise when school texts were purged of rare phrases 
describing, for example, an old grandfather waking up early to pray.  The minister of education 
at the time Mohamed Charfi, was the leading practitioner of pedagogical purification. 
 Moral sources involved personalities, finance and social elements.  Imams and similar 
personalities faced harassment. Financial sources, such as major traditional traders and 
craftsmen, had provided financial support through zakat, something that the state now 
addressed.  Social sources of support were varied but all received attention.  Thus members of 
Ennahda were banned from employment, and other measures were taken against them 
including measures that abused their most fundamental human rights – even traditional head-
shawls, which were quite different from the Islamic shawl or headscarf, were banned, as was 
the growing of a beard.  Mosques in all educational establishments were closed, the buildings 
being used as archives instead (Mabrouk 2012, 57). 
In the face of this ‘cleansing plan’, the Islamic revival within Tunisia in the late 
2000s was noteworthy. The generation of youngsters born in the early 1990s hadn't 
experienced Ennahda's most difficult times and the consequences of government 
opposition.  This generation was attracted to Islamist preachers such as al-Qaradawi, who 
had a weekly program (on Shariaa and life) on the al Jazeera satellite channel.  This and 
many similar free to air religious programs reportedly contributed to the Islamic revival 
in Tunisia and elsewhere. As in Iran on the eve of the 1979 Islamic revolution, many 
sections of society expressed their religiosity by challenging the regime oppression 
towards what they considered to be native customs. While in Iran, the Qom Hawzah75 led 
the popular religious movement, and thereafter facilitated Ayatollah Khomeini's 
leadership of the 1979 popular uprising; Tunisia's enlarging religious section lacked any 
                                                          
75 Qom Hawza was established around 1922 by the Grand Ayatollah Abdul-Karim Ha'eri Yazdi in Qom, 
Iran and is now considered the largest and most prestigious Shia Twelvers’ religious institution. 
 120 
obvious consensual leadership. Ordinary apolitical Tunisians reacted to protect their 
collective identities and support their freedom of religiosity, which they had held for over 
fourteen centuries. 
In addition to that, during the 2000s, the Arab world was being flooded with 
satellite television channels, which were unable to be reached by any serious Arab state 
censorship scissors. These free-to-air satellite stations, like al-Jazeera, Iqra and al-
Manar, broadcasted religious debates, many of them concerning Islamist propaganda and 
general political talkback shows which highlighted the urgent need for democracy, 
dignity and liberties.  The revival was expressed in many forms, such as young people 
occupying the mosques for prayers and women wearing the headscarf. Post-Islamist 
religiosity was at its peak. 
During the 1990s, however, Ben Ali's plan was effective due to the harsh security 
measures imposed on Ennahda-affiliated citizens and their families. Ennahda leaders 
themselves and other observers criticised the cleansing program as a leftist crusade 
against Islam76 as a whole, not just against the Islamists and Islamism (Ghanouchi 2011; 
Zemzemi 2011).  Former leftists had infiltrated the RCD and decided to form an alliance 
with Ben Ali both in order to bury Islamism forever and to acquire influential positions in 
the regime. Notable leftists included personalities such as Mohamed Charfi, Nacer 
Smaoui, Ahmed Haj Ali and Moncef Rouici. Ennahda argued that measures which 
appeared to target the Islamists to force them out of political life, were in fact a campaign 
against the most basic rituals of Islam, which even Bourguiba himself would not have 
dared to carry out (Ghanouchi 2011). According to Mabrouk (2012), without this 
                                                          
76 Leftist academic Mohamed Charfi, (1936/2008) (appointed education minister from April 1989 to May 
1994) was allegedly the main drafter of this cleansing program. 
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undisguised Trotskyist tactic of ‘entryism’77 undertaken by the left, Ben Ali would have 
never dared to undertake such an extreme eradication of Islam from public life.  Indeed, 
in the late 2000s, Ben Ali permitted his son-in-law Sakhr el-Matri, to establish his own 
Zaytouna religious radio station and Zaytouna Islamic bank (Mabrouk 2012). This 
concession could have been due to some combination of the individual religiosity of Ben 
Ali's son-in-law, and Ben Ali's attempts to soften the side effects of the cleansing plan, 
which had gone feral against Islamic traditions and religiosity.  In fact, in the late 2000s, 
Ben Ali tried to show himself as a religion friendly president as national television 
celebrated his pilgrimage to Mecca in Saudi Arabia, and his attendance at most traditional 
religious events across the year such as Eid celebrations and fasting during the month of 
Ramadan. 
The majority of the Tunisian intelligentsia supported Ben Ali against what they 
called dhalamia (obscurantism), referring to the activities of Ennahda prior to their ban in 
the early 1990s. They considered the regime to be fighting the same battle and joined 
forces to more effectively combat the Islamists. These intellectual groups stood 
historically (during Bourguiba’s rule) on the left wing in national politics. Except for a 
                                                          
77 Entryism (also referred to as entrism or enterism) is a political strategy in which an organisation or state 
encourages its members to join another, usually larger organisation in an attempt to expand its influence 
and agenda.  In a situation where the organisation being "entered" is hostile, the entrists may engage in a 
degree of subterfuge to hide the fact that they are an organisation in their own right.  The French Turn 
refers to the classic form of entrism advocated by Leon Trotsky in his essays on "the French Turn".  In 
June 1934, he proposed that the French Trotskyists dissolve their Communist League to join the French 
Section of the Workers International (SFIO) and that it also dissolve its youth section to join more easily 
with revolutionary elements.  The tactic was adopted in August 1934, despite some opposition. 
In Australia, the practice was widespread during the 1950s, where Communists battled against 
right-wing ‘Groupers’, for control of Australian trade unions. The Groupers subsequently formed the 
Democratic Labor Party.  Today the practice in Australia is often known as a type of branch stacking.  In 
recent times RSPCA Australia has been described as being the victim of the practice.  The National 
Farmers Federation and Animals Australia have each been accused of infiltrating branches of RSPCA 
Australia in an attempt to promote opposing policies concerning battery hens, intensive pig farming, and 
the live export of sheep.  For further reading see: Robert J.  Alexander, International Trotskyism, 1929-
1985: A Documented Analysis of the Movement (Durham: Duke University Press, 1991). 
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tiny minority who preferred to abstain, the majority openly supported the regime’s 
campaign (Mabrouk 2012).78 
Radicalisation and deradicalisation climate 
The climate of fear caused by the danger of being arrested and accused of being 
an Islamist or a ‘member of an illegal terrorist organisation’ paralysed everyone who may 
have had an interest in advancing Islamist politics.  This paralysis prevented community 
leaders and organisations, such as small business managers, associations and other 
elements of civil society, from speaking up (Ghanouchi 2011a; Zemzemi 2011). 
Throughout the twenty-two years of Ben Ali’s regime, the government routinely 
emphasised the threat of Islamist extremism in order to justify its authoritarian rule.  
Islamists had grown to be a more threatening force than the leftists had been in the 1960s 
and 70s during the Bourguiba era. In fact, some leftist enclaves had been eliminated by 
official harassment or disappearance when leaders were simply bribed with government 
positions.  This was the case with Samir Abidi, who had been a fierce leftist leader of the 
student union during the 1980s.  Abidi became the media and information minister of Ben 
Ali in early 1990s, and participated in the cleansing program against Ennahda cadres and 
ideology. The other major reason for the weakening of the leftists by the 1990s was the 
fall of the Soviet Union and the wave of democratisation, which swept Eastern Europe in 
the early nineties (Mabrouk 2012; Sadiki 2002a). 
                                                          
78 Later on, after the October 2011 elections and during the following two years of Ennahda's rule, leftist 
leaders fell in the trap of ideological conflict with Islamists and opposed almost everything proposed by 
Ennahda, good or bad, while a splinter group went even further to enter a sacred coalition with RCD 
leaders such as Beji el-Sebsi, the leader of Nidaa Tunis (Call for Tunisia), and his like.  The independent 
leftists, leftist UGTT activists and some tiny Marxist parties who entered coalition of Jabhaa chabia 
(popular front) demanded since early 2013 the dissolution of the NCA, the ouster of the Troika 
government and remarkably, cessation of the work on the new constitution, in reaction to the 
assassination of Chokri Beliad, a famous leftist unionist who led the uprising of the Gafsa mine region 
back in 2008. 
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By using the Islamist threat and the Islamist-fueled civil conflict in Algeria as 
tools, the regime systematically suppressed human rights and avoided political reform. 
Ben Ali maintained that he was “ushering in democratic reforms in a ‘measured way’ so 
that religious extremists could not exploit freedoms” (Arief 2011, 6). 
However, as Amnesty International and the US State Department concluded, 
Tunisian security forces were guilty of a wide range of abuses, including extrajudicial 
arrests, denial of due process, systematic torture and other mistreatment of detainees 
(Arief 2011). 
By the early 2000s, evidence of the corruption of Ben Ali's family mounted.  
Jokes, rumours and disgust spread across the country, as the kleptocratic and insatiable 
family of Leila Ben Ali (nee Trabelsi, the wife of Ben Ali) and known as "the 
Trabelseya", caused discomfort even among other members and leaders of the RCD 
(Sadiki 2003; Alexander 2012).  As Ennahda, its secular allies and human rights activists 
in exile or inside the country intensified pressure and lobbied the international 
community, international human rights groups and Western governments, Ben Ali was 
forced to allow more space for increased opposition activities (Alexander 2012). 
As a result of domestic and international pressure from human rights groups such 
as Amnesty International and the special envoys of European Commission for Human 
Rights, by the early 2000s, hundreds of Ennahda leaders were gradually released from 
prison, due either to completing their sentences or to presidential amnesty.  These leaders 
remained under daily surveillance, were prohibited from talking to the press, and in some 
cases, from performing routine family duties.  There was also the ever-present danger of 
being sent back to jail (Ghanouchi 2011a; Cavatorta 2012b; Allani 2013). 
 124 
Before the Tunisian revolution of December 2010, Ben Ali’s regime faced a 
smaller uprising in 2008, during which widespread unrest broke out in the impoverished 
phosphate mining region of Gafsa where unemployment was much higher than the 
national average. Corrupt businessmen allied with the regime, who employed most of 
their staff from outside the region, controlled the local mines. The government sent the 
army to control the situation, which was beyond the control of local police forces.  Some 
thirty-eight people were detained, imprisoned, tortured and charged with offenses 
including forming a criminal group with the aim of destroying public and private 
property, armed rebellion and assault on officials during the exercise of their duties. A 
similar uprising took place in the southern town of Beni Gardene in 2009 (Filiu 2011, 
15). 
The leftist union leaders dominated this particular uprising, and records show no 
Islamist presence or effect. Upon his release, trade unionist Adnan Hadji stated that 
demands for improving deplorable conditions in the mines had been made via legal 
procedure, and that the demands were about important and relevant concerns including 
pollution, unemployment, disease and maldistribution of wealth (Arief 2011).  All those 
involved in this uprising were paroled in November 2009, on presidential special 
amnesty. 
By this time, a large portion of the left had forgotten about the Islamic threat and 
broke their sacred alliance with Ben Ali. This was primarily due to the harshness of his 
autocratic rule and the oppression of the political dissent after the massive campaign 
against Ennahda during the early 1990s.  
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Though Ben Ali tried to display more personal religiosity, through his pilgrimage 
with his wife Leila Ben Ali to Mecca, and unlimited support of his son-in-law Sakhr al 
Matri in establishing the Ezzeitouna [Zaytouna] Radio and Bank, he would pay an 
expensive price for his suppression of Islamists over a decade earlier (Cavatorta 2013). 
According to Ghanouchi (2011) and Mabrouk (2012), this had resulted in radicalisation 
within Tunisian society and the emergence of the jihadi Salafis, rather than more 
moderate versions of political Islam.  To quote Mabrouk (2012, 69): 
The current political landscape79 and the country’s political party map are not credible.  It 
cannot be representative of political sentiment if only the left, the nationalists and the liberals 
are represented but the Islamists are absent, so that the official view of politics cannot conform 
to the reality of politics as it is experienced.  This denial of reality and creation of a false 
alternative can only mask yet another mistake.  Society cannot be changed by decree… and 
measures and decisions leave their traces behind … In addition the blinkered security system 
has ravaged society and has prevented any other moderate Islamic current from emerging.  
During the Ennahda-led post-revolution interim government (2012-2013), the 
jihadi Salafi groups became much more of a threat, not only to state and wider society 
security, but also to the main party of political Islam: Ennahda. With a more open 
atmosphere of freedom to organise, freedom of expression and the freedom of the press, 
and in accord with the geo-strategic situation of the entire MENA region after the 2011 
revolutions, the jihadis took up globalised agendas and inter-Arab states conflicts, and 
advocated local responses for local problems. As Roy (2008, 2011a) states, neo-
fundamentalism, in the form of international jihadi groups, is a more globalised 
phenomenon, uprooted from its societies and local politics, than a consequence of a 
                                                          
79 Most likely Mabrouk wrote this before the January 2011 revolution, though his study was published in 
2012. 
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particular dictatorship's religious or political policies. History shows that the rise of neo-
fundamentalism is due to MENA regional conflict, Persian-Arab geostrategic wrestling 
over the control of Persian Gulf, and most importantly, the Arab-Israeli conflict and the 
USA-led wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, the global jihadi movement is not the 
only explanation for the rise of Tunisian jihadis; in fact, social and economic reasons 
have accompanied the more fashionable global jihadist solution. Ben Ali's attacks on 
almost all religious citizens and on religiosity during 1990s, plus the harsh neoliberal 
economic policies which deepened the marginalisation, poverty and unemployment of the 
Tunisian youth, all helped to create Tunisia's Salafi phenomenon. 
The role of the Tunisian army 
Bourguiba's mimicking of Ataturk’s secularism in Turkey has played a major role 
in the creation, evolution and the resulting mosaic of Tunisian political Islam.  The 
Tunisian military institution, however, has been immune to policies, security measures 
and intellectual wars against Islamism. 
While the Egyptian army has been at the heart of the political scene for decades 
and remains so, Habib Bourguiba made sure that the Tunisian military never got too big 
or powerful for fear that it could develop into a competing power.   
During the civil unrest in 1978 and 1984, which were caused by an economic 
crisis invested by the UGTT in general strikes that almost paralysed the country at the 
time; the Tunisian army was ordered to help restore security.80 Once security was 
restored, the army happily returned to their barracks. Bourguiba, who was a civilian 
politician in the first place and had been impressed with French-style liberal politics, kept 
                                                          
80 The most notorious event involving the Tunisian army was on the Black Thursday of 26th January 
1978, where the Tunisian army was deployed with brutality (Sadiki 2002, 60). 
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the newly established Tunisian army deliberately out of politics during his rule.  He went 
so far as to ban army personnel from joining the ruling party. Unlike neighbouring 
Algeria and Libya, Tunisia never endured a military coup, or even an attempted coup.  
Tunisia has never had a military strongman, and the army generals never involved 
themselves in policy making or lobbying (Barany 2011, 31; Stepan 2012). Tunisian 
Colonel Boubaker Benkraim explained that since the foundation of the Tunisian military 
post-French colonisation, 
The army chiefs have accepted that they will be apolitical, and pass on to their younger officers 
this culture of ‘devotion to the homeland and loyalty to the Republic’, and that is why our country 
is not known by coups d’état and military plots, which was the spirit of almost all African 
countries during 1960s and 1970s.  Our military schools are open to all Tunisians without 
exception, without social class or origin selection (Ayachi 2012, 227).
81 
Hence, by keeping the army politically weak throughout his rule, Bourguiba was 
relying on the party apparatus and loyal bureaucracy. The Egyptian scenario was less 
possible in Tunisia, partly because the military in Egypt had such sizeable economic 
interests. 
While the weak status of the Tunisian army continued up to the 2011 revolution, 
Ben Ali’s Tunisia was a typical police state, comparable to the infamous and feared 
interior ministry in Egypt, the mukhabaret (intelligence services) in Syria, and the 
‘revolutionary committees’ in Libya during the forty plus years of Gaddafi's rule.  Similar 
to some other militaries in Arab totalitarian states, the Tunisian army found itself 
overshadowed by far larger, more amply funded and more politically influential security 
agencies run by the interior ministry (Barany 2011). 
                                                          
81 This quotation is an English translation of the original French document. 
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After Ben Ali unleashed his thugs and the elite presidential guard against 
protesters in 2010, he ordered the army chief of staff, General Rashid Ammar to deploy 
his troops in support of the regime’s security detachments.  General Ammar rejected this 
order and was soon placing his troops between the protesters and the savage security 
forces, thereby effectively saving the revolution and forcing Ben Ali to flee the country.  
For some observers, it was the “[sixty-three year old general], Rashid Ammar, who 
delivered the fatal blow to the regime, not by staging any kind of coup, but by refusing to 
shoot at the protesters” (Filui 2011, 21). 
Indeed, on 9 January 2011, Ben Ali had ordered Ammar to crush the uprising in 
Tunis and the other major cities.  The general moved in his tanks and units, but refrained 
from using violence, even to enforce a curfew.  Presidential pressure intensified to 
implement a shoot-to-kill policy, but Ammar adamantly refused (Filiu 2011). Tension 
mounted between the military and the police forces, especially General Ali Seriati’s 
Special Forces and the Presidential Guard, among whom were the snipers who shot 
nearly two hundred protesters (Filiu 2011). Reports allege that in the morning of 14 
January 2011, General Seriati intentionally dramatised his security reports to Ben Ali in 
order to get an unconditional green light for his repressive campaign (Filiu 2012, 21).  
This bad news overwhelmed the dictator with panic, leading to a discussion with General 
Ammar as a last resort. The army chief allegedly gave him his only option: to leave the 
country safely.  Yet, there is a persistent rumour that General Ammar convinced Ben Ali 
simply to leave the country until things cooled down and security was restored, at which 
point he would come back to resume his duties as president (Filiu 2011, 21). 
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As Barany (2011, 31) states, with its “comparatively disadvantaged status and its 
officers’ disdain for the notorious corruption of the presidential clique, the military had 
no special stake in the regime’s survival and no strong reason to shoot fellow Tunisians 
on the regime’s behalf. As soon as Ben Ali found himself forced to turn to the soldiers as 
his last resort, he was doomed”. He had kept military spending low and the military’s role 
circumscribed to prevent a coup against his own rule.  This had the unintended effect of 
making it a less effective tool for repression when the real challenge came (Lynch 
2011b). 
At the same Aouina military airport where Ben Ali's presidential aircraft took off, 
General Ammar arrested General Seriati after requesting that he surrender his handgun.  
Swiftly, the army turned against Seriati’s commandos and hunted down the regime 
hardliners inside the presidential palace in Carthage (Filiu 2011). 
After the revolution, and after Ennahda came to power, the Tunisian army 
withdrew to its constitutional role of guarding certain civic sites, and allowed the struggle 
to play out between the new democratic regime and its opposition (Usher 2011). 
In conclusion, the postcolonial Tunisian army remained professional, and isolated 
from country politics and economic benefits to a great extent, though many soldiers 
started after the 2011 revolution to speak up against some earlier military corruption.  
Neither Bourguiba nor Ben Ali ever trusted the Tunisian army to protect them, made 
efforts to strengthen the army, or even let the army commanders share a piece of the pie 
with politicians, unlike Hosni Mubarak had done in Egypt. 
The Troika coalition government led by Ennahda (2011-2014) furthermore, 
played a role in keeping the Tunisian army out of politics, as the interim President 
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Moncef Marzougui facilitated the retirement of General Rashid Ammar in 2013 and 
appointed a new Tunisian major commander whom he trusted. This way, the Tunisian 
revolution secured itself from an Egyptian style coup d’état, but not from terrorism, the 
assassination of two political figures, or political turbulence under Ennahda rule. 
Tunisian Ennahda Party 
The Ennahda Party (Hizb Haraket Ennahda) originated as the Tunisian branch of 
the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood.  The Muslim Brotherhood is said to consist of more 
than eighty similar organisations and political parties around the Arab and Muslim world 
(Wright 2012; Alexander 2012). However, Ennahda’s relations with today’s MB are 
confined to loose networking and intellectual affiliations, rather than organizational ties. 
In early 1970s, leftist students and labour activists displayed their discontent with 
Bourguiba's authoritarianism, the worsening of economic performance and the 
ideological pressure of the international leftist movements.  Islamists pulled deeper into 
politics in September 1969, when members of the Quranic Preservation Society broke off 
to gather around a university based group called al-Jamaat al-Islamiyya (Islamic Group) 
(Alexander 2012; Allani 2009). Rachid Ghanouchi and Abdelfatteh Mourou were the 
leaders of this group, which at that stage, wanted to create a form of religious resistance 
and stimulate moral awareness.  They soon realised that with the influence of the left on 
the street, they should focus on more than religion and identity to reach a larger audience 
(Alexander 2012).  According to Ghanouchi (2011) himself, the small group gathered for 
the first time in 1969 after his return from Paris. Not having a method of preaching 
dawaa, the Islamic call, they used Tablghi Jamaeit, (TJ) which is a grass roots method of 
speaking to people in the streets, in cafes and mosques. Ghanouchi had picked up this 
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preaching method from TJ members in Paris in 1969, particularly in the Belleville 
mosque in suburban Paris (Ghanouchi 2011a; Allani 2009; Mabrouk 2012). 
On an intellectual level, Ghanouchi was obsessed with philosophy, and had 
returned to Tunisia with the ideologies of Mawdudi and the Algerian thinker Malek 
Bennabi (1905 – 1973) and various Muslim Brotherhood publications.82 
These radical new voices during the 1970s were reactions to Marxists and leftists, 
who were seen as a threat to the Arab-Islamic identity by Ghanouchi.  In 1971 and 1972, 
Bourguiba cracked down on leftist students83, which led to officials excusing minor 
Islamist activities, which were seen to counter the leftist forces. As early as 1973, 
Islamists began recruiting in secondary schools and on university campuses.  In response, 
the regime started to fear that it was losing control of this social force it had supported as 
a counter to the left (Alexander 2012). 
The Ennahda Party had its beginnings, as a legal body, in the government-
approved Quranic Preservation Society. This society was apolitical and dedicated 
primarily to encouraging the piety and faithfulness of the rapidly growing numbers of 
Westernised Tunisians post-colonisation.  The society was placed under the Ministry of 
Religious Affairs and supported by President Bourguiba as a counterweight to the 
country’s political left and was in stark contrast to Zaytouna Grand Mosque as a 
                                                          
82 Malek Bennabi is an Algerian writer and philosopher, who wrote (mostly in French) about modern 
Muslim society with a focus on the reasons behind the fall of the Muslim civilisation.  He is mostly 
known for the concept of ‘coloniability’ which is the inner aptitude of some societies to be colonised. 
83 Confrontation between the leftists and the Bourguiba regime escalated in the early 1970s as an 
automatic result of distrust between the socialists and the government and remarkable financial 
difficulties after Ahmed Ben Saleh’s failed socialist experience during 1960s.  Ben Saleh implemented an 
ambitious socialist plan when he was Economy, Planning and Education Minister uninterruptedly from 
1957 until 7 November 1969, when Bourguiba sacked him and charged him with treason. 
Ben Saleh's social planning included his infamous cooperative system between peasants and landowners, 
which generated a huge amount of discontent and anger from small businesses and land owners, allowing 
Bourguiba eventually to get rid of Ben Saleh and focus on a liberal style economy thereafter. 
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traditional hub of knowledge and learning (Ghanouchi 2011; Zemzemi 2011).  Observed 
here is the state's strategy that used the religious-activists-turned-political-activists to 
balance the leftists and vice versa whenever appropriate.  The activities of this small and 
somewhat amorphous Islamist group drew the interest and attention of a growing 
audience of mostly university students. This accelerated the rise of MTI (El-Khawas 
1996, 393). 
In the late 1970s, the opposition, with the cooperation of the student movement, 
UGTE, and the workers union, UGTT, managed to generate social and political unrest.  
Since Ali Ben Ghadhehim’s84 famous 1864 uprising against high taxes and the later 
uprisings against French colonialists, local governments had not faced any major uprising 
until 1978, which saw serious economic riots, protests and strikes throughout the year.85  
The violent government crackdown on protesters created a political void that the 
Islamists, who condemned the social action organised by the UGTT, began to fill on a 
large scale.  The MTI activists learned valuable lessons from the 1978 riots and later from 
the 1984 riots; they would come to understand the social and political role of the street 
(Ismail 2006, 144; Allani 2009).  Two factors helped the Islamists to gain ground.  First, 
Egyptian president Anwar Sadat began the release of Muslim Brotherhood prisoners, 
several of them travelling to Tunisia and other Arab countries, to preach the MB call.   
                                                          
84 Ali Ben Ghadhehim was the famous leader of the 1864 revolt, commonly known as "the revolt of Ali 
Ben Ghadhehim". This was a tribally led anti-tax uprising that shook the entire Kingdom then known as 
Tunis. Distinctive for the swiftness of its mobilisation, the development of far-flung coalitions between 
rural folk and urban centres, and its spectacular failure, it has had a lasting impact on generations of 
Tunisians.  
85  The huge demonstrations in January 1978 marked the end of the traditional alliance between the 
UGTT and the ruling Destour Party.  Two years later, rioting broke out in Qafsah, [Gafsa] to protest 
unemployment and poverty in the rural areas in the southwest (Al-Khawas 1996, 393). 
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Their influence gave stronger political content to Tunisian Islamism.  Second, the 
emergence of the 1979 Iranian revolution provided the new Tunisian militants with a rich 
vocabulary to talk about economics and social issues (Alexander 2012).  The books of the 
most famous Iranian Revolution ideologues, such as Mohammad Baqir al-Sadr86 (1935 -
1980) (in particular Our Philosophy, and Our Economy) and Ali Shariati87 (1933 – 
1977) were widely known among Islamists at that time.88  The London based and Iranian 
backed weekly magazine, al-Alim, was the weekly intellectual and news channel for 
early Tunisian Islamists for years to come. 
After years of loosely organised activism around a monthly intellectual magazine 
called al-Maarifah (The Knowledge), Ghanouchi, Mourou and other early Tunisian 
Islamists formally declared the formation of the Islamic Tendency Movement (MTI) on 6 
June 1981. (Allani 2009) By the year 1984, Islamists were active members within major 
trade unions and syndicates across the country. They become an integral part of the 
labour federation union, UGTT, when they had 70 members elected out of 220 delegates 
to the Union General Congress in 1984 (Ismail 2006, 144). By then, Islamists were 
competing equally with leftists and liberals in trying to gain control over the same social 
constituencies. 
In a press conference, those early leaders declared their first manifesto, known as 
the 6th of June Manifesto (Arabic: Bayaa’n). The objectives of this manifesto were 
                                                          
86 Mohammad Baqir al-Sadr was an Iraqi Shia cleric, a philosopher and also the ideological founder of the 
Islamic Dawa’h Party in Iraq. 
87 Ali Shariati was an Iranian revolutionary and sociologist, who focused on the sociology of religion.  He 
is held as one of the most influential Iranian intellectuals of the 20th century,, and considered by many the 
'ideologue of the Iranian Revolution. 
88 While MTI did not have any difficulty learning from Iranian revolutionaries and Islamic revolution 
ideologues in the late 1970s and early 1980s, today, the rise of Salafis has made cross-sectarian learning 
almost impossible.  The modern Ennahda party has had to distance itself from what Iran had become prior 
to the 2011 Arab Spring as the infamous Iranian theocratic regime, or the rule of the Mullahs.   
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vague, calling for equitable economic reform, an end to one-party rule and a return to the 
‘fundamental principles of Islam’ (American Foreign Policy Council 2012; Ghanouchi 
2011). 
As Torelli points out, the MTI refused to recognise the legitimacy not only of the 
incumbent regime, but of the Tunisian institutional system itself, which was perceived as 
a “conspiracy waged … by Western imperial powers from outside” (Torelli 2012, 70).  It 
was clear that this new Islamic organisation wanted to re-establish Islam as a dominant 
factor in Tunisian society, in contrast to the type of nation that Bourguiba had created.   
As mentioned earlier, its first leaders tried to register MTI as a political party, but 
Bourguiba’s regime refused it, and organisers were faced with imprisonment and torture 
until 1987 when Bourguiba was ousted.89  During the course of the 1980s, and until the 
election of 1989, MTI became younger and more populist in nature, and evolved into a 
well-organised social and political movement linked with the broader civil rights 
movement in the country (American Foreign Policy Council 2012). 
Surprisingly, Ennahda gained relatively high levels of support during 1989 
election; despite the poll’s undemocratic nature (Alexander 2012; Cavatorta 2012; 
Ghanouchi 2011; Stepan 2012). 
                                                          
89 In early 1984, several months after the bread riots had occurred, MTI leaders were released from 
prison. They managed to avoid confrontation with the government until August 1987, when eighty-nine 
of its members were arrested and charged with bombing four tourist hotels.  When their trial began, there 
were huge demonstrations against the government. A month later, seven people were sentenced to death, 
sixty-eight were imprisoned from two years to life, and fourteen were acquitted. It was reported that 
Bourguiba was not pleased with these sentences.  In October he ordered retrials and harsher sentences, 
possibly the death penalty, for all of them.  If imposed, the harsher sentences would have worsened the 
situation in Tunisia by escalating the level of violence between the government and the militant groups.  
This order may have increased the pressure to remove the ailing Bourguiba from office (Al-Khawas 1996, 
393). 
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From late 1990, Ennahda party members were accused of multiple violent plots 
and thousands of party supporters were arrested.90 Many of them experienced torture, 
unjust military tribunal hearings and exile (Arief 2011). During the last two years of the 
Bourguiba era, some MTI members were accused of bombing hotels in the coastal cities, 
threatening Tunisia’s vital tourism industry. In early 1991, some Ennahda members 
allegedly attacked an RCD office in Tunis, killing one civilian and throwing acid in the 
faces of others.  For the new Ben Ali regime, the mass arrest and torture of Ennahda 
Islamists would be a priceless gift; they labeled Ennahda a terrorist group, using videos 
and pictures of the victims as propaganda tools. Ennahda insisted that individuals 
affiliated with Ennahda acted individually and that the leadership had no knowledge and 
gave no approval for such violence (Usher 2011). 
Furthermore, in early 1991, the Ben Ali regime unearthed an alleged conspiracy 
to overthrow the government,91 which Ennahda denied at the time.  In 1992, a Tunisian 
military court convicted 265 Ennahda leaders and members of plotting the coup.  In 
addition, as mentioned earlier, more than 30,000 supporters were arrested or sentenced 
and thousands of others went into exile in more than sixty countries around the world.  
This exile continued for twenty years until the Tunisian revolution when Ben Ali fled the 
                                                          
90 To this day, some opponents accuse Ennahda of holding double standards and of hiding a violent, non-
democratic agenda.  Others simply observe that Ennahda has a wide variety of moderate and extremist 
militants within, as claimed by Ghanouchi. This variety exists in the context of celebrating the wide, and 
sometimes contrasting, difference of opinions and backgrounds. “Ennahda is a mixed bag. The top layers 
are genuinely ‘moderate’, but much of the base has a distinctly fundamentalist tilt.  To date, the leadership 
has hardly reined in the base, nor is it clear it wants to”, observes American analyst Rob Prince (2012, par. 
17). 
91 The plan was allegedly to “infiltrate the army, the security forces and the customs service, and to 
destabilise the government by means of terrorist activities, protests, demonstrations and the call to general 
strikes.  As a result, 300 military and civilian people were rounded up and charged with a plot to 
overthrow the government” (Al-Khawas 1996, 394). 
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country on 14 January 2011 (Alexander 2012; Al-Khawas 1996; Arieff 2011a, 12-13; 
Stepan 2012; Allani 2009).   
In June 2003, representatives from four Tunisian non-regime parties, Ennahda, 
Ettakatol, CPR (Congress for the Republic) and PDP (Progressive Democrats), all of 
which hold seats in the current constitutional assembly, with three of them ruling under 
the coalition, met in France in order to negotiate and sign a ‘Call of Tunis’ (Mabrouk 
2012). This document endorsed the two fundamental principles of the twin tolerances: 
1) any future elected government would have to be ‘founded on the sovereignty of the people as 
the sole source of legitimacy’ and 2) the state, while showing ‘respect for the people’s identity and 
its Arab-Muslim values,’ would provide ‘the guarantee of liberty of belief to all, and the political 
neutralisation of places of worship … The Call also went on to demand the full equality of women 
and men.  (Stepan 2012, 96)  
In an interview with the Financial Times just prior to his 2011 return to Tunisia 
after over twenty years of exile, Ghanouchi stated that his party “drank the cup of 
democracy in one gulp back in the early 1990s, while other Islamist movements ‘have 
taken it sip per sip” (Usher 2011, par. 19).  On another occasion, Ghanouchi explained 
that Ennahda had documented its belief in democracy, orderly transition of power and 
human rights since the first MTI manifesto of 11 June 1981 (Ghanouchi 2013a).   
During the 2010-2011 revolution, Ennahda did not play a major role in the 
protesting as an organised party, mainly because it was still wounded by twenty years of 
prohibition, oppression and tough security measures.  However, Ennahda never stopped 
its underground activities, and without doubt, many of its members participated in the 
revolution as individuals (Roy 2012; Stepan 2012; Wright 2012).  In the months that 
followed the revolution, however,  
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its organisation and financial resources made it the most effective party in Tunisia. Ennahda 
enjoyed name recognition, national grassroots structures, money, and credibility that no other 
party could equal.  It rallied a broad base that stretched beyond religious voters to include social 
conservatives, human rights activists, and voters who saw Ennahda as a representative of Tunisian 
identity (Alexander 2012b, par. 25). 
Ennahda’s first decision after gaining legal status on 1 March 2011, was not to 
join the interim government, but instead to join ‘The Committee of Defending the 
Revolution’, an alliance of over twenty-five organisations including the UGTT.  “The 
dictator has gone, but the dictatorship remains”, Ghanouchi told the thousands who 
greeted him at the airport when he landed in Tunisia back from exile, on 30th of January 
2011. He added, that Ennahda would not work with the RCD (then still a legal party) or 
any of its elements because “only God can bring life from death. And we cannot bring a 
democratic system out of a corrupt dictatorial system” (Usher 2011, par. 27). 
Between March and October 2011 elections the Tunisian post-revolution 
transition continued, planned by a type of democratic consensus and strongly influenced 
by Tunisia’s historical tradition of reformism and constitutionalism.  Ennahda contributed 
to the plan in a non-dominant position, reentering Tunisian politics in a political space 
formatted by certain constraints, which provided a strong incentive for the democratic 
politics that it had in principle accepted long before (Guazzone 2013, 32).  The steps to 
take after the elections were decided beforehand by a consensus of the major political 
parties represented in the Higher Commission for Political Reform, through a political 
agreement on 15 September 2011.  
As Ennahda's members were either in prison, underground or in exile during the 
earliest days of the revolution, Ennahda regained political ground by playing the victim 
 138 
card.  They organised ceremonies across the country in memory of dozens of Ennahda 
militants who fell fighting the dictatorship (Usher 2011). They mobilised tens of 
thousands of supporters in well-organised events.  Later during the election campaign, the 
core leadership reached out to tens of thousands of former activists now out of prison, 
established offices in every city, quietly setting up sections for women, youth, students, 
public relations and the media, and held internal regional elections to select new 
leadership.  One of the leaders explained, “given that we are an old party we have been 
able to revive our structures immediately after the revolution in January 2011.  Some 
militants who have been for a long time in prison started working again for the party 
together with those who operated underground” (Cavatorta 2012, 7). Their long suffering 
at the hands of the despised regime “appealed to the coastal middle class, which they 
courted by claiming as their own the more liberal, progressive culture familiar to the 
Tunisian bourgeoisie. The verdict of the October elections was unequivocal: The 
government was theirs” (Pecastaing 2012, 54). 
The Electoral Independent High Commission confirmed Ennahda's victory with 
41% of the votes (89 seats out of 217 seats of the newly established National Constituent 
Assembly (NCA) followed by the Congress for the Republic 'CPR', the Popular Petition 
Current, and the Alliance for Work and Freedom ‘Ettakatol’ in the fourth place.  The 
remaining political parties split between them the remaining third of the seats.  
According to Allani (2013, 133), analysts have attributed the rise of Ennahda to 
various reasons: 
-unique use of religious references; 
-the fragmentation of the left, centre-left and liberal parties; 
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-the length of the period of persecution that the Islamists were subjected to under 
Ben Ali’s reign; 
-the fear of voters about the return of the Constitutional Rally (the ex-ruling party) 
on whom they placed blame; and 
-Ennahda leaders’ commitment during the election campaign to respect the 
Family Code in place, which represented by their pledge not to force women to wear a 
particular clothing; not to restrict those who frequent bars and places of leisure; not to ban 
what was permissible under the civil government such as drinking alcohol and wearing 
bikinis; and not to interfere with the work of foreign banks. 
A few weeks after the first free election of 23 October 2011, Ghanouchi went to 
Washington in a public relations and diplomatic move aimed to obtain support from the 
United States.  He told the Council on Foreign Relations: “today we are not resorting to 
violence.  People are free to do what they want, so they are learning how to exercise their 
freedom in a responsible way. Freedom needs training and exercise, and we are in the 
process of being trained” (Ghanouchi 2011e, n.p).   
The coming years should provide partial evidence of the extent to which Ennahda 
has changed as a result of the process of democratisation within the organisation itself, 
and within the democratic transition of Tunisia. Ennahda's literature for the 2011 election, 
titled ‘For Freedom, Justice and Development in Tunisia’ states, “The Ennahda 
Movement proposes to Tunisia to establish a political system that eradicates the roots of 
dictatorship … [It] is the parliamentary system, which guarantees public and private 
liberties” (Ennahda 2011). 
 140 
Many of Ennahda's opponents would later on dismiss these statements as pure 
propaganda, while Ennahda politicians and leaders defended their position and blamed 
any faults of the election process on technical flaws.  However, the evolution of Ennahda 
ideology from its declaration in 1981 until the overthrow of Ben Ali in 2011, showed no 
precedent in the experiences of other neo-Islamist parties in terms of harsh conditions of 
working underground for over thirty years, or in terms of adopting new techniques, 
making remarkable concessions and entering alliances with secularists, all in very short 
time, during the months prior and after October 2011 elections. Since then Ennahda has 
been pragmatically amending and changing its tactics and political choices.  
Ennahda, composed of hardline MB followers, Salafis, and Sufis, is still 
undergoing a huge process of self-discovery. Many questions remain unanswered 
concerning the relationship between dawaa and politics, interrelations with liberal and 
leftist political parties and Islamic groups such as the fundamental Salafis, as well as the 
position of the state vis-à-vis Islam. The fact that Ennahda's exiled leaders, such as 
Rashid Ghanouchi, Amer Lareyed and Lotfi Zitoune, were in Europe over the last twenty 
years seems to have complicate matters.  Furthermore, other leaders, namely Hammadi 
Jebali and Ali Lareyed, spent years in prison cells, denied basic rights including access to 
news media, and had been suffering from ‘political jet lag’.  But Ennahda suddenly found 
itself having to recall its members from the diaspora, from prison cells and the 
underground.  
Conclusion: 
The suddenness with which Ennahda came to rule and share power in Tunisia lead 
to the questioning of its intentions and democratic credibility, as well as commitment to 
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free speech and religious freedom. Nevertheless, this neo-Islamist party remains rooted in 
its specific Tunisian socio-economic circumstances though it is descended ideologically 
from the broader MB movement.  
Bourguiba’s promotion of both Turkey’s Ataturk and the French styles of active 
secularism might have contributed to the rise of Rachid Ghanouchi’s movement as early 
as 1971, that’s less than fifteen years after independence (1956). MTI in particular, 
emerged to defend religious rights and speak up on behalf of a vast section of pan-Arabist 
yet marginalised Tunisian citizens of the time. 
Unfortunately, the rise of Islamism itself might be used as an excuse to delay 
democratisation, whether in Tunisia or elsewhere in MENA region.  
Ben Ali transformed Bourguiba's legacy to develop a quite different autocratic 
regime.  The regime took advantage of Algeria's civil war in 1992, later following up the 
campaign against Ennahda with a more thorough program of cleansing Tunisia of 
Islamism. By the early 2000s the regime had exploited concerns arising from al Qaeda 
and its affiliated global jihad groups, to oppress almost any dissenting voice in Tunisia, 
not just the Islamists of Ennahda and the emerging jihadi Salafis.  
Ennahda's discourse and apparent political ambitions have changed dramatically 
since the early 1970s, transforming it from a conservative MB party into a neo-Islamist 
party that preaches pluralism and democracy.  The next chapter examines the credibility 
of these calls for democracy and moderation while Ennahda was in power between 
December 2011 and January 2014.  Such an examination might shed more light on the 
concept of neo-Islamism as it is applied in a concrete socio-political case study. 
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ENNAHDA AS A NEO-ISLAMIST 
PLAYER IN POWER 
 
Ennahda, the political vehicle of one of the more prominent Arab neo-Islamist 
movements, was the first Islamic party to win a free election after the Arab Spring and 
the first Islamic party to lead a freely elected government in modern Arab history. 
Notably, Ennahda was also the first Arab Islamic party ever to share power with a secular 
party. By early 2014, it had become the first Islamic-led government to relinquish 
power92 without coercion, political unrest notwithstanding.  
When Ennahda began leading the coalition government comprised mostly of 
Ennahda, Congress for the Republic (CPR)93 and Democratic Front of Work and 
Liberties (Ettakatol),94 in December 2011, law and order was almost absent in many parts 
                                                          
92 On 28 September 2013, Ennahda became the first democratically elected Islamist party to voluntarily 
accept a plan to relinquish power. Some party members accused their leaders of giving in to the 
opposition. Ennahda is described as "the party of concessions" by many of its members and sympathisers. 
93 In French, Congrès pour La République. 
94 In French, Front Démocratique pour Le Travaille et Libertés, or FDTL, better known in Arabic as 
Ettakatol. 
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of the country due to the vacuum in state authority left by the fall of Ben Ali. Tunisians 
awoke every morning to depressing security reports. According to the International Crisis 
Group (ICG 2013, 1), the Interior Ministry stated that between February 2011 and 
February 2012, more than 400 police stations were attacked, and 12,000 individuals were 
arrested for looting, assault or attempted murder.  
In this chapter, Ennahda is evaluated on the basis of three tests in order to 
determine whether it is capable of participating in and furthering the democratic 
transition in Tunisia. The first test, involving moderation, examines Ennahda's attitudes 
towards democracy, an open society and the free market economy, Tunisia’s non-Islamic 
political parties, and generally, tolerance of differing religious and political points of 
view.  
The second test examines Ennahda's contribution towards remedying the post-
revolution economic crisis. Has Ennahda been successful in resolving any of the 
country's economic problems during its relatively short time in power, and within the 
transitional circumstances? Does Ennahda have a viable economic policy to bring Tunisia 
out of its economic struggles in the long term? 
The third test examines whether Ennahda's actions towards and reactions to 
Salafist influence have been successful (Prince 2012a; Alexander 2012; Allani 2013). 
Salafist influence includes terrorist threats, which Ennahda has experienced since its first 
day in power. More challenging from a political standpoint have been union strikes, coup 
attempts and hostility from ex-RCD activists and security forces. The Salafist question is 
particularly important because Ennahda's enemies and competitors within the secularist 
camp have used Salafists (mainly Ansar a-Sharia) or fear of Salafists to attempt to oust 
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Ennahda from power. Finalising (and leading the historic process towards) the new 
constitution, and thereafter moving the country towards new and permanent institutions 
have been declared Ennahda's most important tasks.95 
Chronology of events: 
A brief chronology of the relevant events between 2012 and 2014 is useful for a 
thorough examination based on these three tests. 
In post-revolutionary Tunisia, Ennahda has played “a central role in the process of 
democratisation, having committed its considerable resources to the construction of a 
new plural democratic political system that would respect civil liberties and human 
rights” (Cavatorta and Merone 2013, 859). However, the twenty-six months in power 
(December 2011 through January 2014) were not by any means an easy exercise for the 
Tunisian neo-Islamist party. Ennahda was met with challenges from inside the 
organisation as well as from the outside.  
Internally, Ennahda suffered from various troubles.96 First, it has never 
demonstrated a clear plan to face the country's economic crisis. Additionally, it has 
                                                          
95 Rachid Ghanouchi himself elaborated on this in February 2014: ‘finally, we decided to step down from 
our governing position without losing an election, facing a counterrevolution or coup d’état. We realised 
that although we had the right to retain power because of our electoral victory, the Tunisian people would 
not get a constitution without our stepping down… The opposition had withdrawn from the constitutional 
assembly and refused to continue drafting the constitution. We could have continued without them. But 
we would have produced a constitution for the Ennahda party, not the Tunisian people as a whole.  So we 
took a difficult path towards general consensus. 
After five difficult months of dialog, we reached consensus with other parties and Ennahda 
relinquished power in favor in favor of a neutral government. We were not obliged to leave power. We 
had the full right to retain it. We are not angels. We would like to have power. But we fervently believe 
that a democratic constitution is more important for Tunisia than Ennahda retaining power’ (Ghanouchi 
2014b, par. 6-7).  
96 From 4 August 2013 to 31 August 2013, Zogby Research Services (based in Washington DC, USA) 
surveyed 3031 Tunisian adults to gauge their attitudes toward the developments that unfolded in Tunisia 
after their revolution, finding a deeply unsatisfied electorate and extremely polarised society.  Rating the 
Ennahda-led government in different areas of governance resulted in the highest score being in security of 
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received harsh criticism from its own cadres, supporters and electoral base due to the 
concessions made to outsiders.  It has experienced infighting and a lack of consensus in 
its decision-making, especially between the hardliners such as Habib el-Louz and the 
moderate wing led by Abdelfattah Mourou.  Its lack of experience in wielding political 
power has shown decision making to be a challenge. 
Externally, Ennahda has suffered from both counter revolutionary forces that have 
had some success in regrouping and their long established hostile relations with the 
leftists of UGTT. These forces are comprised of various groups meeting around a major 
common cause: anti-Islamist rhetoric (Wolf 2014). Among these are supporters of the 
Ben Ali regime who were under the umbrella of the RCD. After the revolution and the 
dissolution of the RCD, they formed many new parties.  One of the major parties is Nidaa 
Tounis, which is comprised of old regime supporters and allies. Established in early 2012 
during the rule of Ennahda, Niddaa Tounis, is headed by charismatic leader Beji Caid el-
Sebsi, (a veteran member of Destour as well as RCD, Speaker of Parliament in the Ben 
Ali era). The Popular Front, which is a coalition of various leftist parties, entered an 
alliance with Nidaa Tounis after the assassination of Chokri Belid in February 2012.  The 
National Salvation Front ‘NSF’, established later, has more components than do Nidaa 
Tounis and the Popular Front, including various civil nonprofit organisations, and UGTT 
and security syndicates, which played critical roles in suppressing Ennahda during the 
autocratic era.  
                                                                                                                                                            
the citizens at 46%.   Meanwhile other priorities came up by a two-to-one ratio out of the total score; such 
as: protecting rights for women, ending corruption in government, finalising the constitution, protecting 
freedom of the press, setting date for the next election, combating extremism and terrorism, expanding 
employment opportunities, protecting personal and civil rights, the high cost of living “scored only 25% 
which is second to priority”, and establishing an independent election body (Zogby 2013). 
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This alliance continually attacked Ennahda when it was in power. The secular 
groups placed blame on Ennahda for its soft stance against Salafist political violence. 
According to the ICG (2013, ii), there is “not much doubt that the non-Islamist opposition 
has displayed excessive and premature alarm and that it sometimes levels unsubstantiated 
accusations. Nor is there much question that it is finding it hard to accept the reality of 
Islamists governing their country”. 
Leftist parties and UGTT activists decided to depose Ennahda at any cost and 
organised union strikes across dozens of work sectors. These strikes occurred almost 
daily, culminating in thousands of strikes in 2012 and 2013. This union-made chaos 
contributed to Tunisia’s economic crisis and to general discontent across the population. 
In August and September 2013, the situation in Tunisia deteriorated nearly to 
Egyptian levels after the military coup that ousted President Mohamed Morsi. Tunisian 
President Marzougui later confirmed rumours that the opposition had been appealing to 
generals from the Tunisian army and security forces to attempt a coup, and that he 
eliminated such risk by replacements members of the Tunisian army leadership. Duran 
(2013, par. 21) noted: 
[The] elimination of high-level officers in [the] Tunisian army by the President Moncef Marzouki 
is another factor that strengthens the possibility of Ennahda’s survival. Furthermore, that the army 
and the police in Tunisia are relatively weak makes it difficult to carry out an Egypt-like coup 
d’état in the country. Nevertheless, one cannot overlook the efforts of the opposition for 
convincing the police to carry out a coup d’état. 
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Ennahda's Prime Minister Hamadi Jebali resigned in early March 2013, 
immediately after the assassination of Chokri Belaid,97 General Secretary of 
the Democratic Patriots' Movement (PPD).98 Prime Minister Ali Laraaid (Interior 
Minister of the first cabinet), also a member of Ennahda, took over. From that position, 
Ennahda ceded control of the interior, defense and foreign ministries to independent 
technocrats; this was a concession secularists had been demanding for some time (Angrist 
2013, 563). 
After the assassination of National Constituent Assembly (NCA) member 
Mohamed Brahmi in August 2013, the situation worsened, and roughly sixty parliament 
members (MPs) resigned from the NCA. Many of these MPs joined the sit-in at Kasbah, 
where the opposition launched a tamaroud movement, similar to Egypt's when Morsi was 
ousted on 3 July 2013. Tunisia's tamaroud claimed to have gathered over 870,000 
signatures, against a goal of two million, supporting a petition to dissolve the country’s 
parliament and substitute a government of "national salvation". In early August, 
Ettakatol's Mustafa Ben Jaafar, the speaker of the NCA, suspended the assembly’s work 
(Angrist 2013, 563). In Ben Jaafar's rush to freeze the NCA, he failed to consult two 
government allies: Ennahda and Moncel Marzougui’s party, CPR. This failure caused 
                                                          
97 Most accusations pointed towards the Jihadi Salafi group Ansar a-Shariaa, being responsible for the 
assassinations of Chokri Belaid (on 6 February 2012) and Mohamed Brahmi (on 25 July 2013) and other 
terrorist attacks against members of the Tunisian army and security forces throughout 2012 and 2013 and 
even after Ennahda stepped down in February 2014. Despite accusations, no concrete evidence exists to 
condemn any person in particular. However, some rumours voiced through social networks, mainly 
Facebook, point towards a secret security cell linked to the lobby left over from the Ben Ali regime. 
98 In French: Parti des Patriotes Democrats, which well known in Tunisia as Watad. The PPD is an 
extreme-left party, with a strong presence on university campuses; it was especially prominent in the 
1980s. Several leaders of UGTT were former members. After the October 2011 election, the party entered 
a coalition of twelve extreme-left and Arab nationalist parties called the Popular Front (French: Front 
Populaire) (ICG 2013, 1). 
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tensions between the government allies, but eventually led to a dialogue supervised by 
Houssine Abbasi, the secretary general of UGTT. 
 UGTT served as an arbitrator between the parties in power and the opposition, 
despite the significant doubt about its neutrality expressed by many Ennahda supporters. 
On the other side, the opposition groups were openly planning Ennahda's ouster.  They 
demanded the removal of the Ennahda government, generating public opinion with the 
help of the press. The Ennahda government, on the other hand, agreed to resign only if a 
new Constitution was drafted, an independent election commission was established, new 
electoral law was enacted and parties reached an agreement on the structure of the new 
government (Ghanouchi 2014; Wolf 2014). 
Regional powers also got involved in the political crisis, Tunisia being the symbol 
of the democratic transition in the Middle East after the 2011 revolutions. It is noted that 
the UAE and Saudi Arabia are among the supporters of the anti-Ennahda groups in an 
attempt to reverse the wave of democratisation. In addition, France’s support of leftist 
groups, and the terrorist acts of some Salafi organisations are additional external factors 
that have threatened the survival of Ennahda (Duran 2013, par. 22). 
The eight weeks of political deadlock within the NCA were punctuated with 
Popular Front protests and counter-protests from supporters of the Ennahda-led 
government. On 28 September 2013, Ennahda leaders agreed to participate in talks 
mediated by UGTT with the aim of protecting the country’s democratic transition by 
forming a caretaker government and scheduling parliamentary and presidential elections 
(Reuters, 28th Sep 2013). 
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Ennahda had already advocated the parliamentary system, to eliminate the 
possibility of presidential autocracy reoccurring as it had under Ben Ali. During its two 
years in power, furthermore, Ennahda managed to make various concessions on several 
issues affecting the non-Ennahda populace. In March 2012 the party announced that it 
would not insist that the constitution list Sharia as one or the only source of legislation. 
By October 2012, it appeared that Ennahda would prefer to give further concessions and 
would not insist that the insulting of religious values would be made a crime (apostasy). 
Angrist (2013, 562) states, furthermore, that by May 2013 “a compromise had been 
reached wherein neither the president nor the prime minister would exercise sole control 
over the executive branch”. 
On 9 January 2014, the troika government effectively stepped down after the new 
constitution was signed by coalition leaders President Moncef Marzougui, the NCA 
speaker Moustafa Ben Jaafar, and the officially resigned Prime Minister Ali Laraaid. 
Mehdi Ben Joumaa, one of Ali Laraaid's ministers, took over as prime minister and 
formed an independent caretaker cabinet. The new prime minister, with this purported 
independent cabinet, is delegated to lead the country towards post-constitution 
parliamentary and presidential elections, which indeed took place before the end of 2014.  
What is more important than the extent of Ennahda's visible moderation to-date is 
Ennahda’s political savvy, demonstrated during its two years in power. Since the October 
2011 election, Ennahda has shown a high degree of socialising “into the mechanisms of 
compromise and bargaining, the very foundation of the liberal democratic game” 
(Cavatorta and Merone 2013, 863). 
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A side effect of the Egyptian military coup in July 2013 was to shake up the 
Ennahda coalition. Ennahda's enemies called upon the Tunisian army and other security 
forces to take over, to ‘copy and paste’ the Egyptian counter-revolution experience in a 
coup d’état that supposedly protect the country from Ennahda's wrongdoings. (Duran 
2013; Feldman 2013)  The Tunisian army, as discussed earlier, was not brought up to be 
involved in politics.  (This is unlike the Egyptian Army, which is a state within a state, 
with a wide range of income sources, such as industrial investments, shopping centers 
and political connections within Egypt and abroad). In fact, when President Marzougui 
eliminated the high level officers in the Tunisian army, he strengthened the possibility of 
Ennahda’s future survival, and confirmed that despite the professionalism of the army, 
some high-ranking generals have been seduced into buying the coup conspiracy (Duran 
2013). 
Besides the assassination of the two prominent opposition leaders, alleged 
terrorist groups camped near Kasrine in mid-western Tunisia also assassinated a number 
of Tunisian army officers in 2013. To date, there exists no clear information about who 
was behind these assassinations. The government of Ali Laraaid, however, made formal 
allegations against Ansar a-Sharia; the Jihadi Salafis group, banning them later as a 
terrorist organisation. 
On the streets of Tunisia and particularly in Facebook discussions, allegations 
were made against various ‘ghosts’, such as secret cells within the Tunisian army or 
security forces. These ghost entities have the goal of destabilising the country in order to 
reinstate the Ben Ali regime, or at least to bring the RCD back into power. Such 
allegations stem from recent history, specifically regarding the role of snipers who killed 
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over 200 Tunisian protesters between 17 December 2010 and 14 January 2011. These 
snipers have never been found and could belong to the same mysterious groups behind 
the spate of terrorist acts and assassinations during Ennahda's rule in 2012 and 2013. 
Opposition groups, however, alleged that Ennahda’s newly established security 
apparatus within the Tunisian army and security forces was to blame for the deaths. 
Regardless of blame, Ennahda’s reputation suffered because of the violence and 
instability during its time in power. The government’s inefficiency and incoherence was 
seen in their management of the frequent labour disputes and social protests which at 
times involved an overly accommodating response, and at others, a harsh reaction 
accompanied by forceful police repression (Guazzone 2013, 37). 
Victim or not, Ennahda was blamed for four failures of administration. First, 
critics say that Ennahda emphasised divisive political and social issues during 
negotiations about what should and should not be included in the new constitution 
(Alexander 2013; Wolf 2013). Issues such as the national identity, the status of women, 
blasphemy, the nature of the political system and the state in general, had become 
propagandist tools rather than the standard issues of the election period. Still others 
(Alexander 2013) cite the pressure regarding these issues being due to Ennahda's internal 
diversity and the tension between pragmatists and Salafist hardliners. 
Second, Ennahda has been accused by its secularist and leftist opponents of 
coddling the Salafis (Alexander 2013; Wolf 2014; Duran 2013).  The softer version of 
this critique accuses Ennahda of double-speak, of condemning acts of terrorism and 
violent Jihadi Salafis, but taking little concrete action. Tougher critics accuse Ennahda 
leaders of openly encouraging extremism, either because Ennahda leaders actually 
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support a more extreme agenda, or because a strong and visible Salafi militancy 
strengthens Ennahda's support from secular voters and parties (Wolf 2014). 
Third, some intellectuals, journalists and even Ennahda supporters have accused 
Ennahda of obstruction, foot-dragging, and making partisan decisions (Alexander 2013).  
Ennahda has been accused of delaying work on the new constitution and new elections in 
order to have the opportunity to shape a text that would impose its values and populate 
the state apparatus with loyalists. Critics furthermore accused Ennahda of stalling while it 
loaded the Interior Ministry and other offices with party loyalists rather than competent 
managers (Wolf 2014; Alexander 2013). 
Finally, Ennahda has been blamed for failing to fix the economy. Instead, it has 
focused on ideological clashes with the opposition and on enhancing its power. It has 
neglected to address the social and economic grievances that fuelled the rebellion against 
Ben Ali (Alexander 2013). 
Looking at the events of 2012 and 2013, however, it appears that non-coalition 
parties have been less concerned about whether the NCA achieved its task of forging a 
new constitution, and instead concentrated their efforts on removing Ennahda from power 
and keeping them out in the future. 
In the process, the achievement of a safe and smooth democratic transition has 
been somewhat diminished despite Tunisia's success in retaining its fledgling democratic 
institutions. Furthermore, goals such as tolerance and mutual acceptance that should have 
dominated the rules of engagement in this transitional democratic scene have been 
overshadowed by murder, fear and divisiveness. Despite this, the constitution was 
ultimately enacted by early January 2014. 
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Moderation Test 
Ennahda developed and promoted itself as a moderate, tolerant movement from 
the start. When Ennahda took power after the October 2011 election, furthermore, the 
official tune of moderation grew louder. The party at times seems obsessed with its image 
of moderation. However, the theory of moderation through inclusion does not apply to 
Ennahda (Cavatorta and Merone 2013). 
Cavatorta and Merone (2013, 857-875) argued that Ennahda gained its 
prominence and success as a political party through a policy of ‘moderation through 
exclusion’.  This runs contrary to most works on extreme-parties-turned-moderate that 
argue that moderation, namely the acceptance of democratic procedures, human rights, 
and a market economy, comes about through inclusion. The inclusion theory appears 
sound when one analyses a number of Islamist parties having contributed to the 
progressive democratisation of their respective countries. The Tunisian case, however, 
offers a different perspective on moderation. Cavatorta and Merone argued that Ennahda, 
through a painstaking process of exclusion, namely through repression and social 
marginalization, has led the party to shift from its extreme anti-systemic position of the 
1970s to its mainstream position today. 
Ennahda's path runs contrary to Turkey's AKP or the Moroccan PJD, which have 
come to embody the very notion of political moderation, accepting democracy and human 
rights, taking a market-oriented position on economic matters and a pragmatic stance on 
sensitive, strategic issues of importance for the West. In a strict institutional sense, 
Ennahda was not afforded the opportunity of participating in the political system before 
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January 2011, and cross-ideological cooperation with other ideological groups never 
occurred prior to the mid to late 2000s (Cavatorta and Merone 2013, 871). 
In late May 2012, Ghanouchi declared from Washington: (Ghanouchi 2012, par. 
11, 15) 
Islamists’ arrival to power does not mean that they will dominate the state, the society, and the 
revolution because they are the most popular party, as practiced by tyrannical systems. The state’s 
role is not to impose a certain way of life on the people. … However, when we faced serious 
differences around issues like sharia, choosing a presidential or parliamentary political system, 
freedom of conscious, the universality of human rights, we had to organize a national dialogue 
between the main parties to reach consensus. This lasted for nearly five weeks and we ended up 
reaching compromises around these different issues, hence we accepted to leave out any mention 
of sharia in the constitution because this notion wasn’t clear to the Tunisian people.  
Observers like Cavatorta and Merone (2013) note that harsh security measures, 
torture and oppression were imposed on Tunisians for decades, requiring many political 
players including the Islamists to find alternatives and make concessions on the go. 
Additionally, the rejection the party faced by a large section of Tunisian society 
made it possible and necessary for Ennahda to entirely re-elaborate how political Islam could 
contribute to the developmental trajectory of the country. From this elaboration flows the 
acceptance of the dominant discourse of democracy, liberalism, and market economy without 
which the party would not have been able to find much space in Tunisia (Cavatorta and Merone 
2013, 859).  
Ennahda as a neo-Islamist party has performed well in recent years to convince 
the outside world of its moderation and democratic attitudes. For instance, there is a 
significantly wide acceptance that the party has come a long way since its foundation in 
terms of its attitudes towards the fundamental principles of electoral democracy and basic 
human rights. As a matter of fact, since the 18 October 2005 ‘Collective’, (better known 
 155 
as Call for Tunis)99 Ennahda no longer faced widespread rejection from the political and 
social representatives of many sectors of Tunisian society; “moderation is recognized as 
having been attained” (Cavatorta and Merone 2013, 870). 
In an internal study distributed within Ennahda members in exile, only few 
months before 2011 revolution, the organisation acknowledges its long journey from 
political stagnation and revolutionary naivety towards pragmatism and political 
moderation. According to the document Ennahda  
started as a group dominated by rejection of most choices made by the post-colonial state in 
dealing with development and nation-state building. It was [Ennahda] acting from a revolutionary 
position. It was clear about what it didn’t want, but unclear of what it wanted as goals and 
objectives of change. As the years passed, the list of rejections shrinked, and has been replaced 
with a mentality of proactivism, realism and positivity; thereafter a reasonable method of change 
was arrived at, which was characterised by flexibility and gradualism (Ennahda 2010, 14-15). 
However, almost everyone would agree that the party is very much influenced by 
the development of Rachid Ghanouchi’s political thinking during the last twenty to thirty 
years100 (Cavatorta and Merone 2013, 860). Ennahda's historic leader continued 
Ennahda's evolution after 2011, coming up with more controversial concepts within the 
wider Islamist community. On 20 May 2013, he commented on Aljazeera TV Channel, 
                                                          
99 Call for Tunis is a meeting took place in Paris in October 2005, between representatives of various 
Tunisian opposition parties from inside Tunisia and outside, including Ennahda, CPR and Ettakatol, (the 
Troika parties) and eventually all the attendees agreed upon various principles of civic state and basic 
human rights to adopt post Ben Ali regime. 
100 It is worth stating here that Ghanouchi’s Public Liberties within the Islamic State (1993), which he 
penned in jail after the declaration of MTI on June 1981, contains the major theoritical work that has only 
been available in Tunisia since Ben Ali's ouster in 2011. Cavatorta and Morene (2013) describe it as the 
pillar of the attitudes and policy positions to public freedoms in the direction of cementing democracy as 
the only viable political system. Ghanouchi’s intellectual work continues to constitute significant 
development for Tunisia because it informs and seeks to constrain the actions of militants from this point 
onwards, as self reflection would be increasingly discussed and eventually accepted from within (868). 
Cavatorta and Morene also observe that Ennahda reached the internal conclusion to support the creation 
of a ‘civil’ state, or in Arabic: ‘dawla madaniyya’, “openly subscribing to the idea that references to 
religion are purely identity-based and not sources for public policy-making” (861). 
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“we believe in Shari’ah and believe that is all justice and compassion. But the 
implementation of Shari’ah was marred by some vices like restrictions on the freedom of 
women, thought, and fine arts, as regrettably happened in more than one Islamic country” 
(Ghanouchi 2013, par. 20). 
He went further to conclude that sharia never left Tunisia, adding that there were 
many breaches of Islamic laws but these should be addressed gradually through 
awareness and “within the laws of time, place, and reality” (par. 23). These statements 
were made in order to elucidate the party’s decision not to insist on including Sharia in 
the draft constitution (Voll and Mandaville and Kull, and Arieff 2012, 31). 
In response to another question regarding Sharia in Tunisia, Ghanouchi replied 
with his usual pragmatism and use of metaphors: “People gave Ennahda their confidence 
based on the programme it presented. This programme is what we understand from the 
Shari’ah” (par. 25), while earlier on he said: “Part of Shari’ah is still vague, and we need 
to clarify it so that people can clearly see that Shari’ah is God’s justice on earth” (par. 
24). He also stated that most Tunisian law is “derived from the first clause in the 
constitution, which states that this is an Islamic state”, adding, “so we are not trying to 
Islamise Tunisia, Tunisia is an Islamic state, but we are trying to correct some flaws” 
(Ghanouchi 2013, par. 24-25). 
Ghanouchi delivered a thoughtful lecture, as the top ideologue of the Tunisian 
ruling party, on 2 March 2013, in the presence of Tunisia's major political leaders and 
academics, which caused controversy regarding “secularism and the relation of religion 
to the state, from the perspective of Al-Nahdha Movement” (Ghanouchi 2013). He 
observed that secularism is not a Western philosophy that fights idealist and religious 
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outlooks. “Secularism appeared, evolved, and crystalized in the West as a procedural 
solution, and not as a philosophy or theory of existence, to problems that had been posed 
in the European context” (Ghanouchi 2013, 6). He also concluded that the Islamic 
historical context differs from Western state-church relations, which require secularism as 
a mechanism to separate powers. It “is due to the absence of a church in Islam that what 
remains is the freedom of thought and interpretation. This will naturally lead to diversity 
in interpretations. … it is of the utmost importance that our heritage is devoid of a 
church” (Ghanouchi 2013, 12-13).  
When asked whether Islam needs secularism, Ghanouchi has given vague answers 
such as  
Islam has not endured for so long because of states’ influence but rather due to the large 
acceptance it enjoys among its adherents, in fact the state has often been a burden on religion … 
[Should] religion be entirely emancipated from the state and politics, this would also carry some 
risks whereby things would get out of control and social harmony would be endangered. The way 
to do it, therefore, is to find a balance that would guarantee people’s freedom and rights, because 
religion is here to do exactly that. To achieve this balance, we need to go back to the issue of 
distinguishing between religion and politics and adjust the parameters of what is constant in 
religion and that which is variable (Ghanouchi 2013, 13-14).  
Such pragmatic and diplomatic answers in public statements have become typical 
of Ghanouchi’s post-Arab Spring thinking. When John Voll asked whether Islam is 
compatible with democracy, Ghanouchi stated, “I don’t answer that question, because I 
think democracy is a part of Islam; if a system is not democratic, it can’t be identified as 
being Islamic” (Voll et al. 2012, 31-32). 
Ghanouchi’s statements suggest that Ennahda is driven by the exigencies of 
politics, which allow for wide interpretation of its doctrine. The constant policy 
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repositioning depends on need and formulaic calculation within maqasid a-sharia. This 
elasticity is a core characteristic of neo-Islamism, especially post-Arab Spring.  
The elections held after the revolution, were somewhat reminiscent of past 
conflicts between earlier versions of the contemporary parties. Between the UGTT strike 
of 1978 against the Bourguiba regime and the bread riots of 1984, the Islamists of the 
Islamic Tendency Movement under Ghanouchi quarreled with trade union activists, 
particularly with the leftists of the era. The groups also clashed in various debates within 
Tunisian universities at the time. The left and the UGTT prevailed, becoming the major 
protagonists of the 1978 general strike.  Most current Ennahda politicians, as well as the 
UGTT and leftist opposition leaders, were active players at that time and still remember 
old wounds. As a result, large sectors of “UGTT still today have a very difficult time 
reconciling with Ennahda, although their ranks also include many Ennahda members and 
sympathizers” (Cavatorta and Merone 2013, 867). There is no doubt that this shared 
historical legacy (Wolf 2014) has had some bearing on the post-October 2011 outcomes, 
contributing to the general sense of polarisation in society. 
Whatever grudge UGTT holds against Ennahda, the widespread dissatisfaction 
and frustration with the Ennahda-led government from its first year in power concerned 
economic and political matters as well as security threats. Perhaps due to the enormous 
pressure of finding itself within a mass of chaos, Ennahda intentionally turned its 
attention towards finalising the constitution, arguing over the new constitution’s critical 
points, party vision and position, instead of improving employment levels, economic 
performance and social harmony. Furthermore, the Salafis “became more aggressive, 
marching in the streets attacking bars, art galleries, and opposition political figures” 
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(Alexander 2013, par. 8). As a consequence, secular leaders held Ennahda responsible for 
the country’s general deterioration. 
Ennahda initially refused calls for resignation for over sixteen months, 
particularly immediately after the assassination of Chokri Belaid. Finally in late October 
2013, Ennahda's pragmatic and most moderate leaders decided “they served their party’s 
longer term interests better by accepting the roadmap and agreeing to resign” (Alexander 
2013, par. 15). A quartet of Tunisia’s most influential civil society organisations, UGTT, 
Chamber of Commerce, the Human Rights League (LTDH)101 and the bar association 
developed a roadmap to help the Ennahda coalition and the opposition navigate through 
the crisis. 
As mentioned earlier, in June 2005, Ennahda signed the 2005 “Call for Tunis” 
with major non-regime parties led to the parties becoming the preeminent entities 
represented in the new NCA; agreeing that: 
1) any future elected government would have to be ‘founded on the sovereignty of the people as 
the sole source of legitimacy’; and  
2) the state, while showing ‘respect for the people’s identity and its Arab-Muslim values’, would 
provide ‘the guarantee of liberty of beliefs to all and the political neutralization of places of 
worship’… The Call also went on to demand ‘the full equality of women and men. (Stepan 2012, 
96) 
The Ennahda–led government respected this historic agreement and for the ‘twin 
tolerations’ principle102. Ennahda contributed forty-two female members to the NCA, 
                                                          
101 The organisation's name is usually abbreviated LTDH for its French name: La Ligue Tunisienne des 
Droits de L'homme. 
102 Stepan describes twin tolerations as both the state and religious citizens tolerating each other in a 
vertical turned into horizontal direction:  
[The] first toleration is that of religious citizens towards the state. It requires that they accord 
democratically elected officials the freedom to legislate and govern without having to confront denials of 
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which is more than all of the secular parties combined. Ennahda leaders “reassured 
Tunisian citizens that it [would] not interfere in their personal lives and … [would] 
respect their basic human rights” (Growder, Griffiths, and Hasan 2014, 123). With these 
assurances came tensions between the Salafis and Ennahda, with the latter being accused 
of making concessions in matters of religious doctrine (Ottaway 2012; Nield 2013a and 
2013b; Fadel 2013). 
Comparing Ennahda to Egypt's MB reveals Ennahda's political savvy, particularly 
with regards to adopting neo-Islamism.103 President Morsi was in office for roughly one 
year before the army ousted him. While in office, he issued a controversial sort of 
constitutional coup, which demonstrated Morsi's tendency towards autocracy and a 
refusal to cooperate with the opposition, let alone share the administration with the 
opposition and politicians from outside the MB104 (Duran 2013). 
                                                                                                                                                            
their authority based on religious claims – such as the claim that "only God, not man, can make laws". 
The second toleration is that of the state towards religious citizens. This type of toleration requires that 
laws and officials must permit religious citizens, as a matter of right, to freely express their views and 
values within civic society, and to freely take part in politics, as long as religious activities and 
organisations respect other citizens’ constitutional rights and the law. In a democracy, religions need not 
be ‘off the agenda’ and indeed, to force it off would violate the second toleration (Stepan 2012, 89-90). 
103 The Egyptian JDP (the electoral vehicle of the MB) if given the chance, could have developed policies 
and methods of becoming a successful neo-Islamist party. However, consecutive wins in both 
parliamentary and presidential elections in 2012, and gaining the upper hand in constitutional debates, led 
Egyptian Islamists to think they had a blank cheque to dominate the political scene and Islamise Egypt 
straight away. That said, during the MB's brief rule, civil life and liberties in general were relatively 
normal and met at least the minimum of revolutionary aspirations. 
An exception may have been the matter of the Coptic demonstrators who were killed, particularly in 
demonstrations at the Maspero building in Cairo and the burning and destruction of Coptic churches.  
Though accused of causing or condoning these attacks, the pro MB government denied them, pointing the 
finger at anti-Morsi forces. 
104 The political crisis was triggered by President Mohammed Morsi's decree giving him extensive new 
powers. Following widespread protests and strikes by parts of the judiciary, Morsi rescinded most of his 
decree on 10 December. However, he refused to postpone the referendum, despite opposition demands. 
In December 2012, the new Egyptian constitution gave the military greater autonomy than it had ever 
enjoyed before but relations with the Brotherhood worsened as public disenchantment with Morsi grew 
and the army polished its own PR. The Egyptian Army chief and Defence Minister el Sisi warned of 
intervention a week before the 30 June protests. Morsi when refused to step back, el Sissi took the 
opportunity to strike at him (BBC, 24/12/2012, Guardian 2/7/2013). 
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Ennahda, on the other hand, had been eager to share power, to make concessions 
and stick to the civil secular state, despite occasional controversial statements from some 
Ennahda leaders. It is worth noting Ennahda's awareness that its victory in October 2011 
did not deliver an absolute majority that would have allowed it to monopolise power, in   
contrast this with impressive results in the Egyptian elections being viewed by the 
Muslim Brotherhood as a mandate to act strictly according to its own agenda. 
Furthermore, the power shift in Tunisian political life, that is, from the secularists 
to the Islamists  
may be the most important outcome of the Arab Spring to date. If the factions can’t get along, the 
friction could bode ill for the democratic evolution across the region. Not surprisingly, Western 
governments have closer ties to the secularists, and were counting on them to moderate some of 
the Islamists’ more conservative positions. That was certainly the case in Tunisia, where the 
Islamist Ennahda party and secular parties agreed to share positions on the committees that are 
drafting a constitution. The elected Constituent Assembly likewise chose a secular president and 
an Islamic prime minster (Kitfield 2012, par. 24). 
Furthermore, Ennahda as a doctrinally diverse party with the largest following in 
the country (according to the 2011 general election), has shown signs of internal strife. 
For instance, NCA member Habib el-Louz has been accused by secularist social media of 
supporting the Jihadi Salafists and of being their spokesman within Ennahda. El-Louz 
made controversial statements demanding that sharia be incorporated as the main source 
of the constitution and laws. Hamadi Jebali, the first Ennahda Prime Minister, was 
accused of being affiliated with Ben Ali's party, RCD and not being firm enough with the 
criminals and election cheats under Ben Ali's regime. Ennahda’s own hardliners protested 
and argued that the October 2011 election endowed them with democratic legitimacy; 
because they won the election, Ennahda should act according to its will, and other parties 
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should simply wait until the next election to attempt political change in their favour. They 
stubbornly opposed the pragmatists’ willingness to compromise, especially on religious 
matters throughout Ennahda's period in government. (Alexander 2013; Wolf 2014). 
Furthermore, there were conflicts over authority within the party as well.  
Alexander (2013) explains: 
[Some] of these tensions are generational, with younger activists challenging Ghanouchi’s long 
rule. These conflicts sometimes overlap with philosophical tensions 105 or with tensions between 
activists who stayed in Tunisia and endured Ben Ali’s repression and those who went into exile. 
Other tensions concern the locus of ultimate authority within the party. Hardliners on the party’s 
shura council contend that the council holds ultimate authority. They have used their positions to 
challenge Ghanouchi’s control over the party (2013, par. 8). 
In conclusion, Ennahda’s journey towards moderation, which has travelled from 
the 1970s through its arrival in power in late 2011, has been quite a long one. It is a 
“journey towards moderation in so far as it accepts the dominant values and discourses 
that the majority of the international community subscribes to” (Cavatorta and Merone 
2013, 862). 
During two years in power, Ennahda did not show visible signs of reversing its 
practice of moderation, although the party has suffered from challenges and power 
struggles within a mostly hostile environment. Such practical development sheds light on 
whether the attempt to reconcile Islam with democratic politics is inherently problematic 
or contingent on the factors addressed in this study. 
Ultimately, although there has been plenty of opportunity to watch Ennahda in 
power over two years, this transitional period is not sufficient to determine with certainty 
                                                          
105 Such as Ghanouchi’s subsequent belief in democracy as an integral part of Islamic teachings, while 
other Ennahda leaders may still doubt the Islamic status of democracy. 
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whether Ennahda's future will be a deep, strategic Islamisation, or to be representative of 
an inclusive process in a secular political system. The defeat that Ennahda suffered at the 
hands of Nidaa Tounis in the October 2014 general elections will no doubt exert 
influence on this future direction. 
Economic test 
Ennahda’s October 2011 platform focused primarily on economic issues, namely 
reducing poverty, promoting economic initiatives, developing tourism and creating jobs. 
The party therefore, presented itself mainly as pro-development (Tonta 2012, 187), but 
without a proper blueprint of how it would be achieved.  
After his party’s victory, Ghanouchi promised during a visit to Washington DC in 
2011 to “introduce reforms that will develop the free market; encourage more free 
investment, both internally and externally; develop the judiciary system towards more 
justice and more independence so as to secure the investors” (Ghanouchi 2011e, par. 23). 
Ennahda’s October 2011’s election campaign promised “to implement an economic and 
social plan aimed at providing jobs for all Tunisian men and women, offering all the 
amenities of a dignified life, achieving balanced regional development and promoting 
investment in all economic sectors” (Ennahda 2011, 5).  
The ambitious programme went further to advocate a four year economic model 
named ‘Recovery, Revival and Excellence’ to be implemented from 2012 to 2016. This 
four year plan had several goals: to transform Tunisia into a regional financial centre with 
international influence; to encourage business listings on the stock exchange; to 
strengthen the independence of the Central Bank, allowing it to become a mechanism for 
developing the banking sector; to improve Tunisian banks’ capitalisation levels by raising 
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the ceiling for bank capital and creating tax-free savings facilities; to attract 
internationally renowned banks to the Tunisian economy; and to improve legislation 
related to health and transport insurance (Ennahda 2011, 22-23). Nevertheless, few 
aspects of Ennahda’s platform feature an Islamic economy; only two notable projects 
might be classified as pertaining to Islamic finance. This is despite the fact that Turkey 
under the AKP and many Gulf countries have managed to integrate them coherently as 
part of a neoliberal economy in the region. Ennahda modestly proposed to 
pass appropriate legislation to establish Islamic banks or Islamic departments within conventional 
banks, and endeavours to use the Islamic banking mechanism to attract public funds as traditional 
and Islamic bonds (sukuk), prepare integrated legislation for Islamic insurance and encourage the 
creation of solidarity (tkaful) departments within existing companies (Ennahda 2011, 22-23). 
Ridha Chkoundali, an economist and one of the drafters of Ennahda 2011 election 
program, said that following Ennahda’s extensive internal and external discussions, they 
decided to use the liberal economy, alongside the Economy of Solidarity and its social 
aspects (Économie sociale et solidaire de marché),106 which will integrate Islamic 
practices such as zak’aat and waqf (interview with author, Tunis, 18 April 2013).  
Questioned about whether such mixing of the liberal economy with economic solidarity 
is considered by his party as a step towards an Islamic economy, Chkoundali replied: 
“No, no! It is only a current vision of what we should do, but we do not have currently a clear and 
complete version of the Islamic economy … such a project needs lots of work and we all know 
that Ennahda has been persecuted and in exile, and in a less than one year we achieved our current 
version. … Surely, in the future there is an urgent need to integrate the Islamic teachings into the 
                                                          
106 The solidarity economy can be seen as: part of the ‘third sector’ in which economic activity is aimed at 
expressing practical solidarity with disadvantaged groups of people, which contrasts with the private 
sector, where economic activity is aimed at generating profits, and the public sector, where economic 
activity is directed at public policy objectives, or as a struggle seeking to build an economy and culture of 
solidarity beyond capitalism in the present. 
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economy, and add things which we see it beneficial to the Tunisian society … The Islamic 
economy derives from maqasid al-sharia [objectives of Sharia], so, everything that benefits people 
is Islamic” (Interview with author, Tunis, 18 April 2013). 
Ennahda acted as if no contradiction existed between economic neoliberalism and 
the Islamic precepts of economics, either because of a lack of alternatives, or because 
neoliberalism is compatible with Islam. Either way, Ennahda's stance added extra tension 
to the already tense Ennahda-UGTT relationship after the revolution. 
Habibi (2012, 5) concluded that Ennahda’s goals and economic vision “reflect a 
strong commitment to free enterprise capitalism, with an active role envisioned for small 
and medium-size enterprises”. As mentioned in the third chapter, Ennahda lacked well-
defined and coherent policies regarding the economy, internal politics, international 
affairs or social policies, apart from some general references to pan-Islamic and pan-Arab 
cooperation and social justice (Torelli 2012, 79). By its first attempt to obtain legal 
recognition in June 1981, Ennahda appeared more interested in economics than other 
fields. The Iranian revolution and the circulation of books from top Iranian revolutionary 
thinkers during the early 1980s created Ennahda's special interest in the critique of 
capitalism, from a Shia Islamist's point of view. Ghanouchi himself acknowledged the 
influence of Iranian philosophers such as Shariati on various occasions (Cavatorta and 
Merone 2013, 861). At the time, most North African or Iranian Islamist thinkers searched 
for an Islam-compatible ‘third way’ between the market economy of the imperialist West 
and the command economy of socialist countries. Within this context Cavatorta and 
Merone (2013) note, 
[It] can be argued that the critique of capitalism dominated the economic agenda of the party 
during the 1970s and 1980s . . . While the party maintains in some ways that this third way is still 
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potentially pursuable, it is quite evident that it has moved significantly towards the acceptance of a 
market economy integrated into the global neoliberal system as the only way for Tunisia to 
develop. There has been for instance no real debate about the free trade agreement that links 
Tunisia so closely to the European economies and even though the party seeks to attract more gulf 
investment into the country, the neoliberal logic is the same given that the gulf economies are fully 
part of the process of neoliberal globalization. It is revelatory that today the constituency of 
reference of Ennahda is largely composed of merchants, traders, and business people rather than 
the fully disenfranchised (mouhammishin) who find instead representation in the extra-
institutional Salafist movements or in marginal leftist groups (861-862). 
Furthermore, anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist sentiments have become over 
time considerably diluted within Ennahda, and neo-Islamist parties in general.107 
However, anti-capitalism was quite strong within neo-Islamism prior to the 2011 
revolutions, with the exception of Turkey's AKP. Habibi (2012, 4) argues that 
the supporters of Islamist movements in recent decades came from four socioeconomic groups: a) 
counter elite businessmen and professionals, b) frustrated intellectuals, c) unemployed or 
underemployed university and high school graduates, and d) urban lumpen proletariat. To these 
one could add the large group of urban and rural poor, who developed sympathies for Islamist 
movements mostly in response to the financial assistance and social services that Islamists have 
offered in poor neighborhoods.  
Torelli (2012, 79) observes that Ennahda is “more popular among the poorer 
social classes and, because of its Third-Worldism, has also always been anti-capitalist, 
although in a rather veiled manner”. However, Ennahda’s electoral programme supports 
the development of a typical neo-liberal economy and not a serious attempt to come up 
                                                          
107 There has been unprecedented cooperation with the USA and Europe on several fronts after the Arab 
Spring. For instance, Ennahda acceded to American demands for a crackdown of Salafist activism in the 
aftermath of the attack on the US embassy in Tunis in September 2012. “There is a sense that the policies 
Tunisia pursued in this respect under Ben Ali will not be much altered” (Cavatorta and Merone 2013, 
862).  
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with a “third way”, let alone an anti-capitalist solution. (Boughzala 2013) Within this 
context Habibi (2012) argues that Ennahda’s centrist model can be described as 
“inclusive capitalism … [as] opposed to what many critics have described as the crony 
capitalism that was in place under the pre-uprising regimes in Egypt and Tunisia” (Habibi 
2012, 5). Apparently, neo-Islamists perceive inclusive capitalism to be a free enterprise 
economic system in which the benefits of economic growth and development are 
distributed among all citizens rather than being reserved for a small political and business 
elite. 
After Tunisia's revolution, domestic unrest and conflict in neighboring Libya took 
a heavy toll on the region's economy. Tunisia’s economy contracted by 1.8 percent, as 
tourism and activity in unionised sectors declined sharply. To help households and 
businesses cope with the effects of the recession, authorities stepped up public spending 
and injected liquidity into the economy. But these measures led to inflation and losses in 
foreign reserves. Despite this, Tunisia recorded the lowest fiscal deficit and public debt 
ratio of all the Arab countries in transition in 2011. The country also posted the highest 
unemployment rate of this group of countries, which includes Egypt, Jordan, and 
Morocco (IMF 2012). 
Ennahda displayed a significant degree of pragmatism on foreign policy matters 
while it led the government and in its economic relationship with the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF). In April 2013 the Ennahda-led government agreed to IMF's 
conditions for a twenty-four month Stand-By Arrangement (SBA) in the amount of 
US$1.74 billion, which is equivalent to around 400 per cent of Tunisia’s quota in the IMF 
(IMF 2013). Notably, radical Islamist parties such as HT, which represents a tiny 
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minority with the Islamist mosaic in Tunisia, harshly criticised the government, accusing 
it of bending to the pressure of neo-imperialist institutions. 
Tunisian neo-Islamists and the MB in Egypt during President Morsi's time 
resumed108 the neoliberal economies of their predecessors (Challand 2013, 182), with 
aspirations of neo-Islamism faring as well as it had in Turkey. The AKP’s blend of 
Islamism and neo-liberalism proved to be a timely political and economic project, as it 
sealed a victory in the November 2002 national election109 (Elshinnawi 2013). Karaman 
(2013, 3416) explains: 
Upon assuming office, the AKP strictly adhered to the IMF-supervised crisis management 
programme that had begun in April 2001, which was initiated by the previous administration, in 
the wake of one of the most severe economic crises in Turkey’s history. The IMF-crafted anti-
inflationary debt management programme mandated checks on spending for public services and 
social reforms. The compliant AKP quickly implemented policies cutting public spending, 
controlling wages, significantly rolling back agricultural subsidies and privatising state-owned 
enterprises, as well as natural resources.  
Nevertheless, the process of socio-economic openness has yet to develop an 
individualistic conception, and runs the risk of the populace remaining anchored to the 
classical concept of ummah, although the emerging forms of Islamic associations are 
based on people's more personal relationships with Islam (Torelli 2012). Ishay (2013, 
378) observed; 
                                                          
108 Benoit Challand (2013) observed: ‘Ennahda took an ambiguous stance in labour actions and 
demonstrations, in particular in spring 2012 when Ennahda’s Interior Minister was accused of using the 
same repressive policing tools as Ben Ali to quell popular demands’ (Challand 2013, 182). 
109 A notable difference between Ennahda and AKP, is that the latter had support from Anatolian business 
people who would benefit from neoliberal, world market oriented policies.  These policies are also a 
weapon for the Anatolian business cartel, against their rival big Istanbul businesses. Ennahda has neither 
a constituency that resembles the Anatolian big businesses nor the circumstances that surround AKP's 
economic choices (Kuru 2013; Goskel 2013; Komecoglu 2014; Habibi 2012). 
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Beyond the immediate economic challenges, there is a widespread sense among the MB and 
Salafists that the free-market capitalist approach pursued by Ben Ali and Mubarak had increased 
socio-economic inequity, and further, that the social tensions associated with neo-liberal 
economics had provided a pretext for political repression in both countries.  
But pro-market policies did not immediately lift Tunisia from dire economic 
circumstances. Ennahda came to be blamed for the country’s continued economic 
doldrums. MacFarquhar (2012b, par. 16) state: 
[Critics] say that the party lacks financial expertise and is so focused on putting an Islamic stamp 
on the new constitution that it has neglected developing even a rudimentary economic vision. 
Its promise to create 20,000 new public-sector jobs compounds the problem, the critics say. ‘They 
are learning how to run the machine while operating it,’ … senior officials say that the public is 
expecting too much too fast. "It's like you get married and you want a baby boy with blue eyes one 
month later’, says Abdelfattah Mouru, a Renaissance Party founder. ‘It is not up to the government 
alone to make the rain and the sunshine’.  
Yet Ennahda did receive international support. The World Bank approved a $500 
million loan in mid-2012 to help carry out economic changes designed to foster job 
creation. The United States, furthermore, provided about $300 million in aid and the 
European Union provided $400 million over two years. Qatar bought an entire $500 
million Tunisian government bond issue in 2012 (MacFarquhar 2012b). 
Ennahda’s focus on the economy was understandable. Zogby’s (2013, 1-5) survey 
entitled “Tunisia: divided and dissatisfied with Ennahda”, concludes that Tunisians do 
not fear ‘Islamisation’ of the country, and that the topic is not a major factor in the 
public’s discontent with the government. Rather, the poll makes clear that the majority of 
Tunisians are disturbed by the government’s failure to deliver on the political and 
economic promises of the revolution. The poll, furthermore, shows that the Tunisian 
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public has a long list of non-religious priorities, with economic, security, and governance 
issues dominating the top of the list. However, Ennahda supporters and non-supporters 
alike share such concerns. 
A 2013 survey by the International Republican Institute asked Tunisians to name 
the three most important problems facing Tunisia. Seventy-three percent of respondents 
named unemployment, while 63 percent referred to the economy and financial crisis. 
Despite their frustration with the economy, Tunisians’ appraisals of their personal 
situations did, in fact, improve. Thirty percent of respondents indicated they had enough 
income for survival plus additional expenses such as new clothes and eating at 
restaurants. This represented a 13 percent increase from IRI’s January 2012 survey (IRI 
2013). 
Salafi Test 
The contemporary image of Ennahda style moderation might be superficially 
compared to post 2011 Tunisian Salafism, in terms of belonging to Islamism more 
generally. In fact, Ennahda’s motivations for adopting an accomodationist approach 
remain 
unexplored and overshadowed by a flurry of conspiratorial rumors concerning its relationship with 
Salafism. The party’s opponents have been eager to paint Salafis as ‘Ennahda’s militia’. This 
argument ignores major tensions between the two movements and gives short shrift to Ennahda 
leaders’ rationale for adopting this inclusionary approach. (Marks 2012, par. 2) 
The emergence of the Salafis after the 2011 election offered a serious challenge to 
Ennahda’s claims of monopolising representation of Islamic interest. The Salafis offered 
“a much more radically conservative interpretation of Islam in politics and social life … 
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[they] challenged such monopoly, shocking both Tunisian society and foreign observers” 
(Torelli, Merone, and Cavatorta 2012, 141). 
Despite the fact that many Salafis opposed party politics and believed 
participation in democracy to be haram (forbidden by Islam), and the electoral 
regulations forbade religious parties from running for office in the NCA election of 
October 2011, Salafists ran in various regions as independents. None of these Salafists 
won a seat, casting doubt on their level of popularity (Donker 2013, 214). Nahdawis 
claims that the real number of Ansar a-Sharia members across the country does not 
exceed a few thousand, even though it was the major Salafi grouping. 
The prestigious International Crisis Group published a report in February 2013, 
titled: “Tunisia: Violence and the Salafi Challenge”, which observed 
As elsewhere throughout the region, the Salafi phenomenon has been steadily growing – both its 
so-called scientific component, a quietist type of Islamism that promotes immersion in sacred 
texts, and its jihadi component, which typically advocates armed resistance against impious forces. 
It made initial inroads under Ben Ali’s authoritarian regime, a response to the repression inflicted 
on Islamists in general and An-Nahda in particular. A new generation of young Islamists, 
relatively unfamiliar with An-Nahda, has become fascinated by stories of the Chechen, Iraqi and 
Afghan resistance (ICG 2013, i). 
On the other hand, Merone and Cavatorta (2013, 5) observed that the emergence 
of the Salafis as a political force was “one of the most interesting and surprising 
outcomes of the Arab Spring”. They forcefully and publicly emerged across the region, 
and in particular, in violent hotspots like Libya, Yemen and Syria. Salafism is not 
monolithic, however; it is a complex phenomenon where different interpretations of the 
sacred texts give rise to different methods of political and social engagement. Yet they 
have something that ties them together. They have a strong appeal to a particular section 
 172 
of their respective communities: disenfranchised youth (in Arabic: muhammasheen or 
mustad’afeen). Salafism apparently “transforms the humiliated, the downtrodden, 
disgruntled young people, the discriminated migrants, or the politically repressed into a 
chosen sect (al-firqa al-najia) that immediately gains access to the truth” (Merone and 
Cavatorta 2013,10). 
Nevertheless, throughout 2011 and 2012, Ennahda attempted to defuse the Salafi 
ideology and their demands with pragmatism and political correctness. Because Tunisian 
Salafis, unlike the Egyptian el-Nour Party, did not have a political party to participate in 
the October 2011 election, and because many Salafists voted for Ennahda, the Ennahda 
leaders consistently entreated them to consider a more patient, gradualist approach to 
Islamising reforms (Marks 2012). The most significant evidence of these attempts is a 
leaked video of a meeting between Salafi leaders and Rachid Ghanouchi, which quotes 
the latter saying110: 
As I said, the Tunisian people want this [Islamic] religion. At the moment secular groups in this 
country, it’s correct; do not make up the majority. But look at the press now: until now it is in their 
hands. And the economy is in their hands, as is the Tunisian administration. … I say to our 
brothers concerning these issues, don’t deceive yourselves with numbers because of the fact that 
you go out [and protest] with a thousand, two thousand, ten thousand or twenty thousands. The 
pillars of the state and its divisions are still in their hands. Take your time to change. At the 
moment we don’t have a mosque, but we have the ministry of Religious Affairs. At the moment 
we don’t have a shop, but we have the state (Donker 2013, 218). 
                                                          
110 In April 2012, in the setting of continued protests for inclusion of Sharia in the constitution, Rached 
Ghanouchi has a phone conversation with a Salafi activist discussing what strategy to follow concerning 
public Islam in the country. The taped phone call was leaked months later. Donker (2013, 218) states, ‘He 
attempted to convince the activists to take a more ‘gradual’ approach. In doing so he outlined in detail 
what this actually meant- implying the close interrelation between activism in society and the political 
arena; in addition to showing the importance of controlling the state administration in building a 
successful Islamist project’. 
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Thus, on many occasions in 2012 Ennahda leaders announced that in the new 
democracy, “there is room for everyone” (Torelli, Merone, and Cavatorta 2012, 145). 
Providing legal status to Salafis parties such as Jabhat al-Islah (RF) and HT became a 
way of symbolising the success of Tunisian democracy. Granting such status was 
conceived as a method of showing the futility of autocracy, oppression and dictatorship, 
as well as confidence in the adoption of a moderate political stance and an open-minded 
culture. 
Over time, Ennahda found itself in  
an increasingly uncomfortable position, caught between non-Islamists who accuse it of excessive 
leniency and laxity in dealing with the security threat and Salafis who denounce it whenever it 
takes a harder line. Based on circumstances – a flare-up in violence or a wave of arrests – the party 
is condemned by either the former or the latter. (ICG 2013, i) 
Indeed, this position has contributed to the division between pragmatic and moderate 
leaders and those hardliners with Salafist tendencies, as well as between its leadership’s 
more flexible positions and the core beliefs of its militant base. 
Politically speaking, such tensions give rise to “an acute dilemma: the more the 
party highlights its religious identity, the more it worries non-Islamists; the more it 
follows a pragmatic line, the more it alienates its constituency and creates an opening for 
the Salafis” (ICG 2013, ii).  Although the Tunisian jihadist Salafis are electorally weak, 
they continued to pose a specific symbolic threat towards Tunisia’s sense of modernity, 
liberalism and contemporary connections with Europe. 
The major Salafi Jihadist group, which caused trouble for the Troika government, 
is Ansar a-Sharia, which organised less than three months after Ben Ali fled the country 
on 14 January 2011. Abu Ayadh al-Tunisi (his real name Seifullah Ben Houcine) 
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dominated the group as the Emir (supreme leader). He is a jihadist who allegedly fought 
in Afghanistan during the battle of Tora Bora, and in 2003 he was deported to Tunisia on 
international terrorism charges. Once released from prison after the revolution of 2011, 
he started gathering followers 
thanks to the contacts and the prestige that prison gave him. In addition, the group [could] count 
on a prominent spiritual leader, Shaykh Khatib al-Idrissi, who had condoned the use of violence 
against the Ben Ali regime, was in prison for two years and enjoys significant credibility (Torelli, 
Merone, and Cavatorta 2012, 149). 
It is worth restating here that a number of Ennahda leaders have Salafi ties, and 
that they influence Ennahda internal politics. These hardliners use their positions on the 
shura council to pressure the moderate wing. Those moderates have remained sensitive to 
Salafi interests in order to protect their right flank and perhaps to moderate Salafi 
behavior (Alexander 2012). 
To conclude, Ennahda has distanced itself significantly from traditional Salafism 
and integrated itself into democratic institutions of governance. This was achieved by 
giving up the two fundamental objectives of traditional Islamism: the creation of an 
Islamic state and the thorough application of sharia laws. Ennahda attempted to integrate 
the Salafists, during its first year in power, prior to the dramatic assassinations of Belaid 
and Brahmi in February and July 2013, for several reasons. First, there is a degree of 
understanding of where Salafis came from, theologically and philosophically speaking, 
and many Ennahda members hold similar views. Second, the inclusion of Salafists in the 
political game might benefit Ennahda electorally, given that Salafi radicalism might be 
softened or neutralised if they joined the political system. 
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Finally, Ennahda could use Salafist radicalism to highlight its own political 
moderation … Extreme Salafism can provide Ennahda with the ultimate moderate image, 
arguing that it is defending democracy and human rights by acting as a rampart against 
Salafism (Alexander 2012; Torelli, Merone, and Cavatorta 2012). 
Facing Ansar a-Sharia 
Unfortunately, events took a dramatic turn on the evening of the attack on the 
American embassy in Tunis in September 2012. In response, the ruling coalition cracked 
down on Jihadi Salafis, due to unprecedented local and international pressure. The 
security forces started a campaign that targeted the leadership and followers of Ansar a-
Sharia. This led to the arrest and imprisonment of many of them but not Abu Ayadh, 
discussed below, who became a fugitive (Torelli, Merone, and Cavatorta 2012, 18). After 
the assassination of Chokri Belaid, the crack down on Ansar a-Sharia worsened too. 
Abu Ayadh has declared that one of the ultimate goals of his movement was to 
wage jihad abroad. He openly praised Osama Bin Laden at the time of his death, calling 
him shahid (martyr) and referring to him as ‘our leader’111 (Torelli, Merone, and 
Cavatorta 2012, 150). There is insufficient evidence to prove, however, that Ansar a-
Sharia was responsible for the assassinations of the two political figures and at least a 
dozen security forces and army personnel. Ansar a-Sharia has never declared war on the 
Tunisian government, or even considered itself pressed to act against it. On the contrary, 
it has stated that: “Tunisia is dawaa-land [peaceful call for Islamic teachings] and not an 
                                                          
 111 There are official and unofficial accusations that Ansar a-Sharia is recruiting young jihadis and 
organising safe passage into Syria to fight or to join mostly al-Qaeda-related groups. The ICG (2013, 7) 
reports that “close to 2000 Tunisians, including jihadis, are currently fighting in Syria, on their return to 
Tunisia; swell the ranks of those who have remained at home”. 
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arena of open conflict between belief and unbelief that would justify resorting to 
violence” (Merone and Cavatorta 2013, 21; ICG 2013, 9). 
All of the above suggests that Ennahdha’s relationship with Salafists during its 
time in government was fraught. The nature of the relationship was perhaps best depicted 
in competition between their respective cadres. While Ennahda was trying to use its 
utmost pragmatic and diplomatic skills to deal with the Salafists ‘brothers’, nasty 
territorial wars had in fact ensued for control of the country’s mosques. Until 2011, all of 
the mosques in Tunisia had been under the rigid control of the Ben Ali regime, which 
appointed the imams for every prayer and issued lists of acceptable topics for Friday 
sermons (MacFarquhar 2012a, par. 5-6). After Ben Ali's ouster, these mosques, under the 
control of the Ministry of Religious Affairs and Ennahda's Noureddine el-Khadmi, were 
the subject of clashes between Ennahda and other groups. An estimated 500 of 5000 
mosques were seized by Salafis (Allani 2013; Alexander 2012). 
Conclusion 
The major finding of this chapter is that Ennahda’s attempt to bring together 
Islam, democracy and free market has involved a very complex process of internal as 
well as external struggle. The problem was not just being stuck between two hostile 
competitors (the Left and the Salafis) but also the dilemma of resisting the old regime 
forces that remained entrenched. 
How all of these factors interact in the context of a struggle to chart a new 
political and economic path will be important for future studies. At the very least the mix 
of factors ensures current and coming instability, and demonstrates that Ennahda cannot 
always get what it wants, and that it always feels insecure. The recurring question is 
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whether it was ever possible for Ennahda to emulate the AKP experience while in power, 
given the sorts of interests existing in the Tunisian context that do not exist in Turkey, 
such as a vibrant and aggressive Salafis movement. 
Nevertheless, although neo-Islamist conceptions of AKP-style economic 
prosperity, freedom and human rights for all may have lost some of their lustre, “the 
Islamist conceptions of values and society are still appealing in the face of pervasive 
corruption and the widespread hostility towards the United States and its allies across the 
Middle East” (Crowder, Griffiths, and Hasan 2014, 124). Thereafter, we can expect a 
widening divide between increasingly pragmatic neo-Islamist groups and those ultra-
conservative and literalist Salafis. Although jihadi Salafis will continue to believe in the 
armed struggle, they are more likely to treat Tunisia as a land for preaching, not for jihad 
(ICG 2013, 9). Having said this, the situation leaves the doors open to the possibility of 
Tunisia being used as a base to conduct violent jihad elsewhere. In fact, the summer of 
2014 saw civil war in neighbouring Libya between the jihadi militias and General 
Khafter, who is backed by el-Sisi regime of Egypt and other petroleum countries, such as 
Emirates and Saudi Arabia. The repercussions of such developments for Tunisian 
democracy cannot be positive. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
Can the neo-Islamists become real democrats? The answer to this question partly 
depends on whether neo-Islamism will continue to be a major factor in the region after 
the Arab Revolutions and whether Tunisian-style neo-Islamism will continue to be 
influential in Tunisia and the broader Arab and Muslim world. However, the 3 short years 
of Ennahda’s participation in the Tunisian democratic transition showed that the version 
of political Islam it represents can be a genuine democratic player. 
This thesis has focused on debates about the commitment of the Arab Spring’s 
neo-Islamists to democracy and pluralism. Traditionally, such a focus would hinge on 
drawing distinctions between moderates and radicals, on the basis of their support or 
opposition to liberal democratic reforms (Schwedler 2011, 348). However, this study has 
addressed the phenomenon of neo-Islamism through a new classification of literalists, or 
scripturalists (dhawahiris) and maqasidis.  This has enabled a better understanding of the 
formation of neo-Islamist thinking. The maqasidi way of thinking has proven to be 
necessary to enable neo-Islamists to contribute constructively to democratisation.  
Neo-Islamism defined 
The study has brought to light five characteristics of neo-Islamism as a socio-
political phenomenon: gradualist Islamisation, modernisation, moderation, nationalistic 
Islamism, and pragmatism in Western relationships.  It has been shown that neo-Islamism 
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employs tactical measures such as gradualism and pragmatic relations with the secularist 
elite and the West, and implements ideological reforms closely related to the concepts of 
democracy, civic participation and peaceful transitioning of power. 
Based on observations of its characteristics and preferences, neo-Islamism is 
defined as follows: 
Neo-Islamism is distinguished by an ethical and theological emphasis on Islam that combines 
social conservatism with political moderation. Neo-Islamists are united in the view that Sharia 
laws is not an immediate reform priority, however there are divisions over whether this is a 
tactical pause towards the ultimate pursuit of shariatisation, whether it should be diluted if 
introduced at some future point, or whether it should never be introduced. 
 
Having said that, the enormous pressure imposed by the Jihadi Salafis and other 
traditional Islamist movements for instant shariatisation and the realisation of the 
caliphate may push neo-Islamists in either direction. 
Neo-Islamism and illiberalism 
This study has also concurred with the view that neo-Islamists may be politically 
illiberal while democratic (Roy 2013, Hamid 2014b). Despite remarkable ideological 
reforms, neo-Islamists continue to carry out painful soul searching related to the 
preservation of their basic existence. This contemplation has been made more difficult 
within the chaos, civil wars and changes of power in countries affected by the Arab 
Spring. The need to evolve amidst the chaos might lead over time to adoption of new 
agendas that swing to the liberal or illiberal ends of the spectrum, including varying 
levels of commitment to democracy and civic participation. In various scenarios, neo-
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Islamism may morph into post-Islamism, where shariatisation is not on the agenda and 
Islam serves as only a moral guide.  
It is crucial to keep in mind that neo-Islamists remain the legitimate children of 
their religious communities and wider societies. There is no particular reason to suggest 
that Islamic “reform” would lead inevitably, for example, to liberalism in the way that the 
Protestant Reformation led, eventually, to modern liberalism.  
In modern Europe, the decline of the clerical class and mass literacy laid the 
groundwork for secularisation. On the other hand, while the Arab and Islamic worlds 
have experienced a weakening of clerical power, religion remains the dominant societal 
influence, even if its power has declined in the political sphere. While the reformist 
impulse has coincided with political Islam’s ascendancy, Arabism, which is not 
inconsistent with religion, has always been tolerated. Thus, the reasons for secularisation 
in the Arab world lie in post-colonial trauma and challenges posed by pressures to adhere 
to Western-style modernisation (Hamid 2014b). 
Future of Ennahda and neo-Islamism in general 
Ennahda's participation in Tunisia's newly free political arena has been observable 
for only about three years, which is insufficient time to make definitive statements about 
its democratic behavior. As Guazzone (2013, 42) stated, Ennahda’s transformations 
engendered “by its evolution from movement to a party in the coalition government must 
be considered one of the factors determining Ennahda’s behavior in government”. The 
party has repeatedly stressed that it remains committed to a democratic regime based on 
Islamic principles and that such a position is compatible with liberal democracy and the 
protection of basic individual liberties. Feuer (2012) observed that the first claim finds 
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ample support in Ennahda's first year in power, as it showed solid commitment to broad 
participation in elections and the principle of the separation of powers. On the other hand, 
Ennahda would prioritise building a society in which public life is guided by a collective 
religious identity over the protection of individual freedoms that might conflict with such 
identity.  This is evident in the long, painstaking argument over Salafi female students 
wearing niqab at university in 2013 and the decision not to include Islam as ‘a’ or ‘the’ 
source of laws in the new Tunisian constitution.  
There were failures, however, during Ennahda's control of government between 
December 2011 and December 2013. While it was responsible for a number of bad 
decisions throughout the period, Ennahda found itself putting out fires in circumstances 
beyond its control. For example, Ennahda could not have been responsible for the 
deterioration of the security environment in the Grand Maghreb (North Africa) after 
Libya's civil war or the legacy of previous regimes’ policies and personnel.  Nor did it 
have any control over the worsening of the socio-economic situation caused by the 
combined effects of the global, and in particular, the European economic crisis. Still, 
while it had the opportunity, Ennahda failed to develop and implement sound economic 
and security policies due to the appointment of incompetents based on cronyism and 
nepotism.  It also may be said that Ennahda gave too much priority to consensus and 
unity rather than to consistency and efficiency (Guazzone 2013, 48). 
Neo-Islamism vs. counter-revolution forces 
Unfortunately, the rise of Islamism itself might be used as an excuse to delay 
democratisation for decades in Tunisia or elsewhere in the MENA region (Challand 
2013). Ennahda’s attempt to bring together Islam, democracy and the free market 
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involved a complex process of internal and external struggles. The problem was not just 
being stuck between two hostile competitors (the Left and the Salafis) but also the 
dilemma of resisting the old regime forces that remain entrenched, as seen in recent 
electoral developments in Tunisia. 
While opposition elements have accused neo-Islamists of carrying totalitarian 
ideologies that run counter to Arab Spring aspirations of freedom and democracy, neo-
Islamists have maintained their commitment to such values. Ennahda, for example, 
remains loyal to the imperatives that have emerged out of its development in Tunisian 
social and political history, though it is descended ideologically from the broader and 
presently much varied MB movement. 
What is clear is that the political turbulence of the post Arab Spring has brought 
neo-Islamist parties to crisis point, especially with the rise of ISIL. But Ennahda leader 
Ghanouchi has argued that the Middle East is at a crossroads rather than in crisis. On one 
hand, the region is experiencing a rise in extremism and instability, but it is also moving 
towards democracy, development and progress.  He noted that Tunisia is the ‘last shining 
candle of the Arab Spring’ from which other countries in the region could learn 
(Ghanouchi 2014b). 
It is also clear, however, that the 26 October 2014 elections resulted in a sobering 
defeat of Ennahda, which only managed to attain 69 parliamentary seats against the 88 
won by Nidaa Tunis, the party of the old establishment. Tunisian veteran journalist 
Abdulatif Fourati likened the election to an earthquake for the Nahdawis (Ennahda 
partisans and followers). This devastating blow came despite Ennahda's concessions to its 
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opponents during the Constituent Assembly and its later ceding power ten months before 
the 2014 elections (Fourati 2014). 
Considering all the impediments it confronted, however, Ennahda's achievements 
to date are arguably quite a distinctive compared to the Egyptian MB.  Tunisia’s success 
has been due to neo-Islamist adoption of ‘consensus politics’ (Ghanouchi 2014b) under 
circumstances in which it could not possibly rule on its own. Ennahda found itself under 
enormous pressure from both Salafis within and outside Ennahda, and secularists whose 
most powerful defender has become the 500,000 strong UGTT led by communists, 
socialists, and Arab nationalists (Ottaway 2012, 3). Achieving consensus in the face of 
the opposition was a preferable alternative to dragging the country back to the pre-
revolution era of authoritarianism and dictatorship. However, the same success in 
achieving consensus while in power has been responsible for the idea that there has been 
inertia and indecisiveness within Ennahda, contributing no doubt to its electoral defeat. 
The Tunisian democratic model 
It is true that Ennahda’s 2011 electoral victory was not as decisive as that of the 
Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt in 2011 and 2012.  But domestically, Ennahda faced strong 
opposition with a grassroots base in the form of trade unions and leftists. The Muslim 
Brotherhood, on the other hand, did not face opposition groups with such well-
established bases of support, which helped lead to a false sense of invincibility.  Also, 
unlike the MB, Ennahda has not had the burden of facing a military with strong economic 
and political claims.  Finally, Ennahda's practice of inclusiveness and consensus building 
has proven to be decisive in placing Ennahda as a major player in Tunisian politics 
(Lesch 2014, 73). 
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While it is too early to conclude that the Tunisian democratic transition has been 
secured, Sezgin (2014) concluded that if there is any model of Muslim democracy after 
the Arab Spring, it is Tunisia, not Turkey. 
In fact, it could be argued that Turkey has a lot to learn from Tunisia’s 
compromise and tolerance based politics. Sezgin (2014) and Gerges (2014), for example, 
viewed the repression following the 2013 Gezi demonstrations in Turkey as reflecting the 
increasingly authoritarian and police-state tendency of the Turkish regime. As recent 
Freedom House, Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch reports suggest, 
Turkish democracy is in steady decline. 
By contrast, Tunisians adopted a new, fairly democratic constitution in January 
2014 with the backing of an astounding 94 percent of the national assembly. In Turkey, 
however, the parliament failed to reach a consensus to produce the country’s first civilian 
constitution, mostly due to the ruling AKP’s insistence on establishing a presidential 
system of government (Sezgin 2014). 
The importance of Tunisian success with its democratic transition and its own 
version of political Islam is not limited to its borders. Countries all over North Africa 
followed Tunisia’s lead by rising against their authoritarian leaders and calling for 
authentic democracy and rule of law. As Flick (2013, 197) stated, “As the catalyst of the 
Arab Spring, Tunisia has served as a weathervane of hope to these countries, revealing 
what democracy and rule of law could be”. 
Therefore, neo-Islamist groups could be expected to play integral political and 
societal roles in Tunisia and in its neighboring countries. 
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Despite setbacks, neo-Islamism remains a source of hope for the region. With the 
rise of emerging jihadist militias such as ISIL, there is, in fact, an urgent worldwide call 
to cooperate with, strengthen and support neo-Islamist bids to convert their societies’ 
economic and political crises into smooth transitions to democratisation. This is certainly 
the wish of neo-Islamist leaders such as Ghanouchi, but whether their dreams become 
reality soon or not at all, only time will tell. 
The limits of this study 
Ennahda's case sheds light on neo-Islamism's possible future scenarios, against 
the background of a region full of societal and political instability.  Their chances of 
success and failure in the coming years depend on each state and each case, and 
importantly, the outside world's reaction to the neo-Islamist political tendency. This 
thesis is exclusively about the neo-Islamists, and focuses on those in Tunisia. Therefore, 
it has the following limitations: 
Short period of assessment: The Ennahda case study is taken as an example of 
the evolution of neo-Islamism after the Arab Spring, not as a concrete example of neo-
Islamist political success. Despite Ennahda’s pragmatism, moderation, willingness to 
share power with non-Islamists during the so-called Troika ruling era, it is still difficult to 
make a final verdict about the party, unlike the AKP in Turkey or the MB in Egypt. 
Intersection with Civil Islam: This is not a study of Civil Islam or post-Islamism; 
neither is it a study of Islamism fundamentalism or Salafi Jihadism. References to such 
tendencies were only made to develop comparisons when needed with neo-Islamism. 
Kömeçoglu (2014) described ‘Civil Islam’ as an evolved ‘post post-Islamism’, which 
shares some characteristics with neo-Islamism. Kömeçoglu argued that Civil Islam 
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delivers uncorrupted and untransformed Islam into a non state-centric political ideology. 
“The main focus of Civil Islam is on the spiritual development of individual Muslims and 
the promotion of the general conditions for human flourishing, including a robust civil 
society, human rights, religious freedom, peace, ethics, social justice, and the rule of law” 
(Kömeçoglu 2014, 17).  However, while Civil Islam might fit perfectly with the goals of 
old Sufi schools such as the Hizmet Movement in Turkey, it does not fit the goals of the 
neo-Islamists, who, while keen on calling themselves Muslim democrats, do not share an 
ideology comparable to Sufi groups. 
Post-Egyptian coup and the failure of Political Islam: This study did not aim to 
address the ‘end of Islamism’ or the Islamists’ frequent failures as per Roy (1993) and a 
few others after the 2011 Arab Revolutions. It is significant that Tadros (2014) and others 
began discussing the failure of political Islam, or ‘the end of Islamism’, as soon as the 
Muslim Brotherhood fell in Egypt after the July 2013 military coup. Additionally, Aktay 
(2013) described analysts who celebrated the ‘end of Islamism’ as societal 
acknowledgement of the failures of the authoritarian, anti-democratic regimes in the 
Islamic world. This claim, however, has been debunked several times over the past thirty 
years and does not take into account contemporary conflicts where armed Islamic groups 
are taking over cities and lands in Syria and Iraq, sometimes with popular support. 
The evolution of neo-Islamism: This thesis posited that neo-Islamism is an 
ongoing evolutionary political phenomenon. There continues to be oscillation between an 
interest in intellectual reform and in developing a modern political party in Ennahda's 
political developments. Although Ennahda has shown promise, it must learn to “deal with 
the state administration and must overcome its internal contradictions: being a movement 
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that through almost all the period of its activity has developed an ideology that differs 
from what it now seems to advocate” (Torelli 2012, 73). In this regard, it is still possible 
that Ennahda will dismiss the need for shariatisation in the future; or quite the opposite, 
declare a set of Islamic blueprints to solve all social problems. Thus, the evolution of 
Ennahda is still worthy of continuous study in relation to the future of neo-Islamism. 
Overall, however, Ennahda has shown itself to be a credible democratic neo-
Islamist option for Tunisia.  
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GLOSSARY OF TERMS 
 
Al-firqa al-najia: the promised sect, which is generally used as religious puritanical sentiment for 
the Salafis. 
Caliphate/ 
Khilafah: 
Islamic state, usually seen as a transnational Islamic state, which covers vast 
lands and a variety of ethnic groups, who share Islamic belief. 
Dawaa: (also: dawah, dawa) literally (Arabic) means a call for something. Generally 
meaning to invite others (normally non-Muslims) to Islam, through preaching, 
and can be in modern days apply to non-practicing Muslims too. 
Dawla al-
madaniya: 
literally (Arabic) means civil state. The term used by contemporary Islamists to 
showcase the civic nature of Islamic state, in reaction to their opponents’ 
accusation of theocracy.  
Dhawahir/ 
Dhawahiris: 
(as opposed to maqasidis) who use scriptist methods in their interpretations of 
the Islamic sacred sources, particularly that of Quran and Sunna. 
Fatwa: legal pronouncement made by an accredited scholar as a judgment or verdict on 
a particular sharia matter.  
Fiqh: Islamic jurisprudence, which technically covers all aspects of life. The outcome 
of the scholarly effort of fiqh is called sharia, or Islamic law. 
Hakimiyyah: God’s sovereignty. In the contemporary Islamic thought, this term is used to 
assert that God alone is the true sovereign and thereby to question all human 
claims to political authority as well as the legitimacy of ‘man-made-laws’.  
Haram: Not permissible in Islam 
Halal: Permissible in Islam. 
Hijab: Islamic head cover, or veil. 
Ijtihad: literally means to struggle to obtain an objective. Is the process of achieving an 
Islamic legal decision through independent reasoning and interpretation of the 
sacred Islamic sources. The opposite is taqlid, which means following precedent 
or existing practice without questioning it. The person who has the scholarly 
credentials to conduct ijtihad is called a mujtahid.  
Islamisation: shariatisation with broader societal and economical contexts.  
Jahiliyyah: refers to a new period of ignorance within contemporary Muslim societies, a 
time akin to the pre-Islamic period of Arabian paganism when the community 
was ignorant of God and his commandments 
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Jihad: literally (Arabic) making efforts or struggle. The term has been used technically 
to describe any armed struggle by Muslims to defend or advance Islam against 
any threats or against its enemies  
Jihadis: Muslim militants who believe in jihad as a religious responsibility. Recently, 
this term has been associated with contemporary Islamists who adopt violence 
for achieving their political ends, often within transnational context.  
Jihadi Salafis: The jihadists who are ideologically framed by Salafism movement. 
Kufr/ kafirs/ 
tekfiris: 
kafir, tekfir, and tekfiri are Arabic terms for apostasy, heretic, person who 
declares others heretics, respectively.    
Maslaha: common good, which within Islamic jurisprudence means the common good; 
that might not be covered by particular evidence from Quran and Sunna. 
Maslahah 
moursaleh: 
(see maslaha) 
Maqasid a-sharia: Objectives and aims of sharia, within the approach of Islamic Laws philosophy. 
Maqasidis: the scholars and promoters of maqasid a-sharia. 
Mujahid al-akbar: the greatest jihadi. The term used by Bourguiba refers to the hadiths regarding 
the greater jihad, which means struggle against one’s inner temptations, as 
opposed to ‘lesser jihad’, which connotes armed struggle. 
Muhammasheen: disenfranchised.  
Sahabah: companions of the Prophet Mohamed, who usually regarded as the most 
righteous generation in Sunni Islam. 
Salafis/Salafism: members of Sunni puritanical movement of salafiyah (salafism). Salafis favour 
a return to a practice of the so called salif al-salih, the righteous ancestors or the 
original guided first three generations of Islam. Today, the Salafis are known for 
their strict literalist interpretation of Quran and Sunna. The Jihadi Salafis as 
well as Wahhabism are considered offspring of the historic Salafi movement. 
Sharia (also: shariaa, shariah, shari’aa): Islamic laws 
Shariatisation: the movement to restore sharia laws dominance over all aspects of life. 
Shura: literally (Arabic) consultation. Some scholars and modern Islamism have 
upgraded shura from a religious political moral value, to a decision making 
system, which might be able to synthesise Islam with representative democracy. 
Shuracracy: a term mixing between shura and democracy, first used by the late Algerian 
Islamist Mahfoud el-Nehneh during 1980s and forth. 
Sufis: Muslim mystics, who normally marginalise the political matters and secular 
affairs within Muslim societies. 
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Ummah: the global Muslim community. 
Ulamas: Islamic religious scholars, who often have the credentials of making ijtihad. 
Ulamas el sultan: derogatory term, meaning the ‘sell-out’ ulamas. 
Wahhabis: a modern Islamic puritanical doctrine of reform and renewal attributed to 
Muhammed ibn Abdul Wahhab (1703-87) who allied himself with the House of 
Saud. Today Wahhabism has served as the official ideology of the Saudi 
regime. 
Waqf: Islamic pious trust. 
Wilayet faqih: Guardianship of the juris consultation elite. This relatively modern concept 
within the Shia sect of Islam, establishes the authority of the faqih (the alim or 
scholar) or the top expert in fiqh (Jurisprudence) over religious as well as 
political matters. First developed by Ayatollah Khomeini in 1963 as a theory to 
breakthrough centuries of Shia political and scholarly stagnation. 
Zawiyas: shrines of Sufi legends, which have been high regarded by Sufi followers over 
centuries. 
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